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In establishing the National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America, you asked its advice on what would be 
appropriate elements of "a l ong-term United States policy that 
will best respond to the challenges of social , economic, and 
democratic developmerit in the region , and to internal and 
external threats to its security and stability. ~~ 
The analyses and recommendations in this report seek to 
respond to that request. However, as we studied the region and 
its problems -- its crisis -- we found that the long-term 
challenge also requires short-term actions. In many respects 
the crisis is so acute, and the time-frame for response so 
limited, that immediate responses are a necessary elemen~ of 
any long-ierm policy. Thus to some extent we have discussed 
both, though we have tried to place such short-term 
recommendations as we make within the framework of a 
longer-term approach. 
You also asked our advice on "means of building a national 
consensus on a comprehensive United States policy for the 
region." Our best advice on this is, I believe, embodied less 
in the specific language of the report than in its total 
message, which reflects the extraordinary experience of this 
Commission. Twelve members, of both political parties and of 
widely disparate views, studying the situation in Central 
America with intensity and :·dedication o ver a period of nearly 
six months, reached a degree of consensus at the end that I 
think few of us expected at the beginning. The lesson of this 
experience, I believe, is that the best route to consensus on 
U.S. policy toward Central America is by exposure to the 
realities of Central America. 
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On behalf of the members of the Commission, I wish to thank 
you for the opportunity you gave us to share this experience. 
We on the Commission hope that t his report will contribute to a 
wider recognition of the urgency of the crisis in Central 
America, and to a deeper understanding both of its dimensious 
and of the opportunity it provides for a united people to help 
our neighbors toward a better fu ture. 
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With great respect, we dedicate this report 
to the late Senator Henry M. Jackson, who 
proposed the cre~tion of a bipartisan 
commission on Central America and served as 
one of its Senior Counsellors. In his life 
and work Senator Jackson was devoted to the 
twin goals of national security and human 
betterment. These are also the goals that 
have guided this report, and we hope, in his 
spirit, that it will contribute to their 
advancement. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For the members of this Commission, these past several 
months have been an extraordinary learning experience which we 
feel uniquely privileged to have shared . 
In this report, we present an extensive set of concrete 
policy recommendations. But we also seek to share what we have 
learned with the people of the United States, and, based on 
what we have found, to suggest ways of thinking about Central 
America and its needs that may contribute to a more informed 
understanding in the future. 
We hope, at the same time, to com~unicate something else we 
developed as a result of this experience: a sense of urgency 
about Central America's crisis, of compassion for its people, 
but also -- cautiously -- of hope for its future. 
For most people in the United States, Central America has 
long been what the entire New World was to Europeans of five 
centuries ago: terra incognita. Probably few of even the most 
educated could name all the coun tries of Central America and 
their capitals, much less recite much of their political and 
social backgrounds. 
Most members of this Commission began with what we now see 
as an extremely limited understanding of the region, its needs 
and its importance. The more we learned, the more convinced we 
became that the crisis there is real, and acute; that the 
United States must act to meet it, and act boldly; that the 
stakes are large, for the United States, for the hemisphere, 
and, most poignantly, for the people of Central America. 
In this report, we propose significant attention and help 
to a previously neglected area of the hemisphere. Some, who 
have not studied the area as we have, may think this 
disproportionate, dismissing it as the natural reaction of a 
commission created to deal with a single subject. We think any 
such judgment would be a grave mistake. 
It is true that other parts of the world are troubled. 
Some of these, such as the Middle East, are genuinely in 
crisis. But the crisis in Central America makes a particularly 
urgent claim on the United States for several reasons. 
First, Central America is our near neighbor. Because of 
this, it critically involves our own security interests. But 
more than that, what happens on our doorstep calls to our 
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conscience. History, contiguity, consanguinity -- all these 
tie us to the rest of the Western Hemisphere; they also tie us 
very particularly to the nations of Central America. When 
Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed what he called his 11 Good Neighbor 
Policy, .. that was more than a phrase. It was a concept that 
goes to the heart of civilized relationships not only among 
people but also among nations. When our neighbors are in 
trouble, we cannot close our eyes and still be true to 
ourselves. 
Second, the crisis calls out to us because we can make a 
difference. Because the nations are small, because they are 
near, efforts that would be minor by the standards of other 
crises can have a large impact on this one. 
Third, whatever the short-term costs of acting now, they 
are far less than the long-term costs of not acting now. 
Fourth, a great power can choose what challenges to respond 
to, but it cannot choose where those challenges come -- or 
when. Nor can it avoid the necessity of deliberate choice. 
Once challenged, a decision not to respond is fully as 
consequential as a decision to respond. We are challenged now 
in Central America. No agony of indecision will make that 
challenge go away. No wishing it were easier will make it 
easier. 
Perhaps the United States should have paid more attention 
to Central America sooner. Perhaps, over the years, we should 
have intervened less, or intervened more, or intervened 
differently. But all these are questions of what might have 
been. What confronts us now is a question of what might 
become. Whatever its roots in the past, the crisis in Central 
America exists urgently in the present, and its successful 
resolution is vital to the future. 
How We Learned 
Before discussing what we learned, we believe it would be 
helpful to indicate something of how we learned. 
The Commission held 30 full days of regular meetings in 
Washington, plus another 12 special meetings. In all, we met 
in the United States with nearly 200 people who had something 
particular to contribute to our deliberations. These included 
President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, all three living 
former Presidents, four former Secretaries of State, members of 
Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an exceptionally wide 
range of organizational representatives and private individuals 
with knowledge of the region and of the kinds of problems 
encountered in the region. 
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During nine days of foreign travel six days in Central 
America, and three in Mexico and Venezuela -- we heard from 
more than 300 officials and other witnesses and briefers. On 
its trips abroad, the Commission met not only with heads of 
government, cabinet members and legislative leaders, but also 
with leaders of the political opposition, journalists, 
educators, business and labor leaders, military experts, church 
officials, Indian leaders, representatives of private 
organizations, experts on health and social services, 
economists, agronomists -- anyone who could broaden our outlook 
or deepen our understanding, including ordinary citizens from 
many walks of life. Similarly in this country, we sought the 
views of a wide variety of people and organizations, 
representing a wide variety of backgrounds and disciplines. 
We sent detailed questionnaires to 170 selected outside 
experts. More than 230 other individuals and groups provided 
written materials, many of them extensive, for the Commission's 
use. All members of the Commission participated in the 
selection of those solicited for their views. 
The entire operation amounted to an intensive seminar on 
Central America, conducted by what was probably the largest and 
most distinguished 11 faculty 11 on Central American issues ever 
assembled. Although we certainly did not become experts on the 
region in the same sense in which many of those we consulted 
are experts, we believe that we did become unusually 
well-informed laymen. And, in the process, we found that many 
of our perceptions changed. 
What we have tried to bring to this report is essentially 
that well-informed layman's perspective, as influenced by the 
particular combinations of experience and values that, as 
individuals, we brought to the Commission. We have sought to 
apply that experience·and those values to what we found in 
Central America, and to what we learned about Central America 
and the relationship between the crisis there and the larger 
world. 
What We Learned 
In the chapters that follow, we present our findings and 
recommendations in detail. 
Chapter 2 places the Central American crisis within its 
larger hemispheric context, with particular emphasis on the 
twin challenges of rescuing the hemisphere's troubled economies 
and establishing principles of political legitimacy. 
Chapter 3 places the crisis in historical perspective, 
tracing the background of the nations of Central America and 
t~e ways in which the crisis developed. 
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Chapter 4 examines the economic crisis in the region, and 
presents specific recommendations for measures that can be 
taken to meet it -- both emergency short-term measures and 
others for the medium and longer term, together with a means of 
ensuring that economic, political and social development go 
forward together. 
Chapter 5 focuses on what we call 11human development .. needs 
particularly in health and education -- and on what must and 
can be done to meet them. 
Chapter 6 explores the security dimensions of the crisis, 
including Soviet and Cuban involvement, the problems of 
guerrilla war, the situation as it is today, what can be done 
to meet it, and what we recommend that the United States do to 
help. 
Chapter 7 examines the diplomatic aspects, including routes 
which could be followed in seeking a negotiated solution. 
Certain common threads run through all the chapters. 
* First, the tortured history of Central America is such 
that neither the military nor the political nor the economic 
nor the social aspects of the crisis can be considered 
independently of the others. Unless rapid progress can be made 
on the political, economic and social fronts, peace on the 
military ~~ont will be elusive and would be fragile. But 
unless the 'ex:ternally-supported insurgencies are checked and 
the violence cu~ped, progress on those other fronts will be 
elusive and would b~ fragile. 
* Second, the root'S-, of the crisis are both indigenous and 
foreign. Discontents are 'r~al, and for much of the population 
conditions of life are miserable~ just as Nicaragua was ripe 
for revolution, so the conditions that invite revolution are 
present elsewhere in the region as well. But these conditions 
have been exploited by hostile outside forces -- specifically, 
by Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union and now operating through 
Nicaragua -- which will turn any revolution they capture into a 
totalitarian state, threatening the region and robbing the 
people of their hopes for liberty. 
* Third, indigenous reform, even indigenous revolution, is 
not a security threat to the United States. But the intrusion 
of aggressive outside powers exploiting local grievances to 
expand their own political influence and military control is a 
serious threat to the United States, and to the entire 
hemisphere. 
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* Fourth, we have a humanitarian interest in alleviating 
misery and helping the people of Central America meet their 
social and economic needs, and together with the other nations 
of the hemisphere we have a national interest in strengthening 
democratic institutions wherever in the hemisphere they are 
weak. 
* Fifth, Central America needs help, both material and 
moral, governmental and nongovernmental. Both the commands of 
conscience and calculations of our own national interest 
require that we give that help. 
* Sixth, ultimately, a solution of Central America's 
problems will depend on the Central Americans themselves. They 
need our help, but our help alone will not be enough. Internal 
reforms, outside assistance, bootstrap efforts, changed 
economic policies -- all are necessary, and all must be 
coordinated. And other nations with the capacity to do so not 
only in this hemisphere, but in Europe and Asia, should join in 
the effort. 
* Seventh, the crisis will not wait. There is no time to 
lose . 
No Room for Partisanship 
If there is no time to lose, neither is the crisis in 
Central America a matter which the country can afford to 
approach on a partisan basis. 
The people of Central America are neither Republicans nor 
Democrats. The crisis is nonpartisan, and it calls for a 
nonpartisan response. As a practical political matter, the 
best way to a nonpartisan policy is by a bipartisan route. 
This Commission is made up of Republicans and Democrats, 
nonpolitical private citizens and persons active in partisan 
politics. It has members from business and labor, the academic 
world, the world of private organizations, former members of 
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government: 
a former Senator and a former Governor, both Republicans: a 
Democratic Mayor and a former Democratic National Chairman: 
among the Senior Counsellors joining its deliberations have 
been members of both Houses of Congress from both parties. We 
are immensely grateful for the contribution made by those who 
served as Senior Counsellors, though we wish to point out that 
the conclusions we have drawn are those of the Commission 
itself and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Senior 
Counsellors. 
We have approached our deliberations in a nonpartisan 
spirit and in a bipartisan way, and we believe that the nation 
can and must do the same. 
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Because the Commission has twelve members, each with strong 
individual views, there obviously are many things in this 
report to which individual members would have assigned 
different weight, or which they would have interpreted somewhat 
differently or put differently. Such is the nature of 
commissions. But these differences were personal, not 
partisan. This report, on balance, does represent what all of 
us found to be a quite remarkable consensus, considering the 
often polarized and emotional nature of the debate that has 
surrounded Central America. Among ourselves, we found a much 
greater degree of consensus at the end of our odyssey than at 
the beginning. This in itself gives us hope that the nation, 
too, as it learns more about Central America, its crisis and 
its needs, will find its way to a united determination to take 
and support the kind of measures that we believe are needed in 
the interests of the United States and of the hemisphere, and 
for the sake of the sorely beleaguered people of Central 
America. 
Chapter 2 
A HEMISPHERE IN TRANSFORMATION 
The Commission has been asked to make recommendations on 
Central America. We recognize that our mandate has this 
geographic limit. But as we examined the isthmus it became 
apparent that the crisis which gave rise to this Commission is 
a part of a broader reality and that United States policy in 
Central America must reflect a clear understanding of its 
hemispheric framework. 
The hemisphere as a whole is in flux. Central America's 
difficulties are enmeshed in the Latin American experience, 
which is different from our own. 
Central America's present suffering is to an important 
degree the product of internal conditions which can also be 
found in Mexico and South America. Much of Latin America has 
an Indian heritage: most of it was colonized by Spain. In 
Central America, the mark of that experience has remained on 
attitudes, political processes and ways of doing things, as it 
has throughout the hemisphere to this day. The conflicts in 
the isthmus derive in part from social and economic structures 
whose origins, as in South America and Mexico, lie in the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The crisis in Central America is also partially the result 
of events and forces outside the region. The soaring costs of 
imported energy, the drop in world coffee, sugar and other 
commodity prices, recession in the developed world, the 
explosion of international interest rates, have undermined 
economic progress. International terrorism, imported 
revolutionary ideologies, the ambitions of the Soviet Union, 
and the example and engagement of a Marxist Cuba are 
threatening the hopes for political progress. 
Throughout history, the u.s. policies toward the nations of 
the Americas that have succeeded have been those that related 
the individuality and variety of the different countries to a 
concept of the hemisphere as a whole. The Monroe Doctrine, the 
Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin Roosevelt and the Alliance for 
Progress shared a recognition that despite the enormous 
differences among nations as ethnically, culturally, 
politically and historically diverse as, for example, Mexico, 
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Argentina, Peru and Brazil, there was a 
commonality of interest and experience calling not for 
uniformity but for coherence in our policies toward the many 
individual nations of Latin America. So it is today. The 
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response of the United States to the conflict in Central 
America must take appropriate account of these national 
differences, but at the same time must relate our interests to 
those of the entire hemisphere in a way that evokes a sense of 
common purpose. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
Commission to recommend policies for the entire hemisphere, we 
have framed our recommendations with this broader context in 
mind. 
The international purposes of the United States in the late 
twentieth century are cooperation, not hegemony or domination; 
partnership, not confrontation; a decent life for all, not 
exploitation. Those objectives must be achievable in this 
hemisphere if they can be realized anywhere. 
Despite our different origins, the United States shares 
much with Latin America. We not only share a hemisphere, we 
share a history as well. Columbus's voyage, five centuries 
ago, helped shatter the old order of Europe, and opened the way 
to a truly New World. 
we also share cultures, ideas and values. The colonial era 
and the overlapping of cultures have left in the u.s. South and 
West a permanent legacy of Spanish and Mexican architecture, 
customs, religion, law, patterns of land ownership, and place 
names. The idea of popular revolution to vindicate the right 
of people to govern themselves swept this part of the world 
first -- nearly simultaneously in its English and Latin regions 
-- a century and a half before the colonial empires of Africa 
and Asia began to disappear. Although North and South America 
followed different paths of national development, the nations 
of the Western Hemisphere have been moved from the beginning of 
their histories by a common devotion to freedom from foreign 
domination, sovereign equality, and the right of people to 
determine the forms and methods of their own governance. 
we also share economic interests. Of all u.s. private 
investment in the developing world, 62 percent is in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Latin America is a major trading 
partner of this country, accounting for more than 15 percent of 
our exports and about the same share of our imports. Our 
consumers and our industries depend on the region for coffee, 
iron, petroleum and a host of other goods. The Panama Canal is 
a vital artery of our international commer~e. The economies of 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela are among the most 
advanced and diversified in the developing world, and also 
among the most heavily burdened with debt. They are major 
contributors to world trade; the way that together we deal with 
their debt problems will be decisive for the future of the 
international financial system. 
We also share a community with Latin America. So many of 
our own citizens are of Latin origin that there is a special 
kinship in this hemisphere. The transcontinental sweep of the 
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southern United States that stretches from Miami to Los 
Angeles, and which is home to many of our fastest growing urban 
areas and high technology industries, regards as a natural 
element of life its shared Gulf and Caribbean sea routes as 
well as a 2,000 mile land border facing south. Common time 
zones and short distances facilitate flows of information and 
constant travel for business, education, pleasure and 
employment. 
The similarities should not be romanticized. Our historic 
experiences have not been the same. North America did not 
begin with an essentially feudal social structure, nor was 
military conquest as central to us as it was in Latin America's 
early history. The Iberian cultures planted different modes of 
thought, different attitudes. But despite these differences 
the Americas, North and South, have tried recurringly to shape 
a common destiny. The sense of interdependence and mutual 
reliance was manifest from the outset of the struggles for 
independence. It moved President Monroe to proclaim this 
hemisphere off limits to the territorial ambitions of European 
colonialism. That same sense of common destiny brought the 
Americas together in the first international organization for 
regional cooperation, the International Conference of American 
States in 1889-90. It led them some 60 years later to design 
-- under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro -- the first mutual 
security system recognized by the U.N. Charter and to organize 
history's boldest venture of region-wide development in the 
Alliance for Progress in 1961. 
We are aware that widespread ignorance about the area in 
this country is an obstacle, indeed a danger. We are also 
aware that our interests, our aspirations, and our capacity to 
grasp the essence of the complex reality of our age will be put 
to one of their most important tests in this hemisphere. This 
is the spirit with which we have approached our assignment of 
dealing with the prospects of a small but integral part of this 
hemisphere: Central America. 
TWO CHALLENGES 
The hemisphere is challenged both economically and 
politically. While that double challenge is common to all of 
Latin America, it now takes its most acute form in Central 
America. 
The Economic Challenge 
First, the commanding economic issue in all of Latin 
America is the impoverishment of its people. The nations of 
the hemisphere -- not least those of Central America --
advanced remarkably throughout the 1960's and 1970's. Growth 
was strong, though not nearly enough was done to close the gap 
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between the rich and the poor, the product of longstanding 
economic, social and political structures. 
But then the situation turned down. Imported energy costs 
went up in the 1970's, while commodities prices fell. The 
developed countries went into recession. Many Latin American 
governments responded by borrowing in the hope that an early 
revival would allow them to carry their newly expanded 
indebtedness. Instead, the cost of servicing that debt began 
to rise rapidly, as international interest rates -- spurred by 
anti-inflationary monetary policy in the u.s. -- shot upwards. 
The nations of Latin America -- including key countries in 
Central America -- were forced to alter course sharply, cutting 
public expenditures on schools, health services, and roads, 
restraining growth and personal incomes, slashing imports and 
raising taxes along with exchange rates. The consequence has 
been that standards of living, already low in comparison to the 
developed world and badly skewed, have been cut back across the 
board. 
What appears to the international financial system as a 
debt crisis has a profound l.uman dimension in the area of this 
Commission's primary concern, as it does throughout Latin 
America. Joblessness is up. Malnutrition and infant mortality 
have escalated. Poverty was pernicious in Latin America even 
during the growth years. Fifteen years ago, at the Conference 
in Medellin, Colombia, the Catholic Church spoke of the need 
for a •preferential option• to concentrate public policy and 
public effort on a social ethic of responsibility for the 
poor. That need is more pressing today. Poverty is on the 
rise everywhere in Latin America. 
No Central American policy for the United States worth its 
name can fail to meet this economic, social and financial 
challenge, nor can we deal with Central America in isolation 
from the rest of the hemisphere. The contraction of the 
hemisphere's economies, and the impoverishment of its people, 
must be reversed. Real gruwth must be restored. 
The Political Challenge 
Second, the political challenge in the hemisphere centers 
on the legitimacy of government. Once again, this takes a 
particularly acute form in Central America. 
Powerful forces are on the march in nearly every country of 
the hemisphere, testing how nations shall be organized and by 
what processes authority shall be established and legitimized. 
Who shall govern and under what forms are the central issues in 
the process of change now under way in country after country 
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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Brazil is in mid-political passage, from almost two decades 
of military rule to popular elections of a civilian chief 
executive, an independent legislature, civilian ministries and 
a multi-party political system. 
Argentina has elected its first civilian president in 
years, restoring democracy and civilian control of government. 
Ecuador ended military rule and elected its own civilian 
president in 1979: Peru did the same in 1980. In the Dominican 
Republic, free and uncorrupted elections have become the rule. 
Venezuela's own democracy remains vigorous, as was evident in 
its elections of December 1983, in which 92 percent of the 
eligible voters participated. Colombia's democracy is equally 
strong. In fact, only a handful of nations in Latin America 
today are ruled through poli~ical systems closed to the 
prospects of elections. 
In short, democracy is becoming the rule rather than the 
exception. The nations of Central America are also, each in 
its own fashion, engaged in a struggle over how a nation shall 
be governed. Panama expects to elect a civilian president next 
year in an open and fair process. Costa Rica made its choice 
years ago and is living under an authentic democratic system --
and it is no accident that Costa Rica is the least violent 
society, the nation of the region most free of repression and 
the one whose relations with the United States are most 
particularly warm. Honduras has held a free election, choosing 
a civilian president with a strong reputation for impressive 
leadership. Guatemala is attempting to arrange an election for 
a Constituent Assembly this year. El Salvador is in 
transition: its present provisional administration is the 
result of a demonstration of popular will in 1982. In March 
1984 it will elect a president under a permanent constitution. 
Of the nations in the region, only the Sandinista leadership in 
Nicaragua, perhaps intending to imitate the political 
arrangements in Cuba, has been ambiguous about -- if not 
hostile to -- what would be accepted by the international 
community as open, multi-party political contests. But even 
the Sandinistas face strong demands from both inside and 
outside the nation, especially from nearby democratic countries 
such as Venezuela and Costa Rica, that they return to the 
ideals of the democratic revolution against Somoza and keep 
their promise of free elections made in 1979 to the 
Organization of America States. 
Experience has destroyed the argument of the old dictators 
that a strong hand is essential to avoid anarchy and communism, 
and that order and progress can be achieved only through 
authoritarianism. Those nations in Latin America which have 
been moving to open their political, social and economic 
structures and which have employed honest and open elections 
have been marked by a stability astonishing in the light of the 
misery which still afflicts the hemisphere. The modern 
experience of Latin America suggests that order is more often 
432-785 0 - 84 - 2 
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threatened when people have no voice in their own destinies. 
social peace is more likely in societies where political 
justice is founded on self-determination and protected by 
formal guarantees. 
The issue is not what particular system a nation might 
choose when it votes. The issue is rather that nations should 
choose for themselves, free of outside pressure, force or 
threat. There is room in the hemisphere for differing forms of 
governance and different political economies. Authentically 
indigenous changes, and even indigenous revolutions, are not 
incompatible with international harmony in the Americas. They 
are not incompatible even with the mutual security of the 
members of the inter-American system -- if they are truly 
indigenous. The United States can have no quarrel with 
democratic decisions, as long as they are not the result of 
foreign pressure and external machinations. The Soviet-Cuban 
thrust to make Central America part of their geostrategic 
challenge is what has turned the struggle in Central America 
into a security and political problem for the United States and 
for the hemisphere. 
There is no self-determination when there is foreign 
compulsion or when nations make themselves tools of a strategy 
designed in other continents. 
THREE PRINCIPLES 
For most of the first 200 years of its history, the United 
States turned its eyes primarily towards Europe. Tradition, 
trans-Atlantic alliances, cultural ties, even the physical 
location of the Eastern centers of power focused attention in 
this country on relations with such nations as Britain, France, 
Italy and Germany. For the United States, the Atlantic 
Alliance has been the central strategic relationship. 
In the years since World War II, as Asia emerged as a 
center of both political conflict and economic power, the 
United States began to look westward -- fighting two Asian 
wars, forging Asian ties, strengthening its role as a Pacific 
power. Through all this time, whether looking east or west, 
the United States focused its attention only intermittently on 
the South. 
As a result, the ties that bind this nation to Latin 
America have rarely been expressed in American foreign policy 
as firmly and consistently as the reality of our 
interdependence demands. We have tended to view the region 
superficially, too often stereotypically; our policy has 
sometimes swung erratically between the obsessive and the 
negligent. The 1980's must be the decade in which the United 
States recognizes that its relationships with Mexico and 
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Central and south America rank in importance with its ties to 
Europe and Asia. 
And we require a design to express that interest. The 
Monroe Doctrine has sometimes been challenged by our neighbors 
to the south -- especially in some of its unilateral · 
interpretations. But they have never questioned its central 
inspiration: the vision of a hemi~~here united by a core of 
common commitment to independence and liberty, insulated from 
other quarrels, free to work out its own destiny in its own 
way, yet ready to play as constructive a role in world affairs 
as its resources might permit. 
In any event, the challenges of today are not the 
challenges of 1823. A contemporary doctrine of U.S.-Latin 
American relations cannot rest on insulating the hemisphere 
from foreign influence. It must also respond in an affirmative 
way to the economic and political challenges in the hemisphere; 
u.s. policy must respect the diversities among the nations of 
America even while advancing their common interests. 
Three principles should, in the Commission's view, guide 
hemispheric relations; we have sought to apply them to our 
considerations of Central America. 
The first principle is democratic self-determination. 
The vitality of the Inter-American system lies now more 
than ever before in accepting a firm commitment of its member 
nations to political pluralism, freedom of expression, respect 
for human rights, the maintenance of an inde·penderrt and 
effective system of justice and the right of people to choose 
their destiny in free elections without repression, coercion or 
foreign manipulation. The essence of our effort together must 
be the legitimation of governments by free consent -- the 
rejection of violence and murder as political instruments, of 
the imposition of authority from above, the use of the power of 
the state to suppress opposition and dissent. Instead we must 
do all we can to nurture democracy in this hemisphere. 
The second principle is encouragement of economic and 
social deve l opment that f a i r l y benefits all. 
The encroachments of poverty must be stopped, recession 
reversed, and prosperity advanced. Adherence to this principle 
involves something deeper than meeting a short-term emergency. 
It means laying the basis for sustained and broadbased economic 
growth. There must be encouragement of those incentives that 
liberate and energize a free economy. There must be an end to 
the callous proposition that some groups will be "have-nots• 
forever. Any set of policies for the hemisphere must address 
the need to expand the economies of its nations and revive the 
hopes of its people. 
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The third principle is cooperation in meeting threats to 
the security of the region. 
The present international framework for dealing with 
challenges to the mutual security of the Americas is weak. 
With respect to Central America, the Inter-American system has 
failed to yield a coordinated response to the threat of 
subversion and the use of Soviet and Cuban proxies, which have 
become endemic since the day when the instruments of 
Inter-American cooperation were first drawn up. 
A modernizing of the regional security system is 
imperative. Just as there can be no real security without 
economic growth and social justice, so there can be no 
prosperity without security. The Soviet and Cuban threat is 
real. No nation is immune from terrorism and the threat of 
armed revolution supported by Moscow and Havana with imported 
arms and imported ideology. The nations of Latin America --
and of each of its regions, as is being demonstrated in Central 
America -- have authentic local collective security interests. 
These should be expressed in new mechanisms for regional 
cooperation and consultation, and in a commitment to common 
action in defense of democracy adapted to the special 
circumstances and interests of the nations affected. Otherwise 
the temptations of unilateralism will become overwhelming. 
In the past, other parts of the hemisphere have been the 
focal points of turbulence. Today•s concentration of crises is 
in Central America. The chapters that follow focus on that 
region, and set forth the specific political, economic and 
security measures which the Commission believes are necessary. 
We see no way to avoid a comprehensive effort to respond to 
these issues together. The remainder of this report sets forth 
the ways in which this Commission believes a consistent 
economic, political and security effort, one which coordinates 
the best efforts of the people in Central America, its 
neighbors, and the United States, can be maintained. The way 
in which that combination of crises is addressed -- or any 
failure to address it with both the urgency and the 
comprehensiveness it requires -- will profoundly affect not 
only our national interest but the larger interests of the 
hemisphere as well. 
Chapter 3 
CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Central America is gripped today by a profound crisis. 
That crisis has roots deep in the region's history, but it also 
contains elements of very recent origin. An understanding of 
it requires some familiarity with both. 
The impact of the 
has been shattering. 
on the United States, 
far-reaching. 
crisis on the people of Central America 
Its potential impact on the hemisphere, 
and, in a larger sense, on the world, is 
If this crisis were a purely local matter, involving the 
peoples of that region alone, it would still deserve the urgent 
attention of the people of the United States as a matter of 
simple humanity. Its larger dimensions give us, in addition, 
strong reasons of national self-interest to be acutely 
concerned about its outcome. 
There has been considerable controversy, sometimes 
vigorous, as to whether the basic causes of the crisis are 
indigenous or foreign. In fact, the crisis is the product of 
both indigenous and foreign factors. It has sources deep in 
the tortured history and life of the region, but it has also 
been powerfully shaped by external forces. Poverty, 
repression, inequity, all were there, breeding fear and hate; 
stirring in a world recession created a potent witch's brew, 
while outside forces have intervened to exacerbate the area's 
troubles and to exploit its anguish. 
Those outside forces have given the crisis more than a 
Central American dimension. The United States is not 
threatened by indigenous change, even revolutionary change, in 
Central America. But the United States must be concerned by 
the intrusion into Central America of aggressive external 
powers. 
In this chapter, we will explore the origins of the crisis 
and try to define its present nature. This requires a brief 
excursion into the region's history. That history is complex 
and in some respects controversial. We neither attempt nor 
pretend to present a comprehensive, definitive treatment of 
it. Rather, our aim is to give enough background to place the 
crisis in perspective, and to trace through certain trends that 
are important to any consideration of prospects and policies 
for the future. 
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This chapter deals principally with the five nations of the 
Organization of Central American States: El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Costa Rica. A sixth 
country, Belize, is geographically within Central America but 
its political, economic and cultural ties are primarily with 
the Caribbean. A seventh, Panama, is affected by the regional 
crisis but emerged in a different historical context. The term 
•central America• tends to be rather loosely and variously 
defined -- sometimes as the five, sometimes as the seven, 
sometimes rather vaguely to include other contiguous parts of 
North and South America. In this report, we will generally 
include the seven for purposes of economic and social programs, 
while focusing our discussion of the security and diplomatic 
crises on the five. With respect to the latter, we follow the 
usage employed by the so-called Contadora Group (Mexico, 
Venezuela, Panama and Colombia), which is assisting in the 
effort to resolve the conflicts within and among the five. 
The Land 
A bridge linking two continents, the Central American 
isthmus winds in a serpentine arc between the Pacific Ocean and 
Caribbean Sea, stretching 1500 miles from the base of the 
Yucatan Peninsula to the Colombian border. It is dominated by 
an imposing range of volcanic mountains, whose rugged patterns 
have presented obstacles to commerce, communications, and 
cultivation. The mountains are punctuated by breaks in Panama, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua that have tantalized travellers and 
entrepreneurs with visions of a trans-oceanic passage. The 
mountains, where at altitudes from 3,000 to 8,000 feet the bulk 
of the Central American population lives, provide a 
spring-like, salubrious climate that contrasts with the 
pestilential rain forest, bush jungles, and swampy marshlands 
of the two coasts. 
Central America is located geographically in a high-risk 
area. Three tectonic plates meet along the isthmus, pushing 
against each other relentlessly and creating several major and 
hundreds of minor geological faults. Earthquakes, which occur 
with alarming frequency, have destroyed cities, disrupted 
commerce, created human misery, and even altered political 
history. Lava flows and pollution have similarly wreaked havoc 
on town and farm. The Caribbean coast is in the hurricane 
belt, where high winds and rains have regularly wiped out 
settlements and set back efforts at tropical cultivation. The 
coming of rainfall in a single season between June and November 
is frequently followed by long droughts, presenting monumental 
problems to agriculture, navigation, and road travel. 
-17-
The Colonial Legacy 
Both conquest and the colonial experience left marks on 
Central America that have greatly hindered political and 
economic development. Except in a few areas, the Spanish 
conquerors imposed on the Indian peoples a semi-feudal system 
based on large land holdings and the exploitation of indigenous 
labor. These patterns persisted from generation to generation 
into our day, with wealth, education, and political power 
continuing to be shared unequally between the descendents of 
the conquerors and those of the conquered. 
The modern history of Central America traces back to a 
•Kingdom of Guatemala,• which gradually emerged in the middle of 
the sixteenth century. It was a product of synthesis, growing 
out of a struggle b~tween rival Spanish conquistadores from the 
vice royalties of Peru and •New Spain,• as Mexico was then 
called. One audiencia (judiciary/legislature) was established 
in Panama under Peruvian auspices, and another was established 
in Guatemala, nominally subservient to Mexico, encompassing the 
present-day countries of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador plus the Mexican state of Chiapas. 
During the three centuries of Spanish colonial rule, 
roughly from the 1520's to the 1820's, Central America's 
political system was authoritarian; the economy was 
exploitative and mercantilist; the society was elitist, 
hierarchical and made up essentially of but two sharply 
distinct classes; and both the Church and the educational 
system reinforced the patterns of authoritarianism. Nor did 
the colonial period ever provide much training in 
self-governance; the large indigenous populations were never 
integrated into the political life of the colonies. 
There were variations up and down the isthmus, however. 
Guatemala had the most gold and silver for the Spaniards to 
take and the most Indians to exploit. Hence the impact of the 
Spanish colonial system was strongest in that country, leaving 
a legacy of political and social structures particularly 
resistant to change. Panama and Costa Rica, with small 
indigenous populations, little gold or silver, and located far 
from the main centers of Spanish rule, felt the Spanish 
colonial impact the least. El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua occupied intermediate positions. 
Independence and After 
Independence from Spain brought a fragmentation of 
political authority but otherwise little to alter the social 
institutions and practices of three centuries. The five 
nations began independent life in 1823 as one: the United 
Provinces of Central America. From the outset civil wars 
disrupted the effort to consolidate a central government. Just 
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15 years later the union dissolved and the five went their 
separate ways. The isthmus became a region of what some have 
called city-states: small countries weak and vulnerable to 
outside forces, and with reduced possibility for economic 
growth and diversification. Professor Ralph Lee Woodward's 
widely read history of the area bears the title Central 
America , a Nation Divided. 
Political independence brought with it no accompanying 
social or economic revolution. The new Central American 
nations retained important characteristics established in the 
colonial era: 
* Economies based on plantation agriculture. 
* A concentration of large land holdings in a few hands 
(except for Costa Rica). 
* Societies lacking vigorous middle classes and dominated 
by the landowning elites (again, except in Costa Rica). 
* Poor communications within the region and relative 
isolation from the outside world. 
* Habits of authoritarian government. 
* Ingrained reliance on centralized state jurisdiction and 
tolerance of corruption. 
Politically, the five nations called themselves republics 
and adopted constitutions modeled in many respects on the u.s. 
Constitution of 1787 and on the liberal Spanish constitution of 
1812. The resulting governments had presidential and electoral 
systems resembling those of the United States. But the 
substance was very different. Judicial traditions based on the 
Roman civil law served primarily to facilitate state control 
rather than as a bulwark of individual rights. The 
difficulties that arose from trying to reconcile two systems, 
one political and the other legal, with distinctly different 
foundations are still apparent in Central America today. 
The first 30 years of independent life were chaotic for the 
five republics. As elsewhere in Spanish America, political 
parties labeled as wLiberal• and •conservative• battled over 
the role of the state and church-state relations. Local 
leaders -- caudillos -- at the head of armed bands contended 
for power. Disorder and violent conflict afflicted the 
region. Central America had repudiated its colonial 
institutions, yet it had not begun to develop free institutions 
to replace them. 
From the 1850's to the 1880's, after the first generation 
of men-en-horseback had died off, some order was brought out of 
the chaos. The •Liberal• parties, with their strong commitment 
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to commerce, came to power all across Central America, and for 
the most part they succeeded in establishing stable 
governments. But in this climate of greater order the 
landholding elites began to reconsolidate their power, while 
governments remained autocratic, generally under a single 
dictatorial leader. 
Rule by Oligarchy 
The period 1890-1930 was the heyday of oligarchic rule in 
Central America. In addition to the older landed oligarchy, a 
commercial import/export class had arisen. A coffee boom that 
began in Costa Rica in the 1870's transformed the export 
economies of Central America, providing substantial new 
wealth. Middle classes began to develop. Unwritten rules were 
established enabling the elites -- whether military or civilian 
or, more usually, a combination of the two-- to rotate or 
alternate in office. Military forces, which had largely been 
bands of irregulars in the service of powerful individuals, 
began to come under central authority and to develop into 
regular armies. This provided an important new avenue of 
upward mobility for ambitious young men, and transformed the 
politics of the region as the armies increasingly grew into 
autonomous institutions. 
All these changes occurred under oligarchic auspices except 
in Costa Rica, which built upon its earlier democratic roots. 
Thus when the depression of the 1930's precipitated political 
and economic convulsions, Central America had no political 
infrastructure -- parties, regular elections, representative 
institutions -- out of which democracy could emerge. 
By the first decades of the twentieth century, common 
characteristics in the economic development of the five 
republics had become apparent. The cultivation of a few basic 
agricultural crops for export -- coffee, bananas and sugar --
dominated their economies. Particularly after the coffee boom 
of the 1870's, plantations producing for export encroached on 
subsistence farming. A dual agricultural system emerged: 
large plantations for export crops~ small plots to raise food. 
This reinforced the social divisions inherited from the 
colonial period. The bulk of the population survived on 
seasonal plantation labor at minimal wages, and on subsistence 
agriculture. A small group of families controlling the most 
productive land constituted the dominant elite. 
Export-oriented growth generated pockets of modernization and 
higher living standards in the urban areas. But the middle 
classes remained weak. 
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Stirrings of Change 
The period of the 1930's was terribly disruptive in Cenfra:l 
America. As the bottom dropped out of the market for Central 
America's products, a wave of instability swept the region; for 
the first time traditional oligarchic rule came under serious 
challenge. In El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua 
new dictators appeared. While they typically ruled with 
strong-arm methods, they also often represented previously 
excluded middle classes. Having restored order, these 
dictators encouraged some economic development and social 
modernization, and they enjoyed a degree of popularity -- at 
least for a time. 
By this point, two main political traditions were operating 
in Central America -- and an emerging third one. 
First, there was the old authoritarian tradition. This 
historically dominant force still drew considerable strength 
from the difficulty of establishing democratic forms in the 
fragmented, violent, disintegrative context of Central America. 
Second, there was a democratic tradition enshrined in 
political constitutions but of only marginal importance in 
practice. The democratic preference did emerge from time to 
time (in Guatemala in 1944, Honduras in 1957, El Salvador in 
1972), but it lacked the practical roots democracy has had in 
the United States and elsewhere in the West. Except in Costa 
Rica, it was not institutionalized in the form of political 
parties and workable representative structures. 
The third strain -- socialism -- also appeared in a variety 
of forms in Central America amid the turmoil of the 1930's and 
has remained present ever since, frequently mixed into both 
democratic (as in costa Rica) and Marxist or even communist 
elements. 
The problem for Central America was to devise a political 
formula capable of dealing with these diverse tendencies, none 
of which could command absolute majority support, and each of 
which was unacceptable to at least some of the main contenders 
for power in these societies. 
Only in Costa Rica was the final formula democratic. After 
a brief but decisive civil war in 1948, regular elections have 
since led to periodic rotation in power by the two dominant 
groups. 
Elsewhere, efforts were made to combine or reconcile the 
traditional and the liberal orientations, and at times even to 
hint at the socialist one. 
In Nicaragua, for example, after the death of Anastasio 
Somoza Garcia (1896-1956), his elder son Luis made various 
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attempts to relax the harsher aspects of the old 
authoritarianism -- to allow a greater sense of pluralism and 
freedom. In Honduras, military and civilian parties rotated in 
office or else ruled jointly in an arrangement whereby military 
officers controlled security matters and acted as political 
arbiters, while the civilian elites managed the economy, held 
key cabinet positions, and staffed the bureaucracy. In 
Guatemala, after the United States helped bring about the fall 
of the Arbenz government in 1954, politics became more 
divisive, violent and polarized than in the neighboring 
states. But even there, there were efforts to combine civilian 
and militaiy rule, or to alternate between them, in various 
shaky and uneasy blends. 
In El Salvador a similar system operated from 1958 to 
1972. There, a group of younger, more nationalistic officers 
came to power and pursued populist strategies. They allowed 
the major trade union organizations to grow and to have a 
measure of political participation. Th~ Army created its own 
political party, modeled after the Mexican PRI. It held 
elections regularly, in which the official candidates generally 
won; on the other hand, through a system of corporate 
representation within the party, most major groups had some say 
in national affairs. 
None of these regimes was truly democratic, but the trend 
seemed to favor the growth of centrist political forces and to 
be leading toward greater pluralism and more representative 
political orders. This trend gave hope for peaceful 
accommodations and realistic responses to the profound social 
changes occurring in the countries of Central America. 
Political Retrogression 
The trend of the 1960's toward more open political systems 
was reversed during the 1970's. Whereas in Honduras the 
military sponsored moderate reform and prepared the country for 
a return to democracy, a period of closed political systems, 
repression and intransigence began in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and 
El Salvador. In each of these three countries, resistance to 
change on the part of the dominant military and civilian groups 
became stronger as demands for a larger share of national 
income, increased social services and greater political 
participation spread from the middle class to the masses of the 
urban and rural poor. The armed forces tightened their control 
over the day-to-day"activities of government and more harshly 
repressed perceived challenges to their power from trade union 
or political movements. 
In Nicaragua, the political opening that 
promised in the 1960's was now closed off by 
son, Anastasio, Jr., who took power in 1966. 
characterized by greed and corruption so far 
had seemed to be 
Somoza's second 
His rule was 
beyond even the 
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levels of the past that it might well be called a kleptocracy~ 
it included a brazen reaping of immense private profits from 
international relief efforts following the devastating 
earthquake of 1972. And as opposition to his regime increased, 
repression became systematic and increasingly pervasive. 
In Guatemala, the more or less centrist civilian and 
military governments of the 1960's gave way in the 1970's to a 
succession of extremely repressive regimes. The 
administrations of General Eugenio Laugerud and General 
Fernando Romero Lucas were among the most repressive either in 
the recent history of the hemisphere or in Guatemala's own 
often bloody past. Possibilities for accommodation, 
assimilation, and further democratization thus faded. 
In El Salvador, the pattern was similar. Military-based 
regimes that had been moderately progressive in the early 
1960's had become corrupt and repressive by the 1970's. The 
annulment of the victory by civilian Christian Democratic 
candidate Jose Napoleon Duarte in the 1972 election ushered in 
a period of severely repressive rule. It was in this context, 
with its striking parallels to the developments in Nicaragua 
and Guatemala, that the present crisis in El Salvador began. 
It is no accident that these three countries -- El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua -- are precisely where the 
crisis for u.s. policy is centered. While there were of course 
significant national variations, all three went through a 
roughly parallel process in which a trend toward more open, 
pluralistic, and democratic societies gave way to oppression 
and polarization, precipitating the crisis which has now spread 
throughout Central America. 
Modernization and Poverty: The Economic Background of the Crisis 
The economic developments of the post-war period --
modernization, rising expectations, persisting poverty, and 
ultimately the economic shock of the late 1970's -- also helped 
set the stage for the present crisis. 
The period between the coming of World War II and the early 
1970's was one of sustained growth. War and the post-war boom 
in the developed world revived the international markets for 
Central America's commodity exports. By the middle of this 
century many Central Americans had come to realize that some 
form of common action by the five might help to overcome the 
obstacles to modernization and development created by history 
and small national size. 
The idea of union had never quite died in Central America. 
It was therefore natural enough that the post-war experience in 
Europe and the maxims of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) under Raul Prebisch focused Central America's 
attention in the 1950's on the possibility of economic unity. 
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On December 13, 1960, representatives of the five republics 
meeting in Managua signed the General Treaty for Central 
American Integration, leading to the establishment of the 
Central American Common Market. 
The Common Market inspired a surge of energy and optimism 
throughout the region. Manufacturing for import substitution 
produced significant industrialization, particularly in 
Guatemala and El Salvador. Intra-regional trade grew from only 
$33 million in 1960 to over $1 billion in 1980, a proportional 
increase two and a half times greater than the growth in world 
trade during these decades. New regional institutions, such as 
the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and the 
Central American Economic Council, held out the promise of 
region-wide growth and development based on close cooperation 
among the five nations. 
The Common Market, along with the external resources 
provided under the Alliance for Progress, made a substantial 
contribution to what the ECLA has described as a "sustained 
dynamism" in the region•s economy in the 196o•s. Generally 
favorable and stable international prices for Central America•s 
export commodities also contributed to this dynamic economic 
growth. The region•s exports went up dramatically, rising from 
$250 million in 1950 to $3.2 billion in 1978. Gross domestic 
product in the region increased at a rate of 5.3 percent per 
year in real terms between 1950 and 1978. Incomes calculated 
on a per capita basis rose at rates all the more impressive 
because they were accompanied by population growth with few 
parallels in the world. The five republics had a population of 
less than eight million in 1950, and of more than 20 million by 
the end of the 197o•s. Yet between those years real per capita 
income doubled. 
Post-war growth brought a sharp increase in urbanizaton. 
Capital cities doubled their share of the total population. 
New highways and port facilities were built. Telephone and 
electric systems were expanded. More people got access to 
radio and television. Advances were made in health and 
education. Old centers of social power such as the armed 
forces and the Roman Catholic Church lost some of their 
homogeneity in the face of new ideological currents. Central 
American societies became more complex. New middle groups 
emerged, especially in the mushrooming cities, but the gulf 
between the rich and the mass of the very poor remained. 
Although some benefitted from social change and economic 
growth in those decades, many others benefitted little or not 
at all. In ECLA 1 s judgment -- and the other experts the 
Commission consulted on this point were in virtually unanimous 
agreement - "the fruits of the long period of economic 
expansion were distributed in a flagrantly ~nequitable 
manner." Thus, as an example, iri El Salvador in 1980, 66 
percent of the national income went to the richest 20 percent 
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of the population, 2 percent went to the poorest 20 percent. 
According to ECLA's data, over 60 percent of the region's 
population was living in poverty, over 40 percent in ••extreme 
poverty... The real incomes of poor families in Guatemala were 
actually lower in 1980 than in 1970. 
While measures of absolute poverty are inevitably arbitrary 
and subject to considerable margins of error, studies show that 
in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua during the 
1970's about half of the urban population and three-quarters of 
the rural population could not satisfy their basic needs in 
terms of nutrition, housing, health, and education. The 
population explosion magnified the problem of inequitable 
distribution of national income. As we have seen, the number 
of Central Americans almost tripled in 30 years. The World 
Bank projects a further increase in the region's population to 
38 million by the end of the century. Except in Costa Rica, 
rapid urbanization and population growth overwhelmed the 
limited resources that governments were prepared to devote to 
social services -- or that private organizations could 
provide. This was true in all fields -- education, health, 
housing, and nutrition. 
In short, the eqonomic growth of the 60's and 70's did not 
resolve the region's underlying social problems. About 60 
percent of the populations of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua (before the revolution) remained illiterate. Ten 
of every one hundred babies born died before the age of five, 
and, according to reliable nutritionists, 52 percent of the 
children were malnourished. Somewhere between four and five 
million people in the region were unemployed or underemployed. 
They and their families were often living on the edge of 
starvation. 
The international economic crisis that developed in the 
late 1970's worsened the situation dramatically. World 
inflation, including the second steep jump in international 
petroleum prices in the decade, hit the five countries hard. 
(Only Guatemala among them has any domestic oil production of 
its own.) At the same time, the escalation in international 
interest rates drove up the annual cost of servicing e~ternal 
debt, a particularly stringent circumstance for democratic 
Costa Rica. Economic stagnation in the developed world also 
had a marked impact on Central American economies, which are 
especially vulnerable to the volatility of commodity prices. 
As a consequence of these factors, the region's exports now buy 
30 percent less in imports than they did five years ago. By 
contrast, oil-importing developing countries as a group 
worldwide increased their export purchasing by more than 7 
percent during this period. 
The economic collapse of the late 1970's, coming as it did 
after a period of relatively sustained growth, shattered the 
rising hopes of Central Americans for a better life. Though 
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the period of modernization by no means lifted most Central 
Americans out of poverty, it did arouse expectations that the 
quality of life would improve. The frustration of these 
expectations, along with the disappointment of efforts to bring 
about political change in the region, thus offered fertile 
opportunities for those both in the region and outside of it 
who wished to exploit the crisis for their own advantage. 
The Growth of Communist Insurgency 
By 1979, in terms of modern military capabilities Cuba had 
become perhaps the strongest power in the Western Hemisphere 
south of the United States. It was also the country best 
prepared and most eager to exploit the intensifying crisis in 
Central America. 
During the preceding two decades, the Cuban revolution had 
already had a major effect in Central America. Castro•s 
successful insurgency was studied eagerly in the universities, 
where the attraction of revolutionary Marxism was already 
strong. Castroism was initially seen as a dynamic deviation 
from the mainstream Soviet-sponsored communist movements, and 
it spawned would-be revolutionary groups in all the countries 
of the isthmus. 
The influence of Castroism also produced schisms in the 
small Moscow-linked parties of the region. They mostly held to 
the orthodox view that, in the conditions then prevailing, 
armed insurgency was an unworkable strategy. But during the 
197o•s, as political and economic conditions worsened, that 
view came under increasing challenge. At the same time, 
conservatives and the military were frightened by the Cuban 
revolution into hardening their attitudes toward political 
change. 
In the early years, the major Cuban effort to export 
revolution to Central America occurred in Guatemala. There, 
Castro gave support to an armed insurgency that began in 1960. 
Though the Soviet Union was relatively inactive after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, Castro provided arms, financing and training to 
the MR-13 guerrilla movement and later to the rival Armed 
Forces of Revolution (FAR). This was not an isolated tactic. 
Cuba was following the same practice in this period with 
similar movements in Venezuela, Colombia and Peru. Indeed, it 
was the discovery of Cuban arms landed in Venezuela which 
resulted in the OAS decision to require the other members to 
cut trade and diplomatic ties. 
The Guatemalan Army•s successful counter-insurgency 
campaigns, Castro•s increasing disappointment over the 
factional infighting of the Guatemalan guerrillas, and his 
disillusionment with the effort generally to export revolution 
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to Latin America (climaxed by Che Guevara's defeat and death in 
Bolivia), greatly reduced the guerrilla threat in Guatemala by 
1968. 
In the succeeding years, and after Castro's decision to 
support the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Cubans seemed to 
adopt the soviet strategy of attempting to fashion normal 
diplomatic and commercial relations with a variety of 
governments in the hemisphere, while downplaying the 
revolutionary mission. Diplomatic ties were established with 
such leading countries as Argentina, Peru, Chile (before 
Allende's fall), Venezuela and Colombia. Contacts were opened 
with the United states and, in 1975, the u.s. cooperated in the 
OAS to eliminate the mandatory nature of that organization's 
sanctions against Cuba. Castro's venture into Angola put an 
end for a time to the u.s. effort to establish a basis for 
understanding with Cuba. But negotiations resumed two years 
later and led to the opening of diplomatic offices ("interest 
sections") in the two capitals. However, widening Cuban 
military involvement in Africa and Castro's unwillingness to 
discuss the question of Cuba's foreign interventions prevented 
further movement toward normalization of relations. 
In 1978 Castro disappointed those who thought he had 
abandoned the export of revolution in this hemisphere. He saw 
new opportunities. Guerrillas were once again in the field in 
Guatemala; the elements of a promising insurgency were present 
in El Salvador; and, above all, a particularly inviting 
situation presented itself in Nicaragua where the Somoza 
dictatorship was beginning to crumble. The United States was 
still suffering the after-effects of Vietnam and Watergate. At 
the same time, Castro's soviet patrons, who had not actively 
supported the armed struggle during the 1960's, were coming 
around to his view that the time for guerrilla war in Central 
America had arrived. 
Their conversion to the doctrine of armed violence became 
complete with the collapse of Somoza in Nicaragua. Although 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, and other Latin American 
countries assisted the revolutionaries in Nicaragua, and 
although the refusal of the u.s. to supply arms helped 
precipitate Somoza's _fall, Cuban support was a particularly 
important factor in the sandinista triumph. It was Castro who 
unified the three Nicaraguan guerrilla factions and provided 
the weapons, supplies, and advisers that enabled the 
Cuban-oriented comandantes to establish themselves as the 
dominant group in the r evolution. 
Cuban and now also Nicaraguan support was subsequently 
critical in building the fighting forces of the Farabundo Marti 
Liberation Front in El Salvador, in maintaining them in the 
field, and in forcing them to unite in a combined effort in 
spite of the deep-seated distrust among the guerrilla 
factions. Indeed, it was a meeting hosted by Castro in 
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December 1979 that had produced agreement among the Salvadoran 
insurgent factions to form a coordinating committee, as was 
publicly announced the following month. 
In March 1982, the Chairman of the Intelligence oversight 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives stated that 
there was •persuasive evidence that the Sandinista government 
of Nicaragua is helping train [Salvadoran] insurgents and is 
transferring arms and support from and through Nicaragua to the 
insurgents. They are further providing the insurgents with 
bases of operation in Nicaragua. Cuban involvement in 
providing arms- is also evident." Specifically, Nicaragua's 
position on the isthmus facilitated the establishment of 
several guerrilla training camps and of guerrilla command and 
control facilities, as well as a variety of propaganda and 
covert activities and the transportation of tons of weapons. 
The evidence reveals that arms flowed into El Salvador from 
Nicaragua in preparation for the Salvadoran guerrillas' 
unsuccessful "final offensive" of January 1981. Air supply of 
arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas came from Nicaragua's 
Papalonal airfield, small boats smuggled arms across the Gulf 
of Fonseca, and indirect supply routes which involved the use 
of Costa Rican territory were developed by the Sandinistas. 
The evidence also indicates that the Salvadoran guerrilla 
headquarters in Nicaragua evolved into a sophisticated command 
and control center. 
At this writing, there are reports that the Sandinistas 
have cut back on their support for insurgency in the region, 
although the evidence is far from clear. One explanation may· 
be that the Salvadoran guerrillas have been able to obtain 
ample arms within El Salvador. Moreover, some evidence 
indicates that arms shipments to El Salvador from Nicaragua, 
although reduced, continue -- particularly shipments of 
ammunition. In any event, nothing we are aware of would 
indicate that the Sandinistas' ultimate commitment to the cause 
of the Salvadoran guerrillas -- or to the cause of armed 
revolution in the region -- has diminished. 
The Present Crisis 
As we have seen, Central America's contemporary crisis has 
been a long time in the making. By the late 1970's, the 
increasingly dangerous configuration of historic poverty, 
social injustice, frustrated expectations, and closed political 
systems was suddenly exacerbated by world economic recession 
and by intensified foreign-promoted communist insurgency. And 
just as the economic collapse and political impasse offered an 
opportunity for the insurgents, the insurgency aggrevated the 
economic and political crisis by spreading violence and fear. 
To varying degrees, but with many common elements, this crisis 
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is reflected in the situation of each of the five Central 
American nations. 
El Salvador. Nowhere is the link between economic decline 
and insecurity more apparent than in El Salvador, once perhaps 
the leading beneficiary of the Central American Common 
Market. El Salvador today faces violence and destruction that 
threaten economic collapse. Planting and harvesting have been 
disrupted, buses and trucks burned, bridges and electric pylons 
dynamited. The cumulative direct cost of the war to the 
economy has been estimated at more than $600 million, with 
indirect costs far higher. El Salvador's economy is now less 
than three-quarters the size it was in 1978, and national 
income on a per capita basis is roughly at the level of the 
early 1960's. 
The insurgents themselves acknowledge that destruction of 
the country's basic infrastructure is a key ingredient in their 
strategy to bring down the government. They seek victory 
through both economic and military attrition. Although their 
absolute numbers have not increased over the last three years, 
and although they have not attracted the broad popular support 
they hoped for, the guerrillas after four years of experience 
in the field demonstrate an increasing capacity to manuever, 
concentrate their forces and attack selected targets. They 
maintain sporadic control over areas in the eastern provinces 
and pose a hit-and-run threat virtually everywhere outside the 
major urban areas. Guerrilla forces regularly attempt to 
intimidate and coerce local populations with shootings, 
abductions and other strong-arm tactics. And the human costs 
of the war have been immense. Displaced Salvadorans driven 
from their homes and leading a precarious existence within the 
country number in the hundreds of thousands. Many thousands 
more have left El Salvador as refugees. 
On the other side, the Government of El Salvador is 
severely hampered by the erosion four years of war have 
produced in the country's basic institutions-- by the 
difficulty it has in enforcing its authority and carrying out 
its functions. For their part, the armed forces have increased 
their manpower four-fold but still face problems in leadership 
and the command structure, as well as the need for more 
equipment and training. But the war effort suffers most of all 
from the terrible violence engulfing El Salvador's civilian 
population. Since 1979 more than 30,000 non-combatants have 
been killed. Government security forces and the right-wing 
death squads associated with them are guilty of many thousands 
of murders. These enemies of non-violent change above all 
threaten hopes for social and democratic reform. 
There was little dispute among the witnesses appearing 
before the Commission that, in the words of one of them, "El 
Salvador needed a revolution" -- a democratic revolution. The 
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coup d'etat carried out by young officers in October of 1979 
put an end to the brutal regime of General Romero and opened 
the way for that revolution. In the years since, even in the 
midst of escalating violence, the struggle for basic reform and 
a democratic transformation has continued. A sweeping program 
of land reform, now -affecting 20 percent of the country's 
arable land, was launched; a Constituent Assembly election was 
held in which about 80 percent of those eligible went to the 
polls under very adverse circumstances; a new constitution has 
now been written and the country is preparing to elect a 
president in March. 
Guatemala. Guatemala is also suffering from violence and 
economic decline. Its economy is the largest and most 
diversified in Central America. But it still depends on coffee 
exports for more than 60 percent of its agricultural foreign 
exchange earnings. With the decline in real prices for coffee 
during the last few years, the economic growth rates, quite 
satisfactory in the 1970's, turned negative. Insurgency and 
political violence dried up sources of international credit. 
Stagnation of the Central American Common Market, in which 80 
percent of Guatemala's industrial exports are normally sold, 
hit the industrial sector hard. Gross national product fell by 
over 4 percent in 1983. 
Guatemala's economic troubles affect a society long 
afflicted by the most extreme social inequity. Sanitation, 
potable water and proper shelter barely exist in the country's 
rural areas, where almost two-thirds of the population live. 
More than 50 percent of adults are illiterate, and life 
expectancy is less than 60 years. Overshadowing all social 
issues in Guatemala is the presence of a large and culturally 
distinct Indian population. Centuries of isolation and 
passivity are now giving way among the Indians to discontent 
and a drive to participate in Guatemala's economy and 
politics. Thus the crisis there takes on an extra dimension. 
In 1982, young officers broke the political pattern of the 
past, overthrowing the brutal regime of General Lucas and 
installing a junta headed by the maverick General Efrain Rios 
Montt, who subsequently named himself President. Under Rios 
Montt the Guatemalan army made significant progress against the 
guerrilla forces, combining civic action with aggressive 
military action into a strategy of nbeans and bullets.n The 
government curbed the murderous activities of the security 
services in the cities, but set up secret tribunals with the 
power to give death sentences; and some rural areas were 
reportedly terrorized with killings designed to end local 
support for the guerrillas. 
A new military regime, which replaced that of Rios Montt 
last year, has scheduled constituent assembly elections for 
July of 1984, promised general elections for 1985 and announced 
that the armed forces will stay out of the political process. 
~-- --- - - - - - - - -· ·-- .. - ~- -- - . -·--
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With 20 years of experience in counter-insurgency, the 
Guatemalan army has so far been able to contain the guerrilla 
threat, despite the lack of outside assistance, and despite 
shortages of equipment and spare parts. But violence in the 
cities -- terrorist attacks by the extreme left and the use of 
murder by the security services to repress dissent -- is again 
growing. Insecurity thus spreads through the country. 
\ 
Nicaragua. In Nicaragua the revolution that overthrew the 
hated Somoza regime has been captured by self-proclaimed 
Marxist-Leninists. In July of 1979 the Sandinistas promised 
the OAS that they would organize •a truly democratic 
government• and hold free elections, but that promise has not 
been redeemed. Rather, the government has been brought fully 
under the control of the Sandinista National Directorate. Only 
two months after giving their pledge to the OAS and while 
successfully negotiating loans in Washington, the Sandinistas 
issued Decree No. 67, which converted their movement into the 
country's official political party and laid the foundation for 
the monopoly of political power they now enjoy. The Sandinista 
Directorate has progressively put in place a Cuban-style 
regime, complete with mass organizations under its political 
direction, an internal security system to keep watch on the 
entire population, and a massive military establishment. This 
comprehensive police and military establishment not only 
ensures the monopoly on power within Nicaragua, it also 
produces an acute sense of insecurity among Nicaragua's 
neighbors. 
From the outset, the Sandinistas have maintained close ties 
with Cuba and the Soviet Union. There are some 8,000 Cuban 
advisers now in Nicaragua, including at least 2,000 military 
advisers, as well as several hundred Soviet, East European, 
Libyan and PLO advisers. Cuban construction teams have helped 
build military roads, bases and airfields. According to 
intelligence sources, an estimated 15,000 tons of Soviet bloc 
arms and equipment reached the Sandinista army in 1983. This 
military connection with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and its 
satellites internationalizes Central America's security 
problems and adds a menacing new dimension. 
Nicaragua's government has made significant gains against 
illiteracy and disease. But despite significant u.s. aid from 
1979 to 1981 (approximately $117 million), its economic 
performance has been poor, in part because of the disruptions 
caused by the revolution, in part because of the world 
recession, and in part because of the mismanagement invariably 
associated with regimes espousing Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
National income per capita is less than $1,000, about equal to 
that of the early 1960's, and Nicaragua is plagued by shortages 
of food and consumer goods, with the result that extensive 
rationing has been instituted. 
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Under military pressure from Nicaraguan rebels who 
reportedly receive u.s. support, and under diplomatic pressure 
from the international community, especially from the Contadora 
group, the Sandinistas have recently promised to announce early 
this year a date and rules for 1985 elections; have offered a 
partial amnesty to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas; have claimed 
a relaxation of censorship on La Prensa, the only opposition 
newspaper; have entered into talks with the Roman catholic 
hierarchy; and have issued proposals for regional security 
agreements. In addition, reports from Sandinista sources in 
Managua have hinted at a permanently reduced Cuban presence and 
of diminished support to other Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
groups in Central America -- although we have no confirmation 
that either has taken place or is likely to take place. 
Whether any one of these moves reflects a true change of course 
or merely tactical maneuvers remains to be seen. 
Honduras. Honduras borders Nicaragua and believes itself 
threatened by the sandinistas' highly militarized and radically 
revolutionary regime. In Honduras an elected government is 
struggling to preserve security and maintain a democratic order 
established just two years ago after the military backed a 
return to constitutional, civilian rule. The government is 
also struggling to restore economic growth in the face of what 
President Roberto Suazo has called the worst economi~ crisis in 
the nation's history. The Sandinista military buildup-- huge 
by Central American standards -- puts heavy pressure on 
Honduras to strengthen its own forces at the expense of its 
development needs. The clandestine transshipment of arms from 
Nicaragua across Honduran territory and over the Bay of Fonseca 
traps Honduras in the bitter conflict of its neighbor. 
The Suazo government has pursued national security through 
closer military ties with the United States and by supporting 
anti-Sandinista guerrillas operating from Honduran territory, 
reportedly in cooperation with the u.s. Honduras has rejected 
Nicaraguan proposals that such issues as border security and 
arms trafficking be addressed on a bilateral basis, insisting 
that a comprehensive regional political settlement, including 
an unmistakeable commitment to democratic pluralism by all five 
countries, is essential if peace is to be restored. 
Honduras's economy is highly dependent on coffee and banana 
exports and has suffered severely in recent years from the 
weakness in the international commodity markets. High rates of 
economic growth in the late 1970's have been reversed. Gross 
domestic product grew by less than 1 per cent in 1981 and 
dedlined by 2.5 percent the following year. According to the 
government's own figures, 57 percent of Honduras's families 
live in extreme poverty, unable to pay the cost of the basic 
basket of food. Population has been growing by an 
extraordinary 3.4 percent annually, and 48 percent are below 
the age of 15. The mixture of extreme poverty, high 
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unemployment, steadily deteriorating social conditions and a 
very young population is potentially explosive. 
Costa Rica. In Costa Rica a long-established democratic 
order remains healthy, but the nation's economy is in distress 
and Costa Ricans are increasingly concerned that the violence 
in the region will intrude on their hitherto peaceful oasis. 
The international recession and the stagnation of the Central 
American Common Market caused a severe economic decline. 
National income per capita fell by 18 percent between 1980 and 
1982. Unemployment doubled. Deterioration in the country's 
trade balance -- in large part due to the drop in coffee prices 
and the rise in oil prices -- led to heavy international 
borrowing. Costa Rica's foreign debt is now over $3 billion. 
Interest payments alone that were due in 1983 came to $500 
million, or 58 percent of anticipated export receipts; arrears 
currently stand at $1 billion. 
The government of President Luis Alberto Monge has 
responded seriously, adopting a severe austerity program, 
raising taxes, increasing fuel prices and public utility 
charges and freezing government employment. Efforts have been 
made to establish a realistic exchange rate, to cut public 
sector spending and bring the finances of autonomous agencies 
und~r central government control. However, the Monge 
administration is committed to maintaining the social and 
educational programs that have been so important in the 
nation's development. These programs have contributed to a 90 
percent literacy rate and a life expectancy of 73 years --
among the best figures for those categories in all of Latin 
America. 
On its visit to Costa Rica, the Commission found great 
anxiety about the situation in Nicaragua. Costa Rica has no 
armed forces beyond a small civil guard and rural 
constabulary. A dispute with Nicaragua over navigation on the 
San Juan River and the operations of anti-Sandinista guerrillas 
in the area have created a high degree of tension along the 
northern border. Sandinista and Cuban propaganda campaigns 
vilifying their country, and Sandinista political and 
intelligence operations there, have alarmed Costa Ricans. On 
November 10, 1983, President Monge declared strict military 
neutrality in Central America's conflicts, making clear that 
his government intended to remain unarmed and to continue to 
rely on international agreements for its security. But he also 
made clear that Costa Rica will not be neutral politically as 
between "democracy and totalitarianism." 
The common dangers. Although the current situation differs 
substantially from country to country, there are many common 
elements. 
The region as a whole has suffered severe economic 
setbacks. All five nations are markedly poorer than they were 
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just a few years ago. Intra-regional trade has fallen 
drastically. The Common Market is threatened with extinction 
as the resources necessary to sustain it dry up. Political 
violence and the menace of the radical left have caused huge 
flights of capital. Investment, even in the leading 
agricultural export sectors, has come virtually to an end. 
The tragedy of the homeless is one of the most bitter 
fruits of Central America's conflict. Although no accurate 
count of refugees and displaced persons is available, the 
Commission received estimates of up to one million Central 
Americans who have left their homes: Nicaraguans moving into 
Costa Rica and Honduras to escape the oppression of the 
Sandinistas; Guatemalan Indians fleeing into Mexico from the 
conflict in the highlands; Salvadorans seeking safety in 
Honduras, or a better life in the United States. But those who 
must endure the worst conditions are the displaced, driven from 
their homes but unable to seek refuge in another land. 
Other costs are also evident. According to testimony 
before the Commission, health, nutrition and educational 
services that were already badly deficient are declining 
further. Unemployment and underemployment are spreading -- an 
overriding social and economic problem in all five countries. 
The high rate of population growth magnifies these problems. 
Job opportunities are vanishing, even as a quarter of a million 
young people are entering Central America's job markets each 
year. In a region where half of the population is below the 
age of 20, the combination of youth and massive unemployment is 
a problem of awesome -- and explosive -- dimensions. 
The configuration of economic recession, political 
turbulence and foreign intervention makes the crisis in Central 
America both exceptionally difficult and exceptionally 
ominous. Although turmoil has often accompanied economic 
difficulty in Central America, it has never before been so 
calculated to create chaos and want. This both intensifies the 
conflict and accelerates the economic and political decay of 
the region. 
The prospect of even greater calamaties should not be 
underestimated. None of the five Central American states is 
free of war or the threat of war. As the conflicts intensify, 
and as Nicaragua builds an armed force with firepower vastly 
greater than anything ever seen before in Central America, the 
threat of militarization hangs over the region. Were this to 
happen, it could further warp Central America's societies and 
shut off the possibilities for internal and external 
accommodations. 
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The United States and Central America 
Historical eerspective. The United States has been 
involved, somet1mes intimately, in the affairs of Central 
America for more than a century. The record of that past is a 
mixed one; it must be understood if we are to address today's 
crisis constructively. 
After the 1848 war with Mexico, the United States developed 
a keen interest in opening a secure transportation route to its 
new territories on the Pacific. It took that era's sailing 
ships no less than three months to get from New York to 
California. A canal through Central America would serve both 
safety and speed. At first, Nicaragua seemed a particularly 
favorable site. The canal was eventually built in Panama more 
than half a century later, after President Theodore Roosevelt 
secured u.s. rights to the Canal Zone by helping to arrange a 
coup that established Panama's independence from Colombia. But 
it was interest in a canal that first spurred u.s. involvement 
in Nicaragua and the isthmus. 
For the most part, u.s. policy toward Central America 
during the early part of this century focused primarily on 
promoting the stability and solvency of local governments so as 
to keep other nations out. This was reflected in Theodore 
Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which held that 
the United States should take action to prevent situations from 
arising that might lead to interventions by extra-hemispheric 
powers. Theodore Roosevelt once defined the sole desire of the 
United States as being wto see all neighboring countries 
stable, orderly and prosperous.w This formulation reflects 
both a great-power interest in keeping the hemisphere insulated 
from European intrigue and the concern for others' well-being 
that has often animated our foreign policy. The result, 
however, was a high degree of interventionism in Central 
America during the early 1900's. 
The United States intervened directly in Nicaragua in 1909, 
landing Marines and deposing a president in an effort to 
restore stability. The Marines returned in 1912 and, with one 
brief interruption, they stayed until 1933. Before leaving, 
the u.s. authorities created a single National Guard with 
responsibility for all Nicaraguan police and defense 
functions. The immediate purpose was to provide stability; the 
ultimate result was to create the instrument Anastasio Somoza 
used after the occupation to impose a personal dictatorship 
once the Marines left. The ability of Somoza and later his 
sons to portray themselves as friends and even spokesmen of the 
u.s. began with the use they were able to make of the legacy of 
u.s. military occupation, thereby creating an identity between 
the U.S. and dictatorship in Central America that lingers, 
independent of the facts, to this day. 
- - ... - ·- - -·- -· ---~ 
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Besides military interventions, the u.s. used other forms 
of pressure as well. At various times these included customs 
receiverships, debt refundings, and non-recognition of 
governments that had come to power by force. None of these 
policies worked very well, and they aroused considerable 
resentment. In addition, private u.s. citizens sometimes 
engaged in free-wheeling operations of their own -- such as an 
invasion of Nicaragua in the late 1850's by freebooter William 
Walker, or the financing of a revolution in Honduras in 1911 by 
Samuel zemurray to protect his shipping and banana interests. 
The legacy of these private interventions also continues, 
understandably, to color the attitudes of many Central 
Americans towards the United States. 
Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy was designed to. 
signal the end of the era of intervention and to put relations 
with all of Latin America on a basis of mutual respect and 
friendship. But in practice -- and particularly when World War 
II put an added premium on good relations with neighboring 
governments -- this policy of friendship and non-intervention 
had the paradoxial effect of continuing to identify the United 
States with established dictatorships. 
The importance of the United States to the region's 
economies has also been a powerful element in shaping Central 
American attitudes toward us. Beginning in Costa Rica almost a 
century ago, u.s. capital developed the banana industry and 
monopolized it throughout the isthmus. For decades, the United 
Fruit Company was known in the area as "the octopus.• It 
controlled much of the region's transportation and 
communications. Bananas were vital to the economies of several 
countries, and United Fruit dominated the international markets 
for the fruit. Since the 1950's patterns of both land 
ownership and distribution in the banana industry have 
diversified. United Fruit itself no longer exists~ its 
successor, United Brands, is widely regarded as both a model 
citizen and a model employer. But the questionable practices 
followed by the fruit companies in those early years, together 
with the power they wielded over weak governments, did a lot to 
create the fear of "economic imperialism• that to some degree 
still persists among Central Americans. 
A history of cooperation. This, however, is only one side 
of the history of u.s. relations with Central America. The 
u.s. government has also made extensive positive efforts to 
advance Central American development, beginning at the turn of 
the century with a public health campaign against yellow 
fever. During the Second World war the Institute of 
Inter-American Affairs, headed by Nelson Rockefeller, was 
established. The Institute developed a system of •servicios• 
-- bilateral organizations to finance and manage projects in 
health, education and housing. Through the decade of the 
1950's the Servicios provided training and experience to a new 
generation of Central American technicians and professionals. 
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With the launching of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, 
the role of the United States in Central American development 
underwent a major transformation. This was a bold and 
unprecedented effort to encourage comprehensive national 
planning and to promote a wide array of social, political, tax 
and land reforms, supported by significantly increased 
resources from the United States, the newly created 
Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and other aid 
donors. The assistance from the United States, and perhaps 
equally as significant, the personal identification of 
President Kennedy with the program, was a critical factor in 
the surge of Central American development which began in the 
1960's. 
u.s. assistance was instrumental in the creation of 
effective central banks and private intermediate credit 
institutions, and in the establishment of agricultural 
:ooperatives, housing projects, roads, · health centers, 
population assistance, and technical training. The Alliance 
for Progress also provided major funding and cooperative 
planning to the Central American Common Market, which was 
perhaps its most important single contribution to Central 
American growth during this period. 
In essence, the Alliance was a compact between our 
government and the governments of Latin America. The goals of 
the Alliance were three: economic growth, structural change in 
societies, and political democratization. But as we have seen, 
it was only in the first area that significant progress was 
made. Central America's growth rate of over 5 percent per 
capita during the 1960's far surpassed the 2.5 percent target 
for all of Latin America laid down in the charter of the 
Alliance. An impressive inventory of physical infrastructure 
was constructed in the five Central American countries during 
this period, including schools, hospitals, low-cost housing, 
and sewage systems. 
But the other two goals of the Alliance, structural change 
and political democratization, proved much more difficult to 
achieve. 
Direct private investment in Central America by u.s. firms 
also continued to grow during these years. While that 
investment might seem small in relation to total u.s. 
investment abroad (currently about 2.4 percent, including 
Panama), it was large in Central American terms. It has 
contributed substantially to the region's growth, as many 
Central Americans are quick to acknowledge. At the same time, 
it has been a constant target·of the propaganda of the radical 
left, which has played upon the theme of economic hegemony and 
"imperialism." 
Central America's dependence on trade with the United 
States has, of course, always been high. Though the portion of 
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the region's exports that came to the United States declined 
from 61 percent in 1955 to 36 percent in 1975, the u.s. still 
led all other countries as a market for Central American 
products and commodities. While such dependence remains a 
sensitive issue, investment from the u.s. and trade relations 
with the u.s. are critically important to the economies of 
Central America. 
Mixed results. The record of United States involvement in 
Central America during these critical years is, in short, 
mixed. The Alliance for Progress was a major force for 
modernization and development. U.S. assistance programs have 
made and continue to make an important contribution. Whatever 
the mistakes of the past, private U.S. investment in the region 
now plays a vital and constructive role. 
It may be that u.s. diplomacy gave too little attention to 
the growing problems in Central America during the past two 
decades. Certainly, the u.s. has at times been insensitive, at 
times interfering, at times preoccupied elsewhere. This is a 
far cry, however, from saying, as the Sandinista National 
Directorate and others say, that this nation's policies have 
been the principal cause of the region's afflictions. 
u.s. Interests in the Crisis 
When strategic interests conflict with moral interests, the 
clash presents one of the classic challenges to confront 
societies and statesman. But in Central America today, our 
strategic and moral interests coincide. We shall deal later ~n 
the report with the specifics of those interests. But in broad 
terms they must include: 
* To preserve the moral authority of the United States. To 
be perceived by others as a nation that does what is 
right because it is right is one of this country's 
principal assets. 
* To improve the living conditions of the people of Central 
America. They are neighbors. Their human need is tinder 
waiting to be ignited. And if it is, the conflagration 
could threaten the entire hemisphere. 
* To advance the cause of democracy, broadly defined, 
within the hemisphere. 
* To strengthen the hemispheric system by strenthening what 
is now, in both economic and social terms, one of its 
weakest links. 
* To promote peaceful change in Central America while 
resisting the violation of democracy by force and 
terrorism. 
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* To prevent hostile forces from se1z1ng and expanding 
control in a strategically vital area of the western 
Hemisphere. 
* To bar the Soviet Union from consolidating either 
directly or through Cuba a hostile foothold on the 
American continents in order to advance its strategic 
purposes. 
In short, the crisis in Central America is of large and 
acute concern to the United States because Central America is 
our near neighbor and a strategic crossroads of global 
significance; because Cuba and the Soviet Union are investing 
heavily in efforts to expand their footholds there, so as to 
carry out designs for the hemisphere distinctly hostile to u.s. 
interests; and because the people of Central America are sorely 
beset and urgently need our help. 
The Future 
We think this challenge can -- and must -- be met. The 
Commission takes heart in the refusal of Central Americans to 
succumo to despair. Everywhere we found hope for a democratic 
future and a readiness to sacrifice toward that end. The high 
level of sustained economic growth during the postwar period 
demonstrates that Central America has the human and material 
resources to develop rapidly. The region's leaders, both in 
government and in the private sector, expressed their 
understanding that there must be greater · equity in the 
distribution of economic benefits and greater justice in social 
relations. If that understanding is translated into reality, 
the opportunity for more balanced and sustained development 
should be at hand. 
We shall discuss in a later chapter what can be done to 
revive the economies of the region. Let us simply note here 
that the small size of these countries means that significant 
but not vast amounts of outside assistance can make an 
important difference -- and that with such assistance Central 
America can progress. 
The people of Central America have lived too long with 
poverty, deprivation and violence. The current turmoil must 
not be allowed to shatter their hopes for a brighter future. 
They have endured too many generations of misrule to let 
their aspirations for democratic political development be 
dashed in this generation on the rocks of fear, division and 
violence. Not least, their own security -- and ours -- must no 
longer be threatened by hostile powers which seek expansion of 
influence through exploitation of misery. 
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The crisis, thus, poses an urgent challenge to the United 
States. But that challenge in turn presents us with an 
op~ortunity -- an opportunity to help the people of Central 
America translate their dreams of a better and a freer life 
into reality. 
Chapter 4 
TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY 
The crisis in Central America has no single, simple cause, 
but the troubled performance of the region's economies has been 
a major factor. They were among the most dynamic in the world 
during the 1960's and early 1970's. But that growth was 
unevenly distributed and poverty continued to plague most of 
the region's people. As the Final Document of the Catholic 
Conference of Latin American Bishops at Puebla, Mexico 
recognized in 1979, there was a "growing gap between rich and 
poor,• which the conference characterized as a "contradiction 
of Christian existence." This contributed to a growing 
political frustration in several countries, intensified by the 
fact that some sectors of these societies were enjoying 
economic success. 
Then, in the late 1970's, production, export earnings, 
incomes, profits, and consumption all began to decline. The 
result was a sharp economic contraction in each country of the 
region. The effects have been particularly severe for those 
who were denied participation in the earlier era of rapid 
growth. 
Yet our meetings with the leaders and people of Central 
America and our consideration of the facts put before us during 
the hearings have convinced us that the Central American 
economies can grow again, and that the fruits of that growth 
can be more equitably shared. This will require that: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Economic growth goes forward in tandem with social 
and political modernization. 
Indigenous savings are encouraged and supplemented by 
substantial external aid. 
The nations of the region pursue appropriate economic 
policies. 
In particular, these policies recognize that success 
will ultimately depend on the re-invigoration of 
savings, growth, and employment. 
The program the Commission envisions -- aimed at promoting 
democratization, economic growth, human development and 
security -- would break new ground. Most past u.s. development 
programs have been predominately economic. We argue here that 
the crisis in Central America cannot be considered in solely 
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economic or political or social or security terms. The 
requirements for the development of Central America are a 
seamless web. The actions we recommend represent an attempt to 
address this complex interrelationship in its totality, not just in its parts. 
This chapter focuses on broad issues of economic 
performance, recovery and expansion. We propose specific 
programs to reinvigorate critical elements within the Central 
American economies in conjunction with social and political 
change and progress. We envision, in the short term, an 
emergency stabilization program and, in the medium and long 
term, a new multilateral regional organization to measure 
performance across the entire political, social, economic, and 
security spectrum, and to target external aid resources where 
~hey can provide the most significant impetus. In support of 
these efforts, we urge a five-year commitment by the United 
States to a substantially increased level of economic 
assistance. 
We recognize that large-scale economic aid alone does not 
guarantee progress. The most successful growth efforts in the 
postwar period-- including Central America's own sustained 
expansion during the 1960's and 1970's --were led by the 
private sector. In these cases governments provided 
appropriate incentives and eliminated roadblocks, rather than 
trying to make themselves the engines of growth. This must be 
done again in Central America. 
success will turn in part on the ability of the nations of 
Central America to take full advantage of the enterprise, 
courage, and initiative of individuals and of non-governmental 
institutions and groups: businesses, voluntary organizations, 
the churches and their lay organizations, trade unions, 
agriculture and peasant leaders and cooperatives. All these 
have roles to play. 
we recognize that it is unlikely that the social inequities 
and distortions that have accumulated over the last five 
centuries will be corrected during the next five years. But 
the groundwork for recovery should be laid as soon as 
possible. To that end, bold initiatives are needed. The costs 
of not meeting the challenge in Central America would be too 
great, today and for generations to come. 
CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THEIR CAUSES. 
Before presenting our policy recommendations, we turn first 
to an examination of current economic conditions and of the 
causes of the crisis. Adverse international economic and 
financial developments, natural disasters, ineffective economic 
policies within Central America, structural economic 
weaknesses, and high levels of violence have combined to 
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produce inflation, a decline in economic activity, capital 
flight, and problems in servicing debt. The results have 
imposed particularly grim burdens on the poor. 
By 1983 real per capita income in Nicaragua was 38% below 
the peak level reached in 1977; the contraction in El Salvador 
was 35%. Costa Rica (-23%), Guatemala (-14%) and Honduras 
(-12%) have also suffered. Another way of looking at the 
economic decline is to note that in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and 
Honduras the absolute levels of real per capita income today 
barely equal those of the mid 1970's. In El Salvador and 
Nicaragua real per capita income has fallen to the levels of 
the early 1960's. 
GOP Decline from Peak Year Through 1983 
GDP Peak Year GOP 12er ca12ita Peak Year 
El Salvador -25% 1978 -35% 1978 
Honduras - 2% 1981 -12% 1979 
Costa Rica -15% 1980 -23% 1979 
Guatemala - 7% 1981 -14% 1980 
Nicaragua -22% 1977 -38% 1977 
The pattern of export-led growth that characterized regional 
economic development in the 1960's and 1970's resulted in 
economies which are highly sensitive to world economic conditions, 
as well as highly interdependent. An economic shock in one 
country affects all. This is particularly true of the five 
members of the Central American Common Market -- Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. They developed a 
strong trade among themselves in manufactured goods and developed 
much of their economic infrastructure (e.g., transportation and 
power systems) on a regional basis. One result is that, despite 
the political differences dividing the region, Nicaragua remains 
an essential part of the Central American economy, although the 
pronounced deterioration in that country over the last several 
years has undermined some of the linkages with the rest of the 
region. 
The contraction of the past several years has led to higher 
levels of unemployment and underemployment, and increased 
poverty. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America, 
more than one-third of the region's population lacks sufficient 
income to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet. The 
consequences are poor health conditions, inadequate 
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nutrition, deficient education, and the other social problems 
described in the next chapter. 
Continued rapid population growth has compounded the human 
consequences of the economic collapse. The population of the 
Central American isthmus nearly doubled from 1960 to 1981, from 
12 to 23 million. During these years, population growth rates 
slowed significantly only in Costa Rica and Panama. overall, 
the regional growth rate remains around 3 percent, among the 
highest in the world. Current projections are for a regional 
population of 38 million in the year 2000, with population 
growth averaging 2.7 percent per year; at that rate, the 
population would double in 26 years. 
Causes of the Recent Decline 
Although the economies of the region were once among the 
most dynamic in the world, they are now in decline. This 
painful change can be attributed to several factors: 
High oil prices, world inflation, prolonged world 
recession, and weak demand and prices for commodity exports 
All of the countries in the region were badly affected by 
the sharp rise in oil prices during the 1970's. Oil imports in 
1981, after the second round of price rises and befor~ the 
collapse of Central America's exports, cost more than one-fifth 
of export revenues. The high cost of energy imports is a 
continuing problem. Slack world demand for Central America's 
key export products (coffee, bananas, cotton, sugar, and meat) 
led to a drastic deterioration of the region's purchasing 
power. As a result, Central America would have to export in 
physical terms almost half again as much today as it did five 
years ago to buy the same goods on the world market. The 
shortfall in export earnings forced the Central American 
countries to cut back imports not only of consumer goods, but 
also of raw materials, spare parts, and capital goods, thus 
accelerating the economic slowdown. 
Intra-regional tensions and political unrest 
The conflict between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 began 
a process which gradually undermined the dynamics of the 
Central American Common Market. Nevertheless, intra-regional 
trade, largely in manufactured goods, continued to grow until 
1980. Since then the political turmoil in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, and the financial problems of all the CACM countries 
have produced a sharp decline in intra-regional trade: the 
value of such trade fell by almost one-third between 1980 and 
1982. This collapse of intra-CACM trade -- in part because of 
the accumulation of serious trade imbalances between Costa Rica 
and Guatemala, which had surpluses, and Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
432-785 0 - 84 - 4 
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and Honduras, which had deficits -- contributed to region-wide 
economic contraction. 
As well as damaging the economic infrastructure, political 
conflicts led to retrenchment by commercial banks and 
investors. Private sector confidence, both within and outside 
Central America, has been shaken; domestic and foreign 
investment has declined; and capital flight has been 
substantial -- perhaps as much as $3 billion over the last 
several years. These developments have seriously undermined 
the prospects for future growth. 
Economic management 
In the past, Central American countries generally pursued 
relatively sound economic policies, which contributed to strong 
growth and low inflation through the 1960's and much of the 
1970's. But in the late 1970's, unsuccessful attempts to 
sustain domestic economic activity in the face of the second 
oil shock, the sharp increase in international interest rates, 
and the onset of recession in the United States led to high 
budget deficits, excessive monetary growth, and sharply higher 
foreign debt in almost all of these countries. In some cases 
government policies resulted in disincentives, including 
inappropriate tax policies, which penalized investment and 
export activity. The results contributed to higher inflation 
(especially in Costa Rica, where consumer prices rose 90 
percent in 1982) declining investment, and economic contraction. 
Excessive foreign debt 
One of the legacies of the past several years is a 
significant accumulation of external debt. Total debt of the 
Central American countries was at least $14 billion at the end 
of 1982, an increase of 240% over 1975. The size of the debt 
and the burden of servicing it are highest in Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, and Panama. In Costa Rica, total external debt 
equals more than 140% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
scheduled debt service (interest and term amortization 
payments) account for more than one-half of export earnings. 
In Panama and Nicaragua foreign debt is equal to around 75% and 
100% of GDP, respectively, and scheduled debt service equals 
about one-third of foreign earnings in both countries. 
Although the burden of these debts and their service is 
less than in some other countries in the Western Hemisphere, 
all of the nations of Central America are having difficulty in 
maintaining timely debt-service payments. Several countries 
have already rescheduled part of their external debt, and 
others are in the process of doing so. Faced with these 
conditions, all of the Central American countries -- except 
Nicaragua -- have adopted economic stabilization programs 
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sanctioned by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These 
programs aim at reducing inflation, stabilizing the balance of 
payments, and recreating the conditions for future economic 
growth. Unfortunately, in the short run the programs seem to 
be more successful in achieving the first two of these than in 
halting economic decline. 
With the beginning of the international debt crisis, the 
Central American countries lost their limited access to the 
international commercial banking market. Trade finance lines 
were cut and public and private sector borrowers were unable to 
raise new funds, thus further compounding debt-service 
problems. To some extent, this reinforced the drop in imports 
and the decline in economic activity, even though increased 
official assistance more than offset the decline in commercial 
bank credits. Any program of reactivation must address these 
key factors. They lie at the heart of the region's development 
problems. 
EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CRISIS 
The Central Americans, the United States, and others are 
already making substantial efforts, thus preventing an even 
more serious deterioration in living conditions. The Central 
Americans -- as they must -- are bearing the largest part of 
the burden. Exacting economic stabilization programs are now 
being implemented in almost all of these countries, while 
further ambitious budget, monetary, pricing, and institutional 
reforms are being considered. In addition, governments are 
beginning to provide incentives to encourage investment as well 
as extra-regional trade. Volunteer groups, especially 
religious and lay organizations, are providing valuable social 
welfare services which governments are unable to finance 
because of budgetary constraints. 
For their part, other countries are also contributing to 
Central America's economic recuperation. Mexico and Venezuela 
have established a major facility to provide oil on 
concessional terms. The United states is making its influence 
felt in several ways: 
* 
* 
* 
By its own economic recovery, which should eventually 
be reflected in greater demand and better prices for 
Central American exports. 
By the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which opens 
up favorable prospects for new Central American 
trade, and by the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), which extends duty free access to the u.s. 
market for many Central American products. 
By its bilateral economic assistance programs, which 
have been considerably expanded during the last few 
* 
* 
* 
------ ----·- -- ... - _ .. 
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years and, for the region as whole, totalled $628 
million in the last fiscal year. 
By its contribution to multilateral agencies, 
including the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, 
which in turn provide financial support, policy 
advice, and technical assistance. 
By its support of the international coffee agreement. 
By the initiative of the thousands of United states 
private citizens working in voluntary organizations 
and on their own to help improve living conditions in 
the region. 
But the outlook, even under optimistic assumptions, is not 
very prom1s1ng. Even if economic stabilization policies are 
consistently implemented, if official capital flows remain at 
roughly current levels through the rest of the decade, if 
private capital flows eventually recover, if the international 
economic environment gradually improves, and if political 
stability returns, unless more is done the economies of Central 
America will only gradually begin to recover. The decline has 
been so sharp over the past several years that any economic 
recovery would probably remain fragile, even if all the 
conditions already outlined were met~ Without a significant 
increase in the levels of foreign assistance, improvement in 
the way those resources are managed and used, and the 
introduction of growth-oriented economic policies, economic 
activity in the region, measured on a per capita basis, would 
probably reach no more than three-quarters of the 1980 level by 
1990. This would mean more unemployment and continued 
widespread poverty. 
In short, present prospects for Central America are 
unacceptable and the present effort is inadequate. The Central 
American countries must improve their own economic policies and 
performance. The United States and the other democracies must 
provide more assistance and greater commitment. Central 
America needs additional resources to finance new investments, 
to rebuild its productive capacity, to utilize more fully 
existing capacity, to replace damaged infrastructure, and to 
maintain debt service. The latter is essential to restoring 
international financial credibility. 
We therefore turn to the specific elements of what must be 
done. 
AN EMERGENCY STABILIZATION PROGRAM 
We cannot wait to check the decline in economic activity 
and the deterioration in social conditions until a long-term 
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program is in place. The Commission therefore urges the 
immediate adoption of an emergency stabilization program 
combining public and private efforts to halt the 
deterioration. Some of our recommendations are endorsements of 
existing initiatives. And, most important, it is critical that 
the Central American countries continue to implement economic 
stabilization programs and, especially, to pursue policies 
designed to foster increased investment and trade. 
The program includes eight key elements: 
We urge that the leaders of the United States and the 
Central American countries meet to initiate a comprehensive 
aperoach to the economic development o f the region and the 
re1nvigoration of the Central American Common Market. 
The United States and the Central American countries should 
convene a conference this year to discuss the impediments to 
and opportunities for economic, political and social 
development. The agenda for such a meeting should include 
consideration of efforts to reinvigorate the Central American 
Common Market, the role of the foreign and domestic private 
sectors in seeking economic recovery, and the promotion of 
balanced regional and hemispheric trade. In addition, as 
discussed later in this chapter, we recommend that the leaders 
consider a new multilateral organization to promote 
comprehensive regional development. 
We encourage the greatest possible involvement of the 
private sector in the stabilization effort. 
Renewed investment and lending, higher production from 
existing facilities, more training, increased purchases of 
Central American goods, and other initiatives would provide 
immediate economic benefits. Health care professionals, 
educators, labor officials, churchmen and women, and others can 
provide and are providing much needed training and technical 
advice. Some of the government programs described below are 
designed to encourage even greater private sector efforts. 
We recognize that the current climate of violence and 
uncertainty discourages private sector initiatives. 
Nevertheless, we believe it is imperative to increase the 
private sector's involvement as soon as possible. Thus, we 
.recommend the establishment of an Emergency Action Committee of 
concerned private citizens and organizations with a mandate to 
provide advice on the development of new public-private 
initiatives to spur growth and employment in the region. 
We recommend that the United States actively address the 
external debt problems of the region. 
We urge new initiatives to deal with Central America's 
serious external debt problems. Although the United States and 
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other creditor governments have agreed in principle to 
reschedule part of Costa Rica's external debt, none of the 
other countries of the region has formally asked for similar 
treatment. They should be encouraged to seek multilateral debt 
renegotiation; this would be a departure from existing practice 
which is essentially reactive. 
At the same time, the United States and the governments of 
other creditor countries should urge private lenders, 
especially commercial banks, to renegotiate existing debt at 
the lowest possible interest rates. A task force of key public 
and private creditors as well as debtors could be established 
to facilitate these debt renegotiations and to encourage new 
lending. The task force could establish general guidelines for 
individual country negotiations and do everything possible to 
expedite agreement between debtors and creditors. Again, the 
engagement of creditor governments would be a significant 
departure from current approaches. 
We do not intend that our recommendations should affect the 
debt negotiations of countries outside of Central America, but 
we believe that the debt burden needs to be addressed as part 
of the emergency stabilization effort. 
We recommend that the United states provide an immediate 
increase in bilateral economic assistance. 
Additional economic assistance should be made available in 
the current fiscal year. Total commitments of U.S. bilateral 
economic assistance to Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama in FY 1983 was $628 
million; the request for appropriated funds for FY 1984 is $477 
million. We recommend a supplemental appropriation of $400 
million for the current fiscal year. Such an increase, if 
complemented by continued improvements in the economic policy 
programs of these countries and if quickly made available, 
would help stabilize current economic conditions. (Forecasts 
of the financial needs of the region are summarized in the 
appendix to this chapter.) We also recommend additional u.s. 
economic assistance in future years, which is discussed in the 
proposed medium-term program. 
The bulk of this additional assistance should be channeled 
through the Agency for International Development (AID), with 
emphasis on creating productive jobs, providing general balance 
of payments support, and helping the recipient countries 
implement their economic stabilization programs. The purpose 
of this assistance would be to stop the continued decline in 
economic activity, and to signal a u.s. commitment to helping 
Central America address its deep-seated economic and political 
problems. Other donors, including Canada, Europe and Japan 
should be encouraged to provide similar additional help as soon 
as possible. 
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we recommend that a ma j or thrust of e xpanded aid should be 
in labor intens i ve i nfrastruc t ure and hous i ng pro j ec t s. 
Although the housing needs of the region are addressed in 
the next chapter, we urge that AID use increased economic 
assistance to expand infrastructure and housing projects. 
Central America suffers from pressing needs for rural 
electrification, irrigation, roads, bridges, municipal water, 
sewer and drainage construction and repair. such construction 
projects, using labor-intensive methods, can quickly be 
initiated, with considerable economic benefit. 
We recommend that new official trade credit guarantees be 
made ava ilable t o the Cen t ra l Ame r i can coun t r i es. 
The decline in the availability of trade finance has 
critically affected the flow of imports into Central America. 
A Trade Credit Insurance Program would provide U.S. government 
guarantees for short-term trade credit from u.s. commercial 
banks. such a program could be administered by the 
Export-Import Bank, although the existing trade credit program 
is not available to Central American countries, in part because 
the risks of non-repayment are viewed as excessive. Therefore, 
every effort should be made to establish the program within 
existing legislation or to create new legislative authority for 
a program reflecting the need for special consideration in 
Central America. The novelty would be that the program would 
be available only for use in Central America. 
We further recommend that participating u.s. commercial 
banks be required, as a condition of their participation, to 
renegotiate their existing long-term credits in accordance with 
guidelines established by the debt task force described above. 
Thus, the program would contribute to easing debt service 
problems as well as to encouraging renewed commercial bank 
lending (albeit with a government guarantee) in Central America. 
We also urge that a program be organized to provide 
seasonal credit to the agricultural sector which would meet a 
critical need in the region. 
We recommend that the United States p rovide an emer gency 
credi t to the Cen t ra l Amer i can Common Mar ket Fund ( CACMF ). 
The Central American countries have asked for a credit to 
refinance part of the accumulated trade deficits among 
themselves which have contributed to the contraction of 
intra-regional trade. The United States should use part of the 
increased economic aid for this purpose; the Central American 
countries that have been in surplus would be expected to 
transform the remainder of the deficits into long-term local 
currency credits. As the Central American countries have 
proposed, CACMF regulations should then be adjusted to avoid 
future build-ups of large unsettled balances. since the debts 
-- -------- ---- --- --
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that would be refinanced under this proposal are among central 
banks, there should be no adverse implications for other 
rescheduling efforts. 
we recognize that support for Common Market institutions 
benefits all members of the Common Market, regardless of their 
political orientation or social and economic performance. 
There is no way to isolate one or two member countries. 
However, support for the Common Market would be one of the 
quickest ways to revive intra-regional trade and economic 
activity. Historically, economic integration has had important 
political and economic benefits for the members of CACM, and 
the Common Market continues to enjoy strong support among 
Central Americans. 
It is on this basis that we have concluded that the 
benefits of an infusion of capital into the CACMF outweigh the 
disadvantages. However, we are convinced that the Common 
Market will have to change toward a more open trading posture. 
This will require, as many Central American experts have 
suggested to us, a basic reorientation of regional trade and 
industrial policies. 
1ile recommend that the United States j oin the Central 
Amer i can Bank f or Economi c Integrat i on (CABEI ). 
The Central American countries are opening membership in 
CABEI to countries outside the region. We urge the u.s. to 
join this institution and to encourage other creditor countries 
to seek membership. The infusion of new resources would help 
reinvigorate the bank, which could channel much-needed funds to 
small-scale entrepreneurs and farmers, provide working capital 
to existing private sector companies, and encourage the 
development of new industries. Again, u.s. membership in CABEI 
would benefit all members of the Common Market. 
A MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
The measures we have outlined above aim at short-term 
stabilization. Essentially, they are emergency economic 
measures made necessary by the severity of the economic 
downturn. They represent an effort to buy time to permit the 
Central American nations and their friends to build a broader 
structure of cooperation for the longer future. That 
longer-term future is our principal mandate, and we now turn to 
it. 
We have already expressed our conviction that political, 
social, and economic development goals must be addressed 
simultaneously. we have neither the responsibility nor the 
competence to design specific long-term development plans for 
each Central American country. These are for the Central 
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Americans themselves. Nevertheless, we are obliged to define 
medium-term objectives which are compatible with the interests 
of the United States: 
* Elimination of the climate of violence and civil strife. 
Peace 
progress. 
inflicted 
basic. 
is an essential condition of economic and social 
So too is elimination of the fear of brutality 
by arbitrary authority or terrorism. No need is more 
* Development of democratic institutions and processes. 
The United States should encourage the Central American 
nations to develop and nurture democratic cultures, 
institutions, and practices, including: 
* 
* 
* 
Strong judicial systems to enhance the capacity to 
redress grievances concerning personal security, 
property rights, and free speech. 
Free elections, by seeking advice from technical 
experts and studying successful electoral systems, 
including Costa Rica's. 
Free and democratic trade unions. The importance of 
unions, which represent millions of rural and urban 
workers, has been firmly established in the region. 
They have been not only an economic force but a 
political one as well, opposing arbitrary rule and 
promoting democratic values. Labor unions will 
continue to have an important part to play in 
political development, as well as in improving the 
social and economic well-being of working men and 
women. Assuring an equitable distribution of 
economic benefits will require both job-oriented 
development strategies and trade unions to protect 
workers' rights. 
* Development of strong and free economies with diversified 
production for both external and domestic markets. 
During the second half of this decade the Central American 
economies need to grow at per capita annual rates of at least 3 
percent in real terms, which is close to the region's 
historical growth rate and is necessary to absorb new entrants 
to the labor force each year. This is an ambitious but 
realistic goal despite today's depressed conditions and the 
misfortunes of the recent past. 
--------- ------ ·-- . -
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* Sharp improvement in the social conditions of the poorest 
Central Americans. 
No investment in Central America will be more productive 
over the long term than that made to improve the health, 
education, and social welfare of its people. This is 
fundamental. We devote the next chapter to it. 
* Substantially improved distribution of income and wealth. 
The goals of equality of opportunity and better income 
distribution require expanded access to ownership of productive 
land and capital. This is also crucial for social and 
political progress. The pervasiveness and depth of rural 
poverty make improvement in rural incomes and living standards 
especially high priorities. Agrarian reform programs should 
continue to be pursued as means of achieving this. 
These are ambitious goals. Their achievement will depend 
primarily on the policies adopted by the Central Americans 
themselves. As we have noted, efforts are already under way to 
achieve them. However, these efforts need to be expanded and 
enhanced~ more important, they now lack the focus and framework 
necessary to signal a forceful, persistent, and long-term 
partnership committed to development, equity, and democracy in 
Central America. 
Our recommendations are divided into two groups. The first 
of these involves proposals for u.s. public and private support 
for Central American development efforts. The second is a 
proposal for developing a new multilateral approach to address 
the region's comprehensive development needs. 
The Nature of U.S. Development Support 
We urge a major increase in u.s. and other country 
financial and economic assistance for Central America. 
Unless there is a substantial increase in aid, in our view, 
the prospects for recovery are bleak. The solution to the 
crisis of Central America does not lie along the path of 
austerity. We believe that the people of the region must at a 
minimum perceive a reasonable prospect that, with sustained 
effort on their part, they can reach 1980 levels of per capita 
economic activity by no later than 1990, and, with 
determination and luck, well before that. However, as we have 
repeatedly stressed, unless economic recovery is accompanied by 
social progress and political reform, additional financial 
support will ultimately be wasted. By the same token, without 
recovery, the political and security prospects will be grim. 
Reaching that goal will require a significant effort. 
External financing needs between now and 1990 have been 
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estimated at as much as $24 billion for the seven countries as 
a group. (Forecasts are summarized in the appendix.) The 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, other official creditors, private investors, 
and commercial banks are likely to provide at least half of 
these funds -- especially if each Central American country 
follows prudent economic policies, if there is steady social 
and political progress, and if outside aggression is 
eliminated. The balance, as much as $12 billion, would have to 
be supplied by the United States. (As defined in the appendix, 
this total financing need includes the projected financing 
requirements of Nicaragua, which is not now a recipient of u.s. 
assistance.) 
We have already proposed that u.s. economic assistance be 
increased in FY 1984 to cover part of this on an emergency 
basis. 
We now propose that economic assistance over the five-year 
period beginning in 1985 total $8 billion. Although the 
macro-economic forecasts on which we base this proposal do not 
translate precisely into fiscal year federal budget requests, 
this global figure would include direct appropriations as well 
as contingent liabilities such as guarantees and insurance. In 
effect, this would represent a rough doubling of u.s. economic 
assistance from the 1983 level. 
We recognize that such a proposal, at a time of serious 
concern in the United States about the level of governmental 
spending and the prospective size of the federal budget 
deficit, may be viewed with scepticism. However, we firmly 
believe that without such large-scale assistance, economic 
recovery, social progress, and the development of democratic 
institutions in Central America will be set back. 
Because of the magnitude of the effort required and the 
importance of a long-term commitment, we further urge that 
Congress appropriate funds for Central America on a multiple-
year basis. We strongly recommend a five year authorization of 
money, a portion of which would be channelled through the 
proposed Central American Development Organization, which is 
outlined later in this chapter. The balance would support 
economic assistance programs administered by existing u.s. 
government agencies. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of increased economic 
assistance will turn on the economic policies of the Central 
American countries themselves. As we have noted, most have 
begun to move away from some of the policies which contributed 
to the current crisis. However, we agree with what many 
experts have told us: that unless these reforms are extended 
economic performance will not significantly improve, regardless 
of the money foreign donors and creditors provide. In too many 
other countries, increased availability of financial resources 
--- - -- - -- - -~·--- - - - -
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has undermined reform by relieving the immediate pressure on 
policy makers. This must be avoided in Central America. 
What-rs-now required is a firm commitment by the Centra l 
Amer i can countr i es to economi c polic i es , i nc luding r eforms in 
tax s ystems , to encourage p rivate enterprise and ind i vidual 
i n i t i ative , to create favora ble i nvestment c limates , to cur b 
corr upti on where it ex i s t s , and t o s pur ba l anced t r ade. These 
can l ay the f ounda tion f or sus t a i ned growth. 
The increased economic assistance we propose should be used 
to promote democracy, renew economic growth, improve living 
conditions, achieve better distribution of income and wealth, 
encourage more dynamic and open economies, and develop more 
productive agriculture. Specific programs are primarily the 
responsibilities of the recipient countries themselves. 
However, we strongly urge that the United states actively work 
to develop and nurture democratic institutions in the region. 
We recommend that the United States expand economic 
assistance for democrat i c i nstitutions and leadersh i p t raining. 
Key initiatives which either are already underway or should 
be developed include: 
* 
* 
* 
The encouragement of neighborhood groups, community 
improvement organizations, and producer cooperatives 
which provide a training ground for democratic 
participation and help make governments more 
responsive to citizen demands. 
The United States Information Service's binational 
centers provide valuable insight into the advantages 
of personal freedoms in the u.s. Significantly 
expanded funding would allow the centers to expand 
their library holdings, courses, and programs. 
Exchange and training programs for leaders of 
democratic institutions. The International Visitors 
Program of USIA and AFL/CIO's George Meany Institute 
are both examples of effective programs that bring 
leaders from Central America, as well as from other 
regions, to the United States for training programs. 
Additional programs should be established to bring 
leaders of such democratic institutions as labor 
unions, local governments, legislatures, and 
professional associations to work and study in 
counterpart u.s. organizations. 
We also recommend a number of other policies and programs 
for the u.s. pubLic and private sectors in the areas of trade, 
investment, and agriculture. These, too, are important 
elements of a broad-based effort to help the Central American 
countries prosper, and we now turn to them. 
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Expanded Trade Opportunities 
Rapid Central American economic growth requires increased 
foreign exchange earnings. In the short run the region will 
continue to rely largely on the earnings which come from the 
export of commodities. The Commission considered, and rejected 
as ineffective or inappropriate, proposals to stabilize 
commodity prices or earnings. Thus, until demand recovers for 
the commodities which Central America produces, the prospects 
for significant increases in export earnings are limited. 
The solution to this problem will necessarily be a slow 
one. Over the medium term, the Central American countries 
should try to broaden their export bases both in the 
agricultural and manufactured good sectors. More diversified 
exports would help to insulate the region from some of the 
swings in the international economy. 
Central American export-promoting policies will come to 
naught, however, if the rest of the world fails to open its 
markets. The United States has taken the lead in this respect 
and the Caribbean Basin Initiative will provide additional 
encouragement for the development of new export industries. 
The Central American countries should also try to free up 
foreign exchange resources by reducing energy imports. The 
United States and other donor nations possess relatively 
inexpensive technology that could be used in the region to 
identify and explore local energy resources. 
We encourag e the extension of duty-free trade to Central 
Amer i ca by other maj or trad i ng countr i es. 
The CBI is a landmark piece of legislation and we hope that 
other countries will be willing to extend similar benefits to 
Central America. We urge the European Community to extend 
trade preferences to Central America under the Lome Agreement, 
since the U.S. is extending CBI benefits to Lome beneficiaries 
in the Caribbean. Other countries of Latin America should also 
be encouraged to offer special trade benefits to the Central 
American countries as their own economic recovery progresses. 
We ur ge the United States to review non-tariff barriers to 
imports f rom Centra l Amer i ca. 
We recognize that this issue -- which principally applies 
to products like textiles, sugar, and meat-- is highly 
contentious, both internationally and domestically. All of 
these products are affected by multilateral agreements which 
partly determine the degree of access to the United States 
market. we encourage the President to use whatever flexibility 
exists in such agreements in favor of Central American 
producers. 
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We recommend technical and financial s uppor t for export 
promotion e ffor ts. 
U.S. economic assistance should be used to provide 
technical and financial support for trading and export 
marketing companies and innovative export-oriented joint 
ventures between Central American and foreign entrepreneurs. 
This is already an important element of the current assistance 
program: in the future this should be a top priority. 
Improved Investment Conditions 
The Central American countries must improve the climate for 
both domestic and foreign investment. These countries could 
eventually become important production centers for low- and 
medium-technology goods to be exported to the United States, 
the rest of Latin America, and Europe : Panamanian leaders 
already are studying the experiences of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and others in an effort to imitate their success as leading 
producers for export. In addition, increased investment should 
be encouraged in industries which produce for local consumption. 
Of course, peace is necessary before businesses will look 
seriously at new investment prospects. Without peace, capital 
flight will continue (although improved financial policies seem 
to have considerably reduced the outflows), infrastructure will 
be destroyed, credit will remain unavailable, and private 
sector initiative will be discouraged. But these countries 
also need to move now on changing those economic policies that 
discourage investment. 
Several initiatives could be undertaken by the United 
States to encourage u.s. investors to consider projects in 
Central America. 
We encourage the formation of a pr ivately- owned venture 
capital company fo r Central Amer i ca. 
We recommend that a venture capital company -- which might 
be called the Central American Development Corporation (CADC) 
be established for Central America. This was suggested to 
us by several private businessmen and organizations and 
represents an innovative way to promote investment in the 
region even under present difficult conditions. CADC, 
capitalized by private sector investors, would use its capital 
to raise funds which, in turn, would be lent to private 
companies active in Central America. It would be managed and 
directed by experienced entrepreneurs. Its loans would be made 
to commercially viable projects in high priority economic 
sectors for working capital or investment purposes. The U.S. 
government could support the CADC initiative through a long-
term loan as it has for similar initiatives in other areas of 
the world. 
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The United States is about to join the Inter-American 
Investment Corporation, which has been formed within the 
Inter-American Development Bank. This new multilateral 
organization will provide technical support, equity, and loans 
to private sector companies which are active in the region. 
This is a potentially useful initiative and we hope that the 
Congress responds favorably to authorizing legislation when it 
is submitted later this year. 
He recommend the expanded availability of OPIC insurance in 
the region. 
Needed foreign investment could be encouraged through an 
expanded insurance guarantee program. The Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation continues to consider investment 
applications, but because of current political conditions it 
extends insurance in very few instances. Leading private 
businessmen told the Commission that the unavailability of such 
insurance is an obstacle to investment in projects that 
otherwise have good prospects for commercial success. OPIC 
should have the resources and the mandate to provide such 
support. 
We recommend the development of aid programs to nurture 
small businesses, including microbusinesses. 
The small business forms the backbone of these economies. 
Economic aid programs specifically aimed at encouraging the 
growth and formation of such businesses would assist in putting 
more people to work and also give people a larger stake in 
their economies. Such programs should include such incentives· 
as seed capital, loan guarantees, and technical assistance. 
Accelerated Agricultural Development 
Central America's rural areas contain the majority of the 
region's poor. They also have the greatest potential for rapid 
increases in production, particularly in the historically 
neglected sector which produces food for local consumption 
rather than for export. 
Integrated programs of rural development targeted at the 
food producing sector have enormous potential for improving the 
welfare of large numbers of people, while increasing and 
diversifying agricultural production and lessening dependence 
on food imports. Such programs require a variety of 
coordinated measures which would have to be undertaken by the 
Central Americans themselves, either by the governments of the 
region or by regional institutions. They should: 
* Provide long-term credit at positive but moderate real 
interest rates to make poss i ble the purchase of land by 
small farmers. 
-58-
* study the holding of idle but potentially productive land, 
and programs to capture capital gains from public works for 
the public. 
* Improve title registration and the defense of property 
rights of farmers. 
* Provide short- and medium-term credit to finance the 
harvesting and storage of crops, the purchase of 
fertilizers and other inputs, and the acquisition of 
machinery and equipment. 
* Follow pricing policies for agricultural commodities that 
protect farmers against unnecessary price fluctuations and 
unfair marketing practices, that avoid a •cheap food• 
policy which favors urban consum~rs and acts as a 
disincentive to producers, and that discourage the 
accumulation of unmarketable surpluses. 
* Where appropriate, initiate programs of agrarian reform --
of "land for the landless• -- in order to distribute more 
equitably the agricultural wealth of the country. 
* Expand the network of rural feeder roads, storage 
facilities, and rural electrification. 
* Sharply increase rural research and extension services 
specifically targeted to crops produced for the domestic 
market. 
* Clarify the legal status and use of public lands, to check 
deforestation and the degradation of the environment. 
These measures involve staggering administrative 
requirements for governments committed to creating a 
diversified rural economy in which medium and small private 
farmers will predominate. That commitment, the political will, 
and most of the administrative skills cannot be provided by 
foreigners. Where the commitment exists, however, external 
help from multilateral institutions and from the United States 
and other countries could make a crucial contribution. 
In particular: 
We recommend that the financial underpinnings of the 
efforts to broaden land ownership be strengthened and reformed. 
We have argued that more equitable distribution of inco~e 
and wealth, including land holdings, is important to economic, 
social, and political development in the region. In programs 
of land reform, ways should be found to ensure that the 
redistribution of land provides the new owners with a valid 
title, that governments promptly allocate resources as they 
become available to ensure that former owners are effectively 
-59-
compensated, and that in the end the system enhances incentives 
to expand the nation's total agricultural output. 
He recommend the provision of financial resources to 
supplement credit and investment programs. 
A key thrust of U.S. bilateral assistance should be to 
supplement national and regional agriculture credit programs; 
this is an element of AID's program which should be expanded in 
the future. In addition, the program of seasonal agricultural 
credit both for imported inputs and working capital which was 
included in the emergency stabilization program should be 
regularized and expanded in the medium term. 
We recommend increased economic support for cooperatives. 
Agricultural cooperatives have been important in both u.s. 
and Central American rural development. They not only 
encourage increased production through the pooling of resources 
and sharing of risk, but contribute to improved distribution of 
income. We recommend that the United States increase its 
support for such organizations as part of its bilateral aid 
program. 
ORGANIZING FOR DEVELOPMENT 
Our second major area of recommendations involves the 
structure and form of the development effort. The proposals we 
put forward in this chapter and the next are not a final 
blueprint for economic and social development. This Commission 
is acutely aware of its own limitations. We cannot provide 
what is most vitally needed: a positive Central American 
vision of the future, and a process for translating that vision 
into reality. This can only be done by engaging the 
initiative, the energy and the dedication of the Central 
Americans themselves, in cooperation with their allies, in a 
forum capable of addressing the development of the region in 
all its dimensions, on a continuing basis. 
We received many suggestions on how to structure such a 
process. It was clear from these proposals, and from our own 
deliberations, that what is required is not another institution 
competitive with AID, the Inter-American Development Bank or 
the International Monetary Fund. Nor should such an 
international organization supersede local development bodies 
and initiatives. Responsibility for the modernization of each 
country must lie with its own public and private institutions. 
Rather, we propose the establishment of a structure which would 
do what no existing national or international body now does: 
provide a continuous and coherent approach to the development 
of the region, a process of review of that development, and 
access to that process by those ~~ho have not before been an 
integral part of it. 
432-785 0 - 84 - 5 
-60-
What follows is our distillation of many different 
proposals. We hope that it will attract the interest of 
leaders, private and public, within Central America. We are 
fully aware that no development organization for Central 
America will have any more consequence than the people of 
Central America are prepared to give it; any institution must 
represent the initiative and enjoy the support of the nations 
of the region or it cannot succeed, however great the 
enthusiasm for it in Washington. 
What will be required, therefore, is a serious examination 
here and in Central America of how the essential cooperation 
among nations for development can be achieved and 
institutionalized. As we suggested earlier, the leaders of 
Central America and of the United States should then meet to 
define, together, the opportunity for comprehensive regional 
development, the principles which should underlie it, and the 
ways of giving organizational form and process to that common 
aspiration. 
From our own consideration of that issue we have distilled 
the following principles, which we recommend for consideration: 
* The development of Central America should be a cooperative 
program. The policy issues involved should be addressed 
through a process of joint deliberation among the nations 
of Central America, the United states, and such other 
democracies as may be willing to participate and to provide 
assistance. 
* The program should promote the development of Central 
America in all its dimensions -- economic prosperity, 
social change, political modernization and peace. Past 
develo~ment efforts have focused too exclusively on 
econom1c issues and programs. External aid should be tied 
to measurable progress toward all of these agreed goals. 
* The assessment of progress should be conducted by 
representatives of participating nations who have access to 
a broad range of information and experience from both 
public and private sources. Private groups and 
institutions in donor and recipient countries should be 
drawn fully into the deliberative process. 
* The ultimate control of aid funds will always rest with the 
donors. But a multilateral body including eminent Central 
Americans can most effectively -- and least offensively --
assess progress, evaluate program objectives, and measure 
external resource needs. In addition, the multilateral 
body should exercise some degree of control over 
development funds to give its assessments added weight, 
even though donors would retain a veto. 
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* The structure must be established on a sufficiently 
permanent basis to demonstrate the long-term commitment of 
both the United States and the Central American countries 
to the coordination of economic development with social and 
political development. The continued utility of the 
organization should be assessed after five years. 
These principles could be served through a variety of 
organizational structures. We have developed the outline of a 
structure which we have called the Central American Development 
Organization, or CADO. We put it forward not as the only 
design, but as a means of illustrating how the concept could be 
implemented. 
Membership in CADO, as we envision it, would initially be 
open to the seven countries of Central America -- Belize, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama 
and to the United States. Associate member status would be 
available to any democracy willing to contribute significant 
resources to promote regional development. We would hope that 
the other Contadora countries would participate actively, as 
well as the nations of Europe, Canada and Japan. The 
organization's Chairman should be from the United States with 
an Executive Secretary from Central America. 
The operating body of CADO, in which each full member would 
be represented, would assess the progress made by each Central 
American country toward economic, political and social 
objectives, as well as make recommendations on the allocation 
of economic resources. It would require of its members a high 
degree of integrity and judgment; they would be expected to 
bring to their tasks special competence and experience in the 
development process. We are convinced that the region has an 
impressive store of men and women, dedicated to the future 
progress of their people, who tould fill these roles. 
Representation should be drawn primarily from the private 
sector. Each country delegation should include representatives 
of a democratic trade union movement, of business and/or the 
government. It would draw on a wide variety of sources for 
information and for economic, political and human rights 
analysis including, for example, the deliberations of the 
Economic Consultative Group, now being organized by the IDB; 
AID; advisory opinions from the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights; the ILO; the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of 
the Organization of American states; and national monitoring 
bodies and appropriate private parties. 
Cent-ral American participation in the program should turn 
on acceptance of and continued progress toward: 
* The protection of personal and economic liberties, freedom 
of expression, respect for human rights, and an independent 
system of equal justice and criminal law enforcement. 
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* Political pluralism, and a process of recurrent elections 
with competing political parties. Only nations prepared to 
base their governments on the free choice of their people 
should be eligible. This does not necessarily mean that 
each country would institutionalize its political processes 
in the same way as the United States, but it does mean that 
each would adopt democratic forms appropriate to its own 
conditions. 
*As set out more fully in Chapter 7, a commitment to 
preserve peace, independence and the mutual security of 
Central American member nations by renouncing intervention 
and limiting arms, as expressed in the reciprocal exchange 
of mutual security undertakings. 
* The establishment and maintenance of sound growth policies 
in the various countries, including tax and land reforms, 
and the invigoration of community trade and monetary 
programs. 
* The development of the human resources of the region, as 
set forth in Chapter 5. 
This commitment would be embodied in a charter. CADO would 
be inaugurated at a summit of the participating countries, at 
which the charter would be signed. 
Nicaragua would be encouraged to participate in CADO in the 
interest of promoting authentic political pluralism and 
economic and social development in that country in harmony with 
the rest of the region. However, Nicaragua's -- or any other· 
country's --continued membership in CADO and access to aid 
within the CADO framework would be conditioned on continued 
progress toward defined political, social, and economic goals. 
If Nicaragua -- or any other country -- concluded that it was 
unable in good faith to commit itself to permit elections and 
guarantee human rights and thus failed to join CADO, it would 
not, in our judgment, affect the ultimate effectiveness of the 
organization. 
We recommend that an economic reconstruction fund be 
established within CADO and that the u.s. channel one-quarter 
of its economic assistance through such a fund. Loans to 
countries would be in support of development programs and 
policies including the implementation of growth-oriented 
economic policies, the establishment of genuine democratic 
institutions, and the adoption of programs to improve social 
conditions. They would be quick-disbursing, balance of 
payments support loans. 
our overall objective in putting forward these 
institutional proposals is substantive, not structural. The 
crisis in Central America is region-wide; it cannot be resolved 
piecemeal. It will require local effort and external support, 
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integrated into a comprehensive approach on security, economic, 
political and social needs. The assessment of that effort 
should be multilateral as well. 
One historic model for this proposal is the Inter-American 
Committee for the Alliance for Progress, or ClAP from its 
Spanish-language acronym. This was a distinguished group of 
persons from the hemisphere, including one u.s. 
representative. They regularly reviewed and provided 
independent commentary on the national economic policies and 
programs of the Alliance members. Since they were mostly Latin 
Americans and seen to be unbiased, their advice was accepted in 
the constructive spirit in which it was given. We have been 
told by former members of ClAP and former officials who figured 
in the Alliance for Progress effort that a similar arrangement 
for Central America would make a valuable contribution. 
Governments, including that of the United States, would not 
be bound to accept the judgments of CADO. The u.s. would be 
free to maintain a bilateral economic assistance program in a 
particular country, regardless of performance. But the present 
purely bilateral process has its drawbacks. It factors 
political assessments directly into economic aid decisions. 
This makes the United States the prosecutor, judge and jury. 
It leads to rancorous debate, sometimes poorly informed. This 
Commission's proposal is an effort to explore a new process. 
The responsibility for assessing development performance would 
be assumed in the first instance by a respected multilateral 
body, with donors retaining effective final control of their 
financial resources. The process should be more effective, 
more acceptable to Central America and more compatible with 
present-day views of how sovereign nations should deal with 
each other. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Appendix to Chapter 4: 
Central American Financial Needs 
Forecasts of Central America's net foreign financial needs 
(which are defined as the sum of a country's balance of 
payments current account deficit plus minimal foreign reserve 
build-up) depend on a number of factors including the 
countries' economic policies, the political climate in the 
region, the ability of national and regional institutions to 
use increased assistance productively, and the international 
economic and financial environment. The financial requirements 
also depend on the economic goal: the more rapidly these 
economies grow, the greater their financial need. Faster 
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growth -- at least in Central America -- would both require and 
lead to higher levels of imports; if export earnings do not 
grow as rapidly, then the resulting increase in the deficit 
must be financed by grants, loans, or investments. 
The ultimate economic goal of an expanded financial 
assistance program should be to help the Central American 
countries recreate the conditions necessary for sustainable 
economic growth. In practical terms, the program should focus 
on helping these countries at least to reachieve 1980 levels of 
per capita income by the end of this decade. Because of the 
depth and duration of the economic decline throughout Central 
America over the past several years, returning to 1980 levels 
will be difficult, attainable only with an enormous, sustained 
effort by both the Central Americans and their bilateral and 
multilateral creditors. Average real growth of about 6 percent 
annually (or 3 percent on a per capita basis) is an ambitious 
but realistic target by the end of the decade; this would be 
sufficient to absorb new entrants to the labor market and to 
reduce unemployment. 
There are four key sets of assumptions that underlie our 
estimates of medium-term financial needs: 
* Peace. Without a considerable reduction in the levels of 
violence, efforts to revive the regional economy will 
fail. Economic and financial incentives to invest or 
even to produce would be overwhelmed by the direct and 
indirect effects of political turmoil. Capital flight 
would continue, draining the new financial resources 
which we propose be made available. Moreover, the 
continuing destruction of infrastructure in El Salvador 
would raise further the cost of economic reconstruction 
in that country. 
* Improved Economic Policy. We assume that, over time, the 
Central American countries will c0nsiderably improve 
their economic performance. Public sector deficits must 
be controlled through appropriate fiscal policies. 
Public investment programs should be reoriented towards 
maintenance and rehabilitation. A growing share of 
public sector capital expenditures should be diverted to 
providing credit to the private sector, in order to 
alleviate the difficult financial conditions of many 
firms. Export taxes and other export disincentives 
should be reduced or eliminated and each of these 
countries should maintain a realistic exchange rate 
policy. In addition, local banking systems need to be 
made more efficient, and appropriate incentives to 
encourage savings and investment should be provided. 
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* Increased Economic Assistance: We assume that 
considerably increased economic assistance will be made 
available from bilateral and multilateral s~urces 
starting in 1984. If this assistance is delayed, 
economic recovery will also lag and the 1990 target will 
be even more difficult to achieve. 
* Improved Global Economic Environment: We assume that 
international economic and financial conditions will 
continue to improve. Relatively strong growth, stable or 
declining interest rates, and low inflation in the major 
developed countries are critical to the health of the 
Central American economies. These conditions would 
result in improved demand for manufactured goods and 
commodity exports. If export market access improves and 
if increased investment leads to greater manufactured 
export capacity, the region's export revenues could 
increase, despite the poor price outlook for Central 
America's key commodity exports. The region's terms of 
trade -- the ratio of export prices to import prices --
have fallen more than 60 percent in the last five years 
and only modest recovery is expected. 
Macroeconomic projections have been prepared for Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama 
through 1990. The combination of peace, much improved economic 
performance, increased foreign assistance, higher export 
demand, and improved market access would allow these countries 
to find a way out of the crisis. Export income would increase 
and imports could follow. Overall per capita growth, and more 
particularly consumption, could at least regain the levels of 
1980 and, in some cases, the late 1970's. Unemployment would 
begin falling. 
In aggregate, the six countries would have a cumulative net 
financing requirement of around $24 billion. Excluding 
Nicaragua -- which is the only one of these countries which 
today does not receive u.s. economic assistance -- the total 
would be almost $21 billion. 
External Financing Requirements, 1984 - 1990* 
Costa Rica $ 5.1 
El Salvador 5.5 
Guatemala 4.5 
Honduras 2.3 
Panama 3.2 
Sub-total 20.6 
Nicaragua 3.4 
TOTAL $24.0 
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* Projected aggregate net financing requirements associated 
with achieving 1980 per capita GDP levels in 1990. For 
Panama the goal is to maintain 1982 per capita GNP, since 
through last year the economy continued to expand. 
These projections may underestimate the region's financing 
needs by assuming that capital flight is eliminated after 1983, 
commercial and financial arrears are fully capitalized, 
maturing public and private debts are refinanced, and most 
important, the bulk of new financial resources goes to 
investment rather than consumption. None of these assumptions 
is likely to be realized fully; the overall net borrowing 
requirement would inevitably be greater. In addition, the 
gross financing requirement would be larger by the amount of 
scheduled amortization, which is estimated at about $5 
billion. These debts will have to be ~estructured, which is a 
burden on the creditors, but does not represent a new transfer 
of financial resources. 
This enormous financing requirement reflects the extremely 
adverse economic developments of the past years, the structural 
weaknesses of the Central American economies, the need to 
rebuild infrastructure in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the 
likelihood that even steady progress to develop export capacity 
through appropriate incentives and accelerated investment will 
only gradually have a significant impact on export revenues. 
At the same time, these funds will not stimulate the projected 
economic recovery unless the Central American countries make a 
determined effort to restructure their economies. 
The bulk of the projected financing needs would have to be 
met by official creditors. Over the next several years 
commercial banks are likely to be reluctant to increase their 
exposure in Central America. However, some $4 billion of 
interest payments to banks are due during 1984 - 1990. Based 
on the refinancing proposals which are being discussed or are 
in place, it seems reasonable to assume that at least half of 
these amounts will be reloaned. This fraction could rise as 
economic performance improves. In addition, several of the 
countries are likely to attract some private investment flows, 
especially in the context of an improving political and 
economic environment. In total these private sources could 
provide as much as $6 billion of new loans or investments. 
Thus, official sources would probably have to provide around 
$18 billion. 
For the u.s. this would mean at least $10 to $12 billion 
over the seven years, assuming that World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank, and other bilateral creditors such as Mexico 
and Venezuela increase their assistance programs at least 
modestly from current levels. A successful effort to increase 
assistance from these organizations or to encourage European 
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and Japanese participation would reduce the share needed from 
the United States. 
In the short run, the financing needs in 1984 of the six 
countries which now receive u.s. economic assistance are 
estimated to be around $1.5 to $1.7 billion, based on forecasts 
of their export earnings and internal economic activity. The 
uncovered gap -- after identified lending and investment 
including budgeted u.s. economic assistance -- seems to be as 
much as $0.6 billion. Thus, we have recommended an emergency 
increase in u.s. economic assitance to help cover this 
shortfall, so that the near-term prospects of economic recovery 
will not dim further. 
One adverse consequence of an ambitious recovery and 
reconstruction program would be a sharp increase in debt levels 
in all the Central American countries unless the terms on which 
new assistance is extended are highly concessional. Such an 
increased debt burden would permanently mortgage Central 
America's future, almost regardless of efforts to enhance 
export (and, hence, debt service) capacity. 
Chapter 5 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
A comprehensive effort to promote democracy and prosperity 
among the Central American nations must have as its cornerstone 
accelerated •human development.• Widespread hunger and 
malnutrition, illiteracy, poor educational and training 
opportunities, poor health conditions, and inadequate housing 
are unstable foundations on which to encourage the growth of 
viable democratic institutions. 
In this chapter we focus on social conditions, and on 
efforts which can be undertaken in both the short and medium 
term to help Central Americans improve their living conditions. 
The burden of action in these areas, even more than in some 
others, lies primarily on the Central Americans themselves. 
However well-intentioned, no foreigner can feed, educate, 
doctor, clothe and house another country's people without 
undermining its government or creating cultural conflicts. 
However, the United States can provide some of the resources 
which the Central Americans need to make their programs work, 
and it can counsel on the design of those programs. 
Many Central Americans with whom we met emphasized the 
importance of bold initiatives to improve Central American 
living conditions. In this spirit, we believe the following are 
ambitious yet realistic objectives for the 1980's: 
* The reduction of malnutrition. 
* The elimination of illiteracy. 
* Universal access to primary education. 
* Universal access to primary health care. 
* A significant reduction of infant mortality. 
* A sustained reduction in population growth rates. 
* A significant improvement in housing. 
The programs we outline below are intended to help Central 
Americans achieve these objectives. Such funds as they require 
from the u.s. government would be part of the expanded economic 
assistance program described in the previous chapter. 
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Developing Educational Opportunites 
Central American countries suffer from widespread 
illiteracy, from insufficient numbers and inadequate quality of 
primary and secondary schools, and from shortages of vocational 
training opportunities. Adult literacy is lowest in Guatemala 
(45% of the population in 1976), Honduras (60% in 1980), and El 
Salvador (63%). Nicaragua now claims 90% literacy. Costa Rica 
(90%), Panama (85%) and Belize (92%) all have high literacy 
rates, although there are sharp differences between urban and 
rural rates. For example, in Panama rural literacy is only 65% 
compared to 94% in the urban areas. 
Although over the past twenty years there have been 
improvements in the system, educational quality continues to be 
generally poor. Educational content often has little relevance 
to the practical needs of students, and there is a mismatch in 
all countries between needed skills and the supply of persons 
trained in those skills. Poorly trained and motivated teachers, 
as well as inadequate physical facilities, textbooks, teacher's 
guides, basic educational materials and supplies are pervasive 
problems. 
In general, the Central American educational system is 
weakest at its base: the quality of primary education is low, 
and drop-out rates are high, despite laws mandating universal 
compulsory primary education throughout the region. The 
problems are particularly acute in rural areas where only three 
or four years of education are the norm. Only a portion of 
students -- under 40% in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua (1975 statistics) -- is retained through the primary 
level. 
The problems of the primary education system extend through 
the secondary, vocational and higher education systems. Less 
than 50% of the eligible population is enrolled at the secondary 
level in most countries of the region. Schools are overcrowded, 
teacher salaries are low, and many teachers are ill-prepared. 
Similarly, vocational training opportunities are relatively 
limited, underfunded, and not well matched to critical skill 
shortages. Universities suffer from over-extended facilities, 
over-emphasis on traditional fields (such as the law) at the 
expense of applied disciplines (such as business, management, 
the natural sciences, engineering, and agriculture), poorly 
trained instructors, and extremely high attrition rates. 
Moreover, many of the universities have become highly 
politicized, more concerned with political activism than with 
educating students to meet the concrete needs of their countries. 
We agree with the many Central Americans who told us that a 
substantial improvement in the availability and quality of 
educational opportunities must begin at once and proceed as 
rapidly as possible. The nations of Central America clearly 
understand the importance of education and have made a 
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commitment to it. Although Central American initiatives and 
organizations must carry the burden of designing educational 
programs and reforms, there is also a great need for financial 
and technical assistance for educational reforms and training 
programs. This assistance can be provided by the United States, 
multilateral organizations, and other countries. 
Educational advance also, very centrally, requires solving a 
key health problem: malnutrition. If children are malnourished 
in their earliest years, they come to school mentally and 
physically underdeveloped and the learning process is almost 
inevitably set back. In testimony before the Commission, Dr. 
Nevin Scrimshaw, founder of Nutrition Institute for Central 
America and Panama, brought the dismaying message that 
malnutrition in Central America, after modest reductions, has 
returned to the levels of the 1950's. In El Salvador, 73 per 
cent of the schoolchildren now suffer from malnutrition. Dr. 
Edward Marasciulo, Executive Vice President of the Pan American 
Development Foundation, reported to the Commission that 52 per 
cent of the people in the region are malnourished. 
The Commission concludes that the first priority for 
education in Central America should be nutritional programs 
sufficient to deliver children to school in normal physical and 
mental condition. 
We recommend that the United States increase food aid on an 
emergency basis. 
Although the permanent solution to the problem lies in 
accelerated agricultural development, the United States and 
other donors -- including members of the European Community 
can help in the short run by providing additional food aid. The 
United States now provides about $100 million annually to 
Central America in such aid through the PL 480 program. This 
should be expanded, and also supplemented by increased use of 
the Commodity Credit Corporation program in Central America. In 
addition, the food distribution system needs to be improved to 
absorb increased levels of assistance effectively. 
The United States and other countries can help Central 
Americans improve educational training opportunities. This 
should focus principally on building institutions, although in 
the short run direct training programs may be needed while 
institutions develop. The effort should start with a literacy 
program and continue with programs to help improve the quality 
and broaden the availability of formal education and vocational 
training programs. 
We recommend that the Peace Corps expand its recruitment of 
front line teachers to serve in a new Literacy Corps. 
A Literacy Corps of qualified volunteeers should be created 
to engage in direct teaching and also to train Central Americans 
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to teach their compatriots. The Peace Corps has had long 
experience in this function. We urge a dramatic expansion of 
volunteers in the region from the current 600 to a figure five 
or six times as great, largely in education. Emphasis in 
recruitment should be on mature persons who speak Spanish. 
Other democratic countries in Latin America should be encouraged 
to offer similar groups of volunteers to help combat illiteracy. 
The Literacy Corps would be a remedial effort for adults and 
children over ten who received no schooling at all. To ensure 
that remedial programs in literacy will not be needed beyond 
1990, primary education must be made available to all children. 
We recommend that Peace Corps activities be expanded at the 
primary, secondary, and technical levels in part by establishing 
a Central American Teacher Corps, recruited from the 
Spanish-speaking population of the United states • 
. Here again, we believe that other democracies in Latin 
America should be encouraged to undertake similar programs, and 
that the countries themselves should dramatize the education 
effort by seeking local volunteers. 
The primary schools are the proper focus for a wide range of 
social programs. Basic public health, including nutrition, is 
much easier to assure when a teacher monitors the condition of 
pupils on a day-to-day basis. Inoculations can be given cheaply 
and effectively as part of the school's routine. 
We recommend an expanded program of secondary level 
technical and vocational education. 
Although both the public and private sectors are already 
active in this area, there is a substantial need for additional 
training programs matched to real jobs. We particularly urge 
that business and labor unions develop apprenticeship programs. 
Vocational training is particularly needed in agriculture, 
which is the mainstay of the Central American economies. 
Drawing on its own agricultural experience, the United States 
can offer increased technical support to help Central Americans 
improve produ~tion and productivity of both cash and food 
crops. The United States should also provide both technical 
support and financial assistance to national agricultural 
centers. These centers can provide valuable training and 
technical assistance to farmers and can form the core of 
national and regional agricultural extension efforts. 
Business and public administration are also crucial to the 
future development of the region. Existing institutions such as 
the Central American Institute for Business Administration 
(INCAE) could benefit from increased support from both public 
and private sector sources. 
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We recommend ex ansion of the International Executive 
Service Corps (IESC . 
The !ESC is a private, voluntary organization of retired 
American business executives. An expanded !ESC effort in 
Central America, perhaps with some support from the u.s. 
Government, should give particular attention to training 
managers of small businesses. This would strengthen the 
economy, while also contributing to the development of the 
middle class. 
A major shortcoming of past u.s. educational assistance has 
been insufficient support for Central American universities and 
university students. By contrast, higher education is 
increasingly a major focus of the efforts of the Soviet Union 
and Cuba in the region. According to USIA, total soviet, 
Eastern European, and Cuban university scholarships to Central 
Americans reached 7,500 in 1982, representing a seven-fold 
increase over the last five years. By comparison, in 1982 only 
391 Central American students were supported in this country by 
u.s. government sponsored scholarships. overall Central 
American enrollment in u.s. universities was around 7,200. 
Nevertheless, such educational opportunities in the United 
States are generally limited to students from families with 
relatively high incomes. The targeting of students from lower 
income families and the large number of government scholarships 
distinguish Cuban and Soviet educational strategy from that of 
the United States. 
In all the Central American countries, political and 
academic leaders emphasized the long-run cost of having so many 
of Central America's potential future leaders -- especially 
those from disadvantaged backgrounds -- educated in Soviet Bloc 
countries. We agree that a major initiative is needed and 
should be an essential part of a comprehensive development 
effort. 
Thus, we recommend a program of 10,000 government-sponsored 
scholarships to bring Central American students to the United 
States. 
The United states should provide 5~000 four to six year 
university scholarships and 5,000 two to four year 
vocational-technical scholarships. Admittedly, this is an 
ambitous program compared both to current efforts and to the 500 
scholarships anticipated under the CBI. Nevertheless, it is 
imperative to offer young Central Americans the opportunity to 
study in the United states, both to improve the range and 
quality of educational alternatives and to build lasting links 
between Central America and the United States. 
We suggest that such a program involve the following 
elements: 
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* Careful targeting to encourage participation by young people 
from all social and economic classes. 
* Maintenance of existing admission standards -- which has 
sometimes been a barrier in the past by providing 
intensive English and other training as part of the program. 
* Mechanisms to encourage graduates to return to their home 
countries after completing their education, perhaps by 
providing part of the educational support in the form of 
loans and linking forgiveness of loans to their return. 
* Arrangements by which the Central American countries bear 
some of the cost of the program. 
* The availability of at least 100 to 200 of these 
scholarships to mid-career public service officials and a 
further 100 for University faculty exchanges. 
We are aware that such a program may be viewed as too 
expensive and too dramatic. Experts have testified to the 
Commission that once in place, such a large-scale program would 
cost about $100 million. Because of the important implications 
which the training of a country's future leaders has on its 
political development, we believe this would represent a sound 
investment of u.s. assistance funds. We hope that such a 
program would be supplemented by significant private sector 
efforts. u.s. universities, faced with declining enrollments, 
will have hundreds of thousands of places by 1990 and could 
readily accommodate these students in existing programs. The 
universities would themselves benefit from attracting additional 
Central American students to their campuses. 
We recommend that the United States, in close partnership 
with the Central American governments and universities, develop 
a long-term plan to strengthen the major universities in Central 
America. 
The principal thrust of this assistance effort should be to 
help improve the quality of Central American universities. A 
balanced program of assistance would include: 
* Technical assistance to provide immediate improvements in 
undergraduate teaching and curriculum. 
* Selective investments in improving libraries, laboratories, 
and student facilities. 
* An innovative effort to recruit and train junior faculty and 
young administrators. 
* A complementary program of refresher training and upgrading 
of existing faculty and administrative staff. 
-74-
* An expanded program of pairing of u.s. and Central American 
colleges and universities. 
* A significant expansion of opportunities for faculty, 
students, and administrators to visit the United States for 
periods which may range from a few weeks to several years. 
we recommend that the United States help strengthen Central 
American judicial systems. 
In the absence of strong legal institutions, political, 
security and economic crises are magnified. This has been 
particularly true in El Salvador, where the virtual collapse of 
the nation's criminal justice system both reflects and 
exacerbates the inability of the government to control the 
prevailing cycle of violence and intimidation. In other Central 
American countries, notably Costa Rica and Honduras, the legal 
systems are not in a similar state of crisis. Nevertheless, the 
lon~-term vitality of these crucial legal institutions could 
benefit substantially from u.s. assistance to indigenous efforts 
to strengthen them and to advance the rule of law, in particular 
by improving the training of judges and investigators. 
Specifically, we recommend the use of u.s. economic 
assistance to: 
* Enhance the training and resources of judges, judicial 
staff, and public prosecutors' offices. 
* support modern and professional means of criminal 
investigation. 
* Promote availability of legal materials, assistance to law 
faculties, and support for local bar associations. 
u.s. assistance policy has failed in the past to reflect the 
importance of such steps. We recommend that recent U.S. efforts 
to begin a program of support for legal institutions be 
formalized, expanded, and expressly funded. Much of this 
training would be best supplied by u.s. universities with 
appropriate legal and criminal justice programs. 
Other cultural and educational activities should also be 
encouraged. We should seek particularly to bridge the gap 
between u.s. and Latin American cultures. For instance, a book 
translation and distribution program sponsored by the u.s. 
Information Agency which was once extensive but has lately been 
withering away should be given support. Translation in both 
directions is currently limited in scope and ofien in quality. 
we recommend a greatly expanded effort, subsidized by the 
u.s. Government through the National Endowment for the 
Humanities, to train high level translators, to support 
translations of important books from both languages, and to 
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subsidize their publication so as to make them generally 
available. 
The National Endowment could make an important contribution 
to u.s.-central American understanding through such a center. 
A REGION'S HEALTH 
If Disraeli's view that the "economic health of a nation 
depends first on the health of its people" is true, then it is 
vital that health conditions in Central America be improved as a 
precondition for economic recovery. 
The Central American people suffer from extremely poor 
health conditions, although ther·e are sharp differences among 
countries. The incidence of infectious diseases, parasitism, 
malnutrition, tuberculosis and infant mortality has remained 
virtually unchanged for the last decade. The resurgence of 
malaria and dengue fever alone will, unchecked, undo any hope of 
social or economic development. Respiratory illness, diarrheal 
diseases, and infectious and parasitic diseases that are 
controlled or cured in developed countries are often fatal in 
Central America. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
widespread malnutrition erodes the basis of health care as well 
as of education. 
These conditions affect infants and children with particular 
severity. Although significant improvements have been achieved 
over the past two decades, mortality rates for infants and 
children are substantially higher in Central America than in the 
rest of Latin America. Infant mortality is higher in Nicaragua 
(88 per 1000 births in 1980 according to the World Bank), 
Honduras (86/1000), El Salvador (75/1000) and Guatemala 
(66/1000). In Belize (30/1000), Costa Rica (27/1000) and Panama 
(21/1000), mortality rates are lower, reflecting the 
considerably higher quality of their health care systems. 
In nations where swamps provide breeding grounds for 
mosquitos, where water is neither adequately available nor 
potable, and where there is limited sewage disposal and poor 
sanitation, the incidence of many diseases will reach epidemic 
proportions. Moreover, where medical facilities are few and 
medical personnel lacking, the possibilities for prevention and 
cure are restricted. 
Considerable effort has been made by the governments of 
Central America in the support of primary health care, 
environmental sanitation and population control. There has also 
been substantial investment of resources in the institutional 
treatment of disease. Just as in our own country, hospitals are 
highly visible and their construction is responsive to the 
demands of the local medical profession. This is a necessary 
component of any health system, albeit the most expensive form 
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of care. The stress on primary care by international agencies 
has had the effect of diverting local funding into the tertiary 
care facilities. The relative lack of concern by such agencies 
with the funding of health manpower training has also left the 
Central American countries unable to staff their existing 
facilities adequately. The low priority given to helping these 
nations improve their ability to deliver a higher level of 
health care has been a serious deficiency in development 
assistance programs. 
The United States can play an important role in supporting 
Central American efforts to achieve adequate and comprehensive 
health care. The immediate priorities of such a program are the 
eradication of malnutrition, the provision of primary health 
care, the prevention of disease, the improvement of health care 
delivery systems, the development of adequate secondary and 
tertiary back-up institutions (improving those that already 
exist -- building anew only when essential) and the training of 
health manpower. 
A comprehensive program of primary health care includes both 
preventive and curative medicine. Secondary and tertiary care 
should be concentrated in regional centers and hospitals. 
Improved communication and transportation facilities are 
essential for the primary health care component which these 
regional centers will support. 
Management and planning for the effective use of scarce 
resources .are at the heart of improving curative and preventive 
health services. 
In order to meet this need, we recommend that existing 
technical assistance programs supported by AID should be 
expanded. 
Broader concentration should be placed upon health care 
systems, management health care planning and health economics. 
These specialities are interrelated; therefore, the training of 
Central American candidates for them should be carried out in an 
integrated manner. A regional center for such training should 
be considered in either Costa Rica or Panama, since both of 
these nations have comparatively advanced health care and 
institutional systems. 
The present system of health care in Central America rests 
on a form of government-provided medical service very different 
from our own. We should not seek to impose our system on those 
countries, but should seek to expand upon and improve the 
structures already in place. Central America must develop a 
system of health care suitable to its own needs. But from our 
own experience we can advise them that what is needed is not 
service alone -- more doctors, better hospitals or research, 
important as these are -- but the development and expansion of 
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alternative systems of health care delivery and an expanding 
eff~rt in preventive medicine. 
Voluntary private organizations must play a significant 
role. They have the advantage of being clearly uninvolved in 
political issues, and they can more readily gain local 
confidence. u.s. government participation should be limited 
primarily to providing financing mechanisms to support technical 
assistance in such key areas as management and planning as well 
as in the evaluation process. Administration of such furiding, 
as carried out by the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad 
·(ASHA) -- the section of AID which supports such institutions --
is a good example of public/private cooperation. 
The United States government and other donors have already 
expended considerable resources to promote the development and 
expansion of health resources in Central America. Since the 
mid-1970's the major thrust of United States government support 
h~s been the extension of primary health care services in rural 
areas and the development of village-level water systems. These 
have been important efforts and have contributed to a growing 
awarenesss that the emphasis of health care services in the 
region must switch from the costly hospital-based central system 
to an emphasis on the provision of primary health care. We 
endorse this approach and urge its expansion, using a portion of 
the increased economic assistance which we have recommended be 
made available. 
In addition, other measures are needed: 
We recommend a resumption of the AID-syonsored program to 
eradicate vector-borne diseases such as rna aria and dengue fever. 
An AID-sponsored vector control program was suspended five 
years ago. However, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador 
are currently experiencing a serious resurgence of malaria and 
dengue fever. The mosquito knows no frontiers and Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica and Panama will soon suffer equally unless drastic 
measures are taken to eradicate the breeding grounds of the 
mosquito. Nearly a century ago, malaria and yellow fever were 
eradicated from areas where they had long held sway. We cannot 
allow a terrible regression to the past. 
Research must be supported so as to find insecticides to 
~hich the vectors are not resistant. In the short term we can 
expand the present programs of spraying with the still-effective 
insecticides. We should encourage and support engineering 
projects which would improve drainage and sewage disposal. 
Additional professionals arid volunteers to combat the diseases 
must be trained. 
We recommend that the Unites states support an expansion of 
programs of or~l rehydration and immunization so as to 
reduce dramatically the incidence of childhood disease and 
mortality in Central America during the next five years. 
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The death rate of children in Central America from diarrheal 
disease is ten times higher than in the United States. Such 
other childhood diseases as diptheria, tetanus, whooping cough, 
measles and polio remain endemic to the region. Yet the 
experience of UNICEF, AID and others indicates that these 
scourges of early childhood can be virtually wiped out in a very 
short time by well administered programs of oral rehydration and 
immunization. 
We recommend the continuation of the population and family 
planning programs currently supported by the Agency for 
International Development. 
Overpopulation presents a serious threat to the development 
and health of the region. Attempts must be made through 
education and family planning to reduce the birth rate to a more 
moderate level. 
We recommend that Central American educational institutions 
be encouraged to increase their concentration on the training of 
primary health care workers, nurses, dental assistants and 
personnel in the allied health skills. 
The United States, through AID, should provide funds for 
expanded programs in these areas to be supervised and 
administered by appropriate divisions of AID, by the Peace 
Corps, or by private voluntary organizations. 
With the exception of Honduras, considerable progress has 
been made in the training of physicians for local needs, though 
external training is still required for more sophisticated 
skills. The training of physicians continues to be a priority: 
but the training of nurses, dentists and other allied health 
technicians required for an adequate health system should be 
increased. 
Nursing services are sorely lacking in the region, in part 
because nursing is not accorded the professional status which it 
merits. High-quality nursing is an important priority for the 
region. Thus, we further recommend the establishment of a 
regional nurses' training unit for the purpose of granting 
graduate degrees so as to establish a greater pool of indigenous 
nursing educators. such a unit could be located in either 
Panama or Costa Rica. 
More village health workers, who live among the people, and 
who can detect illness, treat minor problems, and provide 
essential education in health and personal hygiene, the 
cleanliness of homes and utensils, and nutxition and family 
planning, must be trained. Training at this level is more cost 
effective, and has the further advantage that such trainees are 
more likely to remain in their locales. With proper 
encouragement and assistance, this training responsibility can 
be borne by the local professionals. 
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It is also important to address the general issue of health 
care reform. At present, governments of the region claim that 
health care is provided without charge. The unhappy truth is 
that local facilities are often unable to provide either 
medication or essential diagnostic services to the poor, because 
they cannot afford them. Free service is often no service at 
all. In most of the region, there is also a costly and 
inefficient duplication of health services between the 
Ministries of Health and Social Security. Costa Rica has 
transferred all medical services to a single organization. That 
pattern should be considered for adoption or adaptation 
throughout the region. 
Many urban centers in Central America now have well-
equipped and well-staffed private medical institutions. In 
considering the development of private sector enterprises, as 
well as the fulfillment of local needs, a health insurance 
system could be provided so that these institutions could help 
bear the load created by the rapidly growing urban populations. 
The lessons of experience from Medicare and Medicaid and 
from private insurance systems in the United States should be 
brought to bear on the development of demonstration finance 
systems. Existing social insurance programs should be extended 
or modified on a country-by-country basis. This is especially 
significant as the middle class becomes a larger proportion of 
the population. A fundamental principle should be to ensure 
equitable medical care for the indigent. This could begin to 
fill a gap in existing health care systems and avoid the 
unnecessary duplication of health care programs. It could also 
provide for a new, local, private sector initiative where none 
exists, or expand such efforts where they have already begun. 
We recommend that the nations of Central America be urged to 
develop methods which would integrate public and private 
financing of health services. 
In this effort state investment should be focused on primary 
health care services for the rural and urban poor and on 
environmental services for all. Specifically, care must be 
taken to prevent health insurance programs funded in whole or in 
part from public funds from providing excessive support to 
hospital services, thereby discouraging adequate public 
investment in primary care and related· preventive and 
environmental interventions. In every Central Americah capital 
city, as well as in many of the larger provincial towns, there 
are well-equipped private clinics and hospitals available to 
those who can afford the cost. Health care insurance could be 
used to make these services more generally available. 
Finally, the problems of worker health and safety and 
industrial pollution must be addressed. Greater attention needs 
to be paid to standards of worker health and safety. Serious 
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workplace accidents are common. Under present conditions, 
environmental controls are limited. Uncontrolled waste and 
indicriminate use of insecticides and fertilizers are polluting 
the land, rivers and lakes. 
u.s. corporations, active in the region, have a particular 
responsibility to provide leadership in creating safe and 
healthy conditions, as well as to introduce appropriate 
standards of environmental pollution control in their own 
operations. 
HOUSING 
Urbanization throughout Central America is rapidly 
transforming the character of the region. A region wfde 
movement of peoples, from the countryside to the city, places a 
strain on all urban facilities. National and local governments 
are unable to meet the needs of their new residents. Housing 
and the development of urban services are critical needs, 
affecting as much as three-quarters of the population, primarily 
the poor. 
Currently over 40% of the region's people live in cities; in 
Nicaragua and Panama, the majority of the population is urban 
and, by the turn of the century, all the Central American 
countries are expected to be predominantly urban. However, the 
cities lack sufficient resources to cope with their existing 
populations. The past two decades of growth have outpaced the 
ability of the institutions and economies of the various nations 
to provide the whole range of facilities and services we 
associate with life and work in the modern city -- from shelter 
to basic water and sanitation, electricity and phone service, 
public transport, garbage collection, fire and ambulance 
service, etc. Moreover, the economic collapse of the region --
which has brought sharply higher levels of unemployment and has 
further reduced the availability of governmental resources to 
cope with these problems -- has worsened living conditions in 
the cities even more. 
Housing conditions are critical. A very high proportion of 
dwellings, in both urban and rural areas, are built with 
non-permanent materials and lack the most elementary sanitary 
facilities. This is particularly true in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In addition, recent data 
from these countries show that, on average, almost half of all 
urban residences lack basic water services and more than 60% 
lack sewage services. In San Salvador, over one-half the 
metropolitan area households live in marginal settlements. In 
1979 in the metropolitan area of Guatemala City only 44 per cent 
of all households had access to piped water and two-thirds lived 
in marginal settlements. Conditions in rural areas are worse. 
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Efforts to improve conditions have fallen far short of the 
pace of rapidly growing populations; for example, between 1974 
and 1978 in Honduras, almost 33,000 new urban households were 
formed, but only 16,400 new apartments and houses were 
constructed. Moreover, what construction occurs is primarily 
for the wealthy. Eighty-six per cent of El Salvador's total 
1978-79 investment in housing went into dwelling units for 
households in the top 20 to 25 per cent of the income range. In 
Nicaragua the figure was 88 per cent. Similar but less 
exaggerated trends have existed in other countries of the region. 
The prospects for the future are grim. One u.s. government 
estimate indicates that the number of urban households could 
increase by more than 4 million between 1985 and the end of the 
century. Given recent housing construction rates of both 
private builders and government agencies, less than one-quarter 
of this need would be met. This inevitably would mean more 
6vercrowding of existing dwellings, further proliferation of 
marginal and •squatter• settlements, and more pressure on 
already overburdened services. 
Central Americans, in both the public and private sectors, 
must inevitably bear the major part of the burden of providing 
adequate shelter to their people. Unfortunately, governmental 
ineffectiveness and inefficiencies have compounded the 
problems. Cost recovery is generally not practiced. Subsidies 
are heavy and not necessarily related to income or wealth. 
Interest rates are pegged at artificially low levels. Public 
sector bureaucracies, including city governments, are typically 
inefficient, overstaffed, and poorly managed. One typical 
result is that legalization of land tenure has often lagged, 
without which city services cannot be extended. 
The u.s. government and other donors have made housing a 
priority for many years and have probably prevented an even 
worse situation from developing. These efforts have included 
housing guarantee programs, support for the establishment of 
housing banks and other financial associations, training, 
technical assistance, and direct financial support for 
construction financing. These programs should be expanded, in 
close coordination w~th the Central Americans, as part of the 
comprehensive development effort in the region. This also is 
another area where the private sector, both in the United States 
and in Central America, can play a valuable role in mobilizing 
resources and bringing to bear the kinds of practical experience 
which government organizations often lack. 
There are two areas where u.s. assistance should be 
concentrated. 
First, we recommend an enlarged housing and infrastructure 
construction program. 
This recommendation was highlighted in the last chapter, but 
it is important to stress it again here. AID has estimated 
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that, over the next decade, required housing investment in urban 
areas will cost some $700 million annually, with another $2DO 
million in related infrastructure costs. Most of this will 
eventually have to come from local resources, but an expanded 
aid program could also help. In addition to the benefits from 
improved housing, construction programs create productive 
skilled and unskilled jobs. On average, $100 million of 
additional investment in urban construction annually would 
support a construction workforce of at least 20,000. 
However, it is essential that such a program rely heavily on 
the private sector for both design and implement ation. There is 
considerable unused capacity in both the u.s. and Central 
American construction industries that could be harnessed to 
expand the production of shelter and related infrastructure. 
Second , we recommend u.s. gover nment s upport for accelerated 
education and training of pro f ess i ona l s i n public admi ni s t ra tion. 
In our earlier discussion of educational needs and 
priorities we identified such training as essential in many 
fields . Improved public secto r management -- through better 
trained managers -- is critical to addressing the housing and 
shelter , problems of the region in both the short and medium 
term. This should occur both through scholarship and exchange 
programs in the United States and by providing resources to 
national and regional public administration institutes. 
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
The t r agedy of the more than one million displaced persons 
in Central America -- driven from their homes by violence and 
fear of violence -- is well known. Those who have found refuge 
in Mexico, Honduras and Costa Rica are being adequately cared 
for under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees. However, hundreds of thousands remain in El 
Salvador and Guatemala living under the most miserable 
conditions. These nations, whose economies have been seriously 
disrupted, cannot by themselves provide adequate care or relief 
for these people. The refugee camps and overcrowded cities to 
which they have fled become breeding grounds for discontent and 
frustration. 
The Commission believes that effective relief efforts which 
would assist these people would not only serve a humanitarian 
purpose but would have a positive effect on the political, 
social and economic future of the countries involved. 
We recommend e xpanded support for adequate r elief efforts 
through the Ag ency f or I nternat i onal Deve lopment and the 
Depar t ment of St a t e ref ugee program. 
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The Needed Commitment 
The recommendation~ we have made in this chapter constitute 
an ambitious program of human development in Central America. 
They cannot be accomplished by appropriations of money alone. 
Stability and security in the hemisphere depend on the existence 
of democratic and economically viable nations in Central 
America. In turn, this requires that their people be healthy, 
educated, properly housed and free. 
To achieve this requires a consensus in the United States 
that the welfare of Central America is crucial to the well-being 
of the United States itself, and a commitment by thousands of 
corporations and individuals -- as well as by the government --
to help improve living conditions throughout Central America. 
We believe that if this development effort is to succeed, it 
must be supported by th~ educational and business institutions 
of this country. such support is clearly in our own best 
interests, as well as in those of the Central American nations. 
Chapter 6 
CENTRAL AMERICAN SECURITY ISSUES 
We ardently wish that there were no need for a security 
chapter in a report on Central America. But there is. 
The region is torn by war and the threat of war. It needs 
peace in order to have progress. It needs security in order to 
have peace. 
The conflicts that ravage the nations of Central America 
have both indigenous and foreign roots. Restoring peace and 
stability will require a combination of social and political 
reforms, economic advances, diplomatic pursuit and military 
effort. In earlier chapters we dealt with the social, economic 
and political aspects: in the next chapter, we will discuss 
possible diplomatic measures. We hope that negotiations will 
bear fruit so that the people of Central America can devote 
their energies to bettering their lives. That is our strong 
preference -- a vigorous, concrete and comprehensive diplomatic 
effort is set forth in the next section. But even as military 
measures are needed to shield economic and social programs, so 
too are they essential as an adjunct to diplomacy. 
Thus, in this chapter, we discuss the military and 
strategic aspects -- first in their wider dimensions, and then 
in terms of the specific situations now confronting us in 
Central America. 
We have stressed before, and we repeat here: indigenous 
reform movements, even indigenous revolutions, are not 
themselves a security concern of the United States. History 
holds examples of genuinely popular revolutions, springing 
wholly from native roots. In this hemisphere Mexico is a clear 
example. But during the past two decades we have faced a new 
phenomenon. The concerting of the power of the Soviet Union 
and Cuba to extend their presence and influence into vulnerable 
areas of the Western Hemisphere is a direct threat to u.s. 
security interests. This type of insurgency is present in 
Central America today. 
The complexity of the political conflicts in Central 
America aggravates the situation in several countries and 
sometimes obscures the outlines of the different contests that 
are underway. 
In Somoza•s Nicaragua three broad groups were in~olved in 
the struggle for decisive control of that country; the Somoza 
machine, which dominated the country•s government, army and 
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economy~ oppositionists who desired to establish democratic 
institutions including free elections and all the associated 
guarantees~ and Marxist-Leninists who were tied to Cuba and the 
Soviet bloc. 
After 1978 those in Nicaragua who opposed the Somoza regime 
joined together in a single "broad front" which evei:ltually 
overthrew the Somozas. In the ensuing struggle, the 
Marxist-Leninist FSLN, with a monopoly of military power, took 
control of the machinery of government. They have since used 
that control effectively to exclude the democratic opposition 
from power. Some of the latter continue their struggle today 
as leaders of an armed insurgency against the Nicaraguan 
government. 
In El Salvador two separate conflicts have raged since 
1979. One conflict pits persons seeking democratic government 
and its associated rights and freedoms against those trying to 
maintain oligarchical rule and its associated privileges. A 
second conflict pits guerrillas seeking to establish a 
Marxist-Leninist state as part of a broader Central American 
revolution against those who oppose a Marxist-Leninist victory. 
In each of these conflicts one of the parties has pursued 
its goals by violence. Both traditionalist death squads and 
murderous guerrillas have attacked political party, labor and 
peasant leaders working to establish and consolidate democratic 
institutions, killing them and dismantling their efforts to 
build democracy. 
The co-existence of these conflicts greatly complicates the 
task of the democratic forces and their friends. Each violent 
group attempts to hide behind the other. Neither group has 
been will'ing to subordinate its desire for power to the 
civilized disciplines of the democratic process. The violence 
of the death squads weakens fragile democratic institutions at 
a time when they are already under attack by communist 
guerrillas. It wipes out democratic leaders, intimidates the 
less hardy, undermines freedom, and hampers the forces of 
democracy in their struggle against the armed guerrillas. 
Marxist-Leninist violence imposes the economic and social 
strains of war on El Salvador at the same time that it kills 
Salvadorans, progressively destroys the economy, disrupts and 
intimidates the democratic leaders and others, and weakens 
those struggling to consolidate democratic institutions. 
Both violent groups are morally and politically repugnant 
to this Commission, which strongly supports the consolidation 
and defense of democratic institutions in El Salvador. 
In previous chapters, the Commission has proposed a number 
of measures designed to encourage and assist Salvadorans in the 
consolidating of democratic institutions and strengthening the 
rule of law, including technical assistance for elections, 
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economic and education programs. In this chapter we recommend 
"conditioning" military assistance to the government of El 
Salvador on progress in the effort to bring death squads under 
control. 
It is not only for the sake of democratic reform and human 
rights that we oppose the death squads. Their violent attacks 
-upon Salvadoran democrats handicap the struggle to resist the 
armed insurgency of the guerrillas. This Marxist insurgency 
not only opposes democracy and is committed to the violent 
seizure of power, but also threatens u.s. security interests 
because of its ties to Nicaragua, Cuba, anq the Soviet Union. 
The policy challenge facing the United States is to untangle 
these two conflicts -- to support the forces of democratic 
reform against the death squads while at the same time helping 
El Salvador resist subjugation by Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. 
A major goal of u.s. policy in Central America should be to 
give democratic forces there the ~ime and the opportunity to 
carry out the structural reforms essential for that country's 
security and well-being. 
Because this chapter addresses the question of security, it 
will focus initially on the threat posed by Marxist-Leninist 
insurgencies in Central America. It will then put forward 
proposals to end human rights abuses by the death squads. 
The externally-supported guerrilla insurgency that 
confronts us in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America is 
really a new kind of war. It differs as much from indigenous 
revolts as it does from conventional wars. It is more complex, 
both in concept and in execution. By now the world has had 
enough experience with it so that its nature is known and its 
patterns are predictable. 
An examination of any particular externally-supported 
insurgency requires an understanding of a) the internal 
conditions that invited it, and b) the external forces that 
support ' it. Both are essential elements, and the interaction 
between them is one of the key factors that make these wars so 
difficult for governments to win and so devastating for the 
people who become their victims. 
The Path of Insurgency. 
Cuba and Nicaragua did not invent the grievances that made 
insurrection possible in El Salvador and elsewhere. Those 
grievances are real and acute. In other chapters we have 
discussed ways of remedying them. But it is important to bear 
in mind three facts about the kind of insurgencies we confront: 
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* They depend on external support, which is substantially 
more effective when it includes the provision.of 
privileged sanctuaries for the insurgents. 
* They develop their own momentum, independent of the 
conditions on which they feed. 
* The insurgents, if they win, will create a totalitarian 
regime in the image of their sponsors• ideology and their 
own. 
Let us first take these three points, briefly, in order, 
and then examine them more fully in the particular context of 
the struggle now going on in Central America. 
External Intervention. Whatever the social and economic 
conditions that invited insurgency in the region, outside 
intervention is what gives the conflict its present character. 
Of course, uprisings occur without outside support, but 
protracted guerrilla insurgencies require external assistance~ 
Indeed, if wretched conditions were themsei"ves enough to create 
such insurgencies, we would see them in many more countries of 
the world. 
Propaganda support, money, sanctuary, arms, supplies, 
training, communications, intelligence, logistics, all are 
important in both morale and operational terms. Without such 
support from Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, neither in 
El Salvador nor elsewhere in Central America would such an 
insurgency pose so severe a threat to the government. With 
such support, guerrilla forces could develop insurgencies in 
many other countries. The struggle in El Salvador is 
particularly severe because it is there that external support 
is at present most heavily concentrated. 
Therefore, curbing the insurgents• violence in El Salvador 
requires, in part, cutting them off from their sources of 
foreign support. 
Independent Momentum. If reforms had been undertaken 
earlier, ther e would almost surely have been no fertile ground 
for revolution, and thus no effectively developed insurgency. 
But once an insurgency is fully under way, and. once the lines 
of external support are in place, it has a momentum which 
reforms alone cannot stop. Unchecked, the insurgents can 
destroy faster than the reformers can build. 
One reason for this is that an explicit purpose of 
guerrilla violence is to make matters worse: to paralyze the 
economy, to heighten social discords, to spread fear and 
despair, to weaken institutions and to undermine government 
authority -- all so as to radicalize the people, and to 
persuade them that any alternative is better than what they 
have. By disrupting order, the strategy of terror strikes at 
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the foundation of authority. By helping to provoke the use of 
counter-terror, as Carlos Marighella wrote in his classic 
terrorist tract, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, guerrillas 
can transform "the political situation in the country ••• into a 
military situation in which the militarists appear more and 
more to be the ones responsible for terror and violence, while 
the problems in the lives of the people become truly 
catastrophic." 
None of this legitimizes the use of arbitrary violence by 
the right in El Salvador or elsewhere. Indeed, the grim 
reality is that many of the excesses we have condemned would be 
present even if there were no guerrilla war supported by 
outside forces. But this analysis does explain why political, 
economic and social programs do not by themselves defeat these 
insurgencies, though they address a central part of the 
problem. If the reforms are to be effective, the violence must 
be checked -- which means that the security situation must be 
improved dramatically. 
The Totalitarian Outcome. Because the Marxist-Leninist 
insurgents appeal to often legitimate grievances, a popular 
school of thought holds that guerrilla leaders are the engines 
of reform. They characteristically reinforce this by inviting 
well-meaning democratic leaders to participate in a Popular 
Front, taking care, however, to retain in their own hands a 
monopoly of the instruments of force. If the insurgents were 
in fact the vehicles for democratic and social progress, the 
entire security issue would be moot; they would no longer be 
the problem, but rather the solution. 
Unfortunately, history offers no basis for such optimism. 
No Marxist-Leninist "popular front" insurgency has ever turned 
democratic after its victory. Cuba and Nicaragua are striking 
examples. Regimes created by the victory of Marxist-Leninist 
guerrillas become totalitarian. That is their purpose, their 
nature, their doctrine, and their record. 
The Cuban-Soviet Connection 
In retrospect it is clear that Castro's communization of 
Cuba was a seminal event in the history of the Americas -- a 
fact appreciated almost immediately by the Soviet Union. It 
prompted Khrushchev to declare in 1960 that the Monroe Doctrine 
had "outlived its times" and had died "a natural death". 
Soviet policy in this hemisphere has followed the pattern 
of Soviet policy elsewhere in the world: Moscow has exploited 
opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence. In the 
aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets concentrated 
on expanding their diplomatic, economic and cultural ties in 
Latin America and on strengthening the influence of local 
communist parties in broad electoral fronts, trade unions and 
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the universities. In this respect they differed from Castro, 
who continued to support a course of armed struggle in 
Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and several other countries. 
But later the fall of Allende in Chile and the subsequent 
right-wing takeovers in Uruguay, Argentina, and Bolivia 
discredited the Soviet expectation of the "peaceful path" to 
communism in Latin America. 
In the 1970 1 s, a number of other developments combined to 
shift the Soviet Union toward a more adventurous approach, 
including support for revolutionary armed struggle in Central 
America. 
One of these developments was the triumph of Soviet-backed 
forces in Indochina, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South 
Yemen. This seemed to reward a more aggressive Soviet policy 
toward the Third World generally, in keeping with the 
perception in Moscow that the "correlation of forces" had 
shifted dramatically against the West. 
The result was a very·significant strengthening of the 
Soviet military capability in the Caribbean. This included a 
dramatic build-up in the size and sophistication of the Cuban 
Armed Forces, not least their air and naval components; an 
enlarged direct Soviet military presence in Cuba, with regular 
port calls by Soviet naval task forces and nuclear missile 
submarines and the deployment of advanced reconnaissance 
aircraft; increased numbers of Soviet military advisers; and 
close operational collaboration between Soviet and Cuban 
forces, as, for example, when Russian pilots were sent to Cuba 
in 1976 and 1978 to replace Cuban pilots aiding pro-Soviet 
regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. 
This coincided with a reduction in the u.s. military 
presence in the Caribbean Basin (from over 25,000 in 1968 to 
under 16,000 in 1981), in the wake of Vietnam and in a climate 
of public hostility to u.s. security concerns, especially in 
the Third World. 
Finally, the 197o•s saw the sharpening of the social, 
economic, and political crisis in Central America -- a 
development extensively dealt with elsewhere in this report 
which made the region an inviting target for insurgency. 
The success of the revolution in Nicaragua in 1979, like 
Castro•s own accession to power a decisive event, accelerated 
the revision of Soviet policy toward revolution in Central 
America. The President of the Soviet Association of Friendship 
with Latin American countries, Viktor Volski, called the armed 
victory in Nicaragua a "model" to be followed in other 
countries, while Boris Ponomarev, the chairman of the 
International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist Party, included the countries of Central America for 
the first time among Third World states undergoing 
revolutionary changes of "a socialist orientation." 
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Cuban and Soviet perceptions began to merge again. The new 
line was quickly accepted by the Communist Party of El Salvador 
(PCES), which had previously described the country's insurgent 
groups as "adventurist" and "bound to fail," and had been 
accused, in turn, of "decadence" and "revisionism." The PCES 
now made a complete about face and turned toward armed 
struggle. The Party Secretary General, Shafik Jorge Handal, 
wrote in Kommunist, the theoretical organ of the Soviet 
Communist Party, that the Salvadoran revolution "will be 
victorious by the armed road ••• there is no other way." 
The revolutionary strategy pursued in 1978-79 by Cuba in 
Nicaragua has since been attempted in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras. Traditionally splintered insurgent groups were 
r~quired to unify as a condition for increased Cuban and other 
Soviet bloc military support. This creation of a uni f ·ied 
military front allowed Cuba to exercise greater control over 
the uprising. Meanwhile, a separate political front was 
created-- a "broad coalition," led by the extreme left but 
including some elements of the noncommunist opposition. Such a 
political front allowed the guerrillas to co-opt some 
noncommunist leaders and to neutralize them as rival 
alternatives to the existing government. This objective was 
also served by the insurgency itself, which undermined the 
political center by sharpening the increasingly violent 
confrontation between left and right. The popular-front tactic 
helped the guerrillas to disarm critics by posing as 
noncommunist democrats, to obtain noncommunist international 
support, and to attempt to isolate the targeted government from 
Western political and material help. 
Cuba was in a position to back up this strategy with an 
institutional capacity to promote guerrilla warfare far greater 
than it had possessed during the 1960's. The principal 
instrument was the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist 
Party, established in Havana in 1974 to centralize Cuba's 
operational control over covert revolutionary activities 
throughout the hemisphere and particularly in Central America. 
The Department's activities also included supervision of a 
network of guerrilla training camps and indoctrination schools 
inside Cuba. 
The commitment to the promotion of armed struggle was 
further backed up by a dramatic increase in Soviet arms 
deliveries to Cuba. They grew from an average of 15,000 tons a 
year in the 1970's -- roughly equal to current deliveries to 
Nicaragua -- to 66,000 tons in 1981, and about the same amount 
in each of the following two years. Cuba's armed forces 
currently total 227,000, a fivefold increase over 1960, and 
this figure does not include paramilitary and reserve 
organizations of 780,000. Cuban forces are well equipped with 
sophisticated weaponry supplied by Moscow, have extensive 
combat experience on foreign soil, and are well trained. In 
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addition, the Soviets provide a brigade of approximately 3,000 
men stationed near Havana, as well as an additional presence of 
2,500 military advisers and 8,000 civilian advisers. 
The Cuban Air Force now has more than 200 combat jet 
aircraft, including three squadrons of Mig-23's, as well as 
Mi-8 helicopter gunships and Mi-24 assault helicopters. AN-26 
and other transport aircraft give Cuba a logistic capability 
much greater than it had at the time of the airlift to Angola 
in 1975. An expansion of the Cuban Navy which began in the 
1970's has continued with the acquisition of two Foxtrot 
submarines, a Koni-class frigate, minesweepers, and landing 
craft, and an upgrading of the naval base at Cienfuegos, which 
services nuclear submarines. 
All this makes Cuba no less than the second military power 
in Latin America after Brazil, a country with twelve times 
Cuba's population. And some experts put Cuba ahead of even 
Brazil in terms of modern military capabilities. Cuba's island 
geography complicates its sponsorship of subversion. But 
Nicaragua suffers no such limitation. From . there, men and 
materiel destined for El Salvador can be transported overland 
through remote areas by routes that are almost impossible to 
patrol on a constant basis, or by sea to isolated beaches, or 
by air at night to remote bush strips along the coast or 
farther inland. Furthermore, Cuba, with Soviet aid, has built 
a powerful radio communication center that is now being used to 
relay the orders of insurgent leaders based in Nicaragua to 
their troops in the field, thus making the Salvadoran 
guerrillas far more effective than would otherwise be possible. 
As a mainland platform, therefore, Nicaragua is a crucial 
steppingstone for Cuban and Soviet efforts to promote armed 
insurgency in Gentral America. Its location explains why the 
Nicaraguan revolution of 1979, like the Cuban revolution 20 
years earlier, was a decisive turning point in the affairs of 
the region. With the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, 
the levels of violence and counter-violence in Central America 
rapidly increased, engulfing the entire region. 
Strategic Implica tions for the United States 
Through most of its history, the United States has been 
able to take for granted our security in our own hemisphere. 
We have come to think, as Walter Lippmann wrote four decades 
ago, "that our privileged position was · a natural right." In 
fact, it was the rivalries in Europe and the supremacy of 
British seapower that allowed us to uphold the Monroe Doctrine 
with minimal effort for more than a century -- until the 
intrusion of communism into Cuba. 
The ability of the United States to sustain a tolerable 
balanqe of power on the global scene at a manageable cost 
dep~nds· .on the inherent security of its land borders. This 
I 
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advantage is of crucial importance. It offsets an otherwise 
serious liability: our distance from Europe, the Middle East, 
and East Asia, which are also of strategic concern to the 
United States. Security commitments in those areas require the 
United States to supply its forces overseas at the far end of 
trans-oceanic lines of communication whose protection can be 
almost as costly as the forces themselves. 
At the level of global strategy, therefore, the advance of 
Soviet and Cuban power on the American mainland affects the 
global balance. To the extent that a further Marxist-Leninist 
advance in Central America leading to progressive deterioration 
and a further projection of Soviet and Cuban power in the 
region required us to defend against security threats near our 
borders, we would face a difficult choice between unpalatable 
alternatives. We would either have to assume a permanently 
increased defense burden, or see our capacity to defend distant 
trouble-spots reduced, and as a result have to reduce important 
commitments elsewhere in the world. From the standpoint of the 
Soviet.Union, it would be a major strategic coup to impose on 
the United States the burden of defending our southern 
approaches, thereby stripping us of the compensating advantage 
that offsets the burden of our transoceanic lines of 
communication. 
Such a deterioration in Central America would also greatly 
increase both the difficulty and the cost of protecting these 
lines of communications themselves. Under present plans, some 
SO percent of the shipping tonnage that would be needed to 
reinforce the European front, and about 40 percent of that 
required by a major East Asian conflict, would have to pass 
from the Gulf of Mexico through the Caribbean-Central American 
zone. These same sea routes also carry nearly half of all 
other foreign cargo, including crude oil, shipped to this 
country. 
The Soviets have already achieved a greater capability to 
interdict shipping than the Nazis had during World War II, when 
SO percent of u.s. supplies to Europe and Africa were shipped 
from Gulf ports. German U-boats then sank 260 merchant ships 
in just six months, despite the fact that Allied forces enjoyed 
many advantages, including a two-to-one edge in ·submarines and 
the use · of Cuba for resupply and basing operations. Today this 
is reversed. The Soviets now have a two-to-one edge overall in 
submarines and can operate and receive aircover from Cuba, a 
point from which all 13 Caribbean sea lanes passing through 
four chokepoints are vulnerable to interdiction. 
The Soviet ability to carry out a strategy of "strategic 
denial" is further enhanced by the presence near Havana of the 
largest Soviet-managed electronic monitoring complex outside 
the Soviet Union, as well as by the regular deployment of TU-9S 
Bear naval reconnaissance aircraft. 
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Now there is the added threat of an entire new set of 
problems posed by Nicaragua. It already serves as a base of 
subversion, through overland infiltration of people and 
supplies, that can affect the entire region, Panama included. 
Panama is gradually assuming full responsibility for the 
security of the Canal: this means that any threat to the 
political security of that country and to the maintenance of 
its friendly relations with the United States automatically 
constitutes a strategic threat. 
As Nicaragua is already doing, additional Marxist-Leninist 
regimes in Central America could be expected to expand their 
armed forces, bring in large numbers of Cuban and other Soviet 
bloc advisers, develop sophisticated agencies of internal 
repression and external subversion, and sharpen polarizations, 
both within individual countries and regionally. This would 
almost surely produce refugees, perhaps millions of them, many 
of whom would seek entry into the United States. Even setting 
aside the broader strategic considerations, the United States 
cannot isolate itself from the regional turmoil. The crisis is 
on our doorstep. 
Beyond the issue of u.s. security interests in the Central 
American-Caribbean region, our credibility worldwide is 
engaged. The triumph of hostile forces in what the Soviets 
call the "strategic rear•• of the United States would be read as 
a sign of u.s. impotence. 
Thus, even in terms of the direct national security 
interests of the United States, this country has large stakes 
in the present conflict in Central America. They include 
preventing: 
* A series of developments which might require us to devote 
large resources to defend the southern approaches to the 
United States, thus reducing our capacity to defend our 
interests elsewhere. 
* A potentially serious threat to our shipping lanes 
through the Caribbean. 
* A proliferation of Marxist-Leninist states that would 
increase violence, dislocation, and political repression 
in the region. 
* The erosion of our power to influence events worldwide 
that would flow from the perception that we were unable 
to influence vital events close to home. 
The Problems of Guerriila War 
Despite these high stakes, the debate over Central America 
has been polarized in the United States. One reason may be the 
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seeming paradox in which important security questions are 
raised by small conflicts in an area which we have customarily 
neglected. 
On the one hand, the territories involved are not large, 
and neither is the number of soldiers, policemen, and 
insurgents active in each country. The current amounts of u.s. 
military assistance are also not significant by global 
standards. In the last fiscal year, for example, u.s. military 
aid to all countries in Central America combined amounted to 
$121.3 million, or 3 percent· of u.s. military assistance 
worldwide. 
On the other hand, there is the extreme intricacy of the 
struggles. They proceed concurrently in the realms of internal 
politics, regional diplomacy, and the global East-West 
competition, including worldwide propaganda: they comprise both 
guerrilla and terrorist phenomena as well as more conventional 
confrontations among armed forces: and they are governed by 
very complicated interactions between violence in all its forms 
and the political, social, and economic circumstances of each 
country. 
Thus what is being tested is not so much the ability of the 
United States to provide large resources but rather the realism 
of our political attitudes, the harmony of Congressional and 
Administration priorities, and the adaptability of the military 
and civil departments of the Executive. What is more, Central 
American realities often clash with our historical experience 
and with the disparity between our resources and those of the 
threatened countries. 
The fundamental dilemma is as follows: both the national 
interests of the United States and a genuine concern for the 
long-term welfare of Central America create powerful incentives 
to provide all neces~ary assistance to defeat totalitarian 
guerrillas. At the same time one of the principal objectives 
of the guerrilla forces is to destroy the morale and efficiency 
of the government's administration and programs. 
We thus labor under an immediate handicap. Unlike the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the u.s. cannot -- and should not 
-- impose its own administration, even for such laudable 
objectives as implementing political, social and economic 
reforms: it cannot place its own experts in each village and 
town to gather political intelligence: and it cannot supervise 
the conduct of each soldier and policeman in all dealings with 
the population. For all these goals, the U.S. Government must 
rely on the abilities and good faith of the government under 
attack. 
But that government -- already fragile because of history 
and structure and co~flicting attitudes -- is being 
systematically weakened further by the conditions of guerrilla 
warfare in which it must function. 
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Much attention has been paid -- correctly -- to the 
shortcomings of the El Salvador government. But it is 
important -- and only fair -- to recall the many demands that 
have been made upon it and the progress that has been made in 
many fields. It carried out impressive elections in 1982, 
despite severe intimidations by the guerrillas, and will 
conduct another one this March. It has been going forward with 
an extensive land reform program. It allows debate, freedom of 
assembly, opposition and other aspects of democracy, ho~ever 
imperfect. Albeit belatedly and due to u.s. pressure, it is 
beginning to address the problem of right-wing violence. It 
has made offers to the insurgents to resolve the conflict 
through the political process. All of this has been done in 
the midst of a bitter war. It is a record that compares very 
favorably with El Salvador•s past and with that of its 
neighbor, Nicaragua. 
There is, of course, a darker side as well in El Salvador. 
The United States obviously cannot accept, let alone support, 
the brutal methods practiced by certain reactionary forces in 
Central America. Some of these actions are related to 
counter-insurgency. Their common denominator is the systematic 
use of mass reprisals and selective killing and torture to 
dissuade .the civil population from participating in the 
insurgency or from providing any help for the insurgents. 
Historically, such reprisals, along with the static guard of 
key installations and the occasional ambush of betrayed 
insurgent bands, have often proved capable of preserving 
colonial rule and unpopular governments for a very long time, 
even centuries. Other violence has in fact ~othing to do with 
insurgency at all. It is designed to terrorize opponents, 
fight democracy, protect entrenched interests, and restore 
reactionary regimes. 
Whatever their aims, these methods are totally repugnant to 
the values of the United States. Much more enlightened 
counter-insurgency models were pursued in, for example, 
Venezuela and Colombia in the 1960 1 s when military action was 
combined with positive economic and political measures. The 
methods of counter-insurgency developed over the last 
generation by the armed forces of the United States are 
consistent with such models. They depend upon gaining the 
confidence and support of the people and specifically exclude 
the use of violence against innocent civilians. 
Yet these methods are expensive. In addition to continued 
action on the economic and social ·fronts, they require two 
forms 'of military action, to be carried out by two distinct 
types of forces. First, local popular militias must be formed 
throughout the country (·with whatever minimal training is 
feasible and with only the simplest weapons) to prevent the 
insurgents from using terror to extract obedience. These must 
include members trained as paramedics to deliver basic health 
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care, which evokes strong local support for these forces. 
Since this localized protective militia cannot be expected to 
resist any sustained guerrilla attack, u.s. counter-insurgency 
methods also require the availability of well-trained and 
well-equipped regular forces in adequate numbers. These 
methods assume that the regular units will be provided with 
efficient communications and suitable transport, notably 
helicopters, to enable them to provide prompt help for village 
militias under attack, and to allow them to pursue guerrilla 
bands on the move. 
The present level of u.s. military assistance to El 
Salvador is far too low to enable the armed forces of El 
Salvador to use these modern methods of counter-insurgency 
effectively. At the same time, the tendency in some quarters 
of the Salvadoran military towards brutality magnifies 
Congressional and Executive pressures for further cuts in aid. 
A vicious cycle results in which violence and denial of human 
rights spawn reductions in aid, and reductions in aid make more 
difficult the pursuit of an enlightened counter-insurgency 
effort. 
The combination of the tactical guidance given by u.s. 
advisers and levels of aid inadequate to support that advice 
creates a potentially disastrous disparity between U.S. 
military tactics and Salvadoran military resources. u.s. 
tactical doctrine abjures static defense and teaches constant 
patrolling. But this requires the provision of expensive 
equipment such as helicopters. In their absence, the 
Salvadoran military abandon their static defenses for intensive 
foot patrolling, only to find the stategic objective they had 
been guarding destroyed in their absence. 
In the Commission's view it is imperative to settle on a 
level of aid related to the operational requirements of a 
humane anti-guerrilla strategy and to stick with it for the 
requisite period of time. 
Another obstacle to the effective pursuit of anti-guerrilla 
strategy is a provision of current U.S. law under which no 
assistance can be provided to law enforcement agencies. This 
dates back to a previous period when it was believed that such 
aid was sometimes helping groups guilty of serious human rights 
abuses. The purpose of the legislation was to prevent the 
United States and its personnel from being associated with 
unacceptable practices. That concern is valid, but, however 
laudable its intentions, the blanket legal prohibition against 
the provision of training and aid to police organizations has 
the paradoxical effect, . in certain cases, of inhibiting our 
efforts to improve human rights performance. For example, 
while it is now understood in the Salvadoran armed forces that 
human rights ·violations endanger the flow of u.s. assistance, 
in the police organizations there is no training to 
professionalize an~ humanize operations. And in Costa Rica, 
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where the police alone provide that country's security, we are 
prevented from helping that democracy defend itself in even the 
most rudimentary fashion. 
We therefore suggest that Congress examine this question 
thoroughly and consider whether Section 660 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act should be amended so as to permit --. under 
carefully defined conditions -- the allocation of funds to the 
training and support of law enforcement agencies in Central 
America. 
A final problem is philosophical. our historic tendency as 
a nation is to think about diplomacy and military operations as 
antithetical. The fact is that the principles outlined here 
will enhance the prospects of a political solution whose 
characteristics are outlined in ·the next chapter. Experience 
suggests that a lasting political, solution will become possible 
only when the insurgents are convinced that they cannot win 
through force, and are therefore willing to settle for the next 
best option: taking advantage of opportunities for democratic 
competition and participation. 
In this regard, a military stalemate will not enhance but 
rather would inhibit the prospect·s for a political solution, 
since it would confirm that the government cannot prevail. 
This is itself a chief goal of an insurgency that aims to 
undermine a government's legitimacy. In a guerrilla war, a 
stalemate is not the same as a balance of power. Moreover, 
while an insurgency can sustain itself over time if it has 
access to sanctuaries and external sources of support, there is 
nothing to suggest that a government, especially a weak one, 
can endure the cumulative toll of protracted conflict. A 
successful counter-insurgency effort is not a substitute for 
negotiations. But such an effort -- the more rapid the better 
-- is a necessary condition for a political solution. 
The Situation in El Salvador 
The war is at a stalemate -- a condition that in the long 
term favors the guerrillas. They have relativel·y little 
popular support in El Salvador, but they can probably continue 
the war as long as they receive the sort of external support 
they are now getting. 
The guerrilla front (the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front -- FMLN) has established a unified military 
command with headquarters near Managua. The dominant element 
of the five guerrilla groups making up the FMLN is now the 
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), which is active in eastern 
El Salvador. ERP strategy is one of systematic attacks on the 
economic infrastructure, in order to precipitate an economic 
and political collapse, and military actions designed for 
political and psychological effect. The ERP leaders are keenly 
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interested in the impact of guerrilla actions on international 
public opinion, especially in the U.S., where they hope to 
discourage further support for El Salvador's Government. 
The number of guerrillas has remained basically unchanged 
for the last two years: there are an estimated 6,000 front-
line guerrillas and a slightly larger number organized in 
militia and support units. But these latter forces have been 
increasingly well armed and involved in operations with the 
front-line forces. The insurgents can now put perhaps as many 
as 12,000 trained and armed fighters in the field. Currently 
the Salvadoran armed forces, including defense and public 
security forces, have about 37,500 men. That gives the 
government less than a 4 to 1 advantage over the insurgents. A 
ratio of 10 to 1 has generally been considered necessary for 
successful counter-insurgency, though this ratio varies by 
individual case and clearly depends upon the capability and 
mobility of the government forces. In any event, the 
guerrillas have been able to demonstrate an increasing ability 
to maneuver and to concentrate their forces, and to react to 
Salvadoran Army moves. 
In 1983, as in the past, the war was characterized by a 
cyclical pattern, in which the initiative swung between 
government and guerrilla forces. The ebb and flow of field 
operations has enabled the guerrillas to strengthen their 
presence in the eastern departments over the past two years. 
In the absence of significant Salvadoran military forces, armed 
guerrillas operate at will throughout the countryside. They 
have established the rudiments of a civil administration and 
have enforced a tax regime in areas under their control. 
Increasingly, they are able to mass their forces and overwhelm 
isolated garrisons or ambush relief columns. 
The severity of guerrilla attacks on the transportation and 
electri~al network in the eastern departments has resulted in 
the effective isolation of much of that area. The nature and 
extent of guerrilla operations have led to speculation that the 
military objective of the guerrillas in the eastern departments 
might be the establishment of a "liberated" zone, as a prelude 
to the extension of the war into the central departments. 
The situation is not uniformly favorable to the 
guerrillas. Their bases in San Vicente have been disrupted. 
They have lost their infrastructure in western El Salvador and 
have been unable to reconstitute their support network in the 
cities. But although the military situation continues to be 
essentially a stalemate, the guerrillas' campaign of economic 
disruption and sabotage has helped to devastate the Salvadoran 
economy. In large part due to the violence, the country's 
gross domestic product has declined 25 percent in real terms in 
the last four years. In eastern El Salvador, the economic 
decline has been even more precipitous. 
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In part, the Salvadoran military's difficulties in 
containing the guerrilla threat are related to manpower 
problems -- their training, their retention, their equipment, 
and their development. About three quarters of the Salvadoran 
armed forces are deployed in static positions that protect 
fixed installations. This leaves insufficient maneuver forces 
to carry the war consistently to the guerrillas. 
The Commission has heard testimony that as the end of the 
U.S. fiscal year approaches the Salvadoran armed forces husband 
ammunition and equipment until the scale of congressional 
appropriations for U.S. assistance becomes clearer. At present 
assistance levels there are critical shortages of basic 
equipment, including communications, medicaL equipment and 
airlift assets. 
The Salvadoran armed forces have also suffered from 
inadequate command and control, coordination and leadership. A 
recent major reorganization of the military command structure 
is designed to achieve needed improvements in command and 
control and coordination, and to lead to a more aggressive 
prosecution of the war. But to end the stalemate will require 
much more in equipment and trained manpower. 
The Insurgency in Guatemala 
The insurgency in Guatemala is at a much lower level. 
There are about 2,500 guerrillas in four groups loosely 
organized under an umbrella organization. The guerrillas lost 
critical ground in the fall of 1982 and have not yet 
recovered. The guerrillas engage in harassment and terrorism 
but make no attempt to hold ground or to engage military units 
in sustained combat. 
The Guatemalan Army continues to apply counter-insurgency 
tactics developed through 20 years of experience in the field. 
At the heart of these tactics is aggressive and persistent 
small-unit patrolling in areas of guerrilla activity. A key 
feature of the counter-insurgency effort has been the 
organization of about 400,000 campesinos and Indians into Civil 
Defense Forces. These forces are poorly armed -- only about 
one in ten men in some units is armed with a gun, usually an 
M-1 rifle -- but they provide security for villagers, go on 
patrol regularly and have taken heavy casualties in contacts 
with insurgents. 
The positive aspect of the counter-insurgency program is· 
civic action, in which the Guatemalan Army has a long 
tradition. Under Rios Montt t h e armed forces provided food 
and housing materials to villages participating in the Civil 
Defense program. The Guatemalan government's financial crisis, 
however, has led to a slowdown of the civic action efforts. 
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The Guatemalan armed forces have been able so far to 
contain the insurgency without assistance from abroad. This 
relative success is due to a number· of factors: long 
experience in counter-insurgency: the greater geographical 
difficulty the guerrillas have in obtaining supplies from 
Nicaragua, as contrasted with the Salvadoran case: and the more 
favorable conditions for counter-insurgency operations 
prevailing in the less densely populated backlands of 
Guatemala. But financial restrictions on the Guatemalan 
government and shortages of military supplies and spare parts 
could soon begin to limit the effectiveness of the Guatemalan 
counter-insurgency effort. 
An even more serious obstacle in terms of the ultimate 
containment of armed revolt in Guatemala is the brutal behavior 
of the security forces. In the cities they have murdered those 
even suspected of dissent. In the countryside, they have at 
times killed indiscriminately to repress any sign of support 
for the guerrillas. Such actions are morally unacceptable. 
They are also self-defeating -- as long as they persist, the 
conditions in which insurgency can appear and reappear will 
continue. · 
Other Regional Security Problems 
Security problems of a different order exist elsewhere in 
the region. Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts to foment insurgency 
in Honduras have so far failed. But on its visit to 
Tegucigalpa, the Commission found a deep anxiety over the 
extraordinary military buildup in Nicaragua. The Sandinista 
armed forces far outnumber and out-gun those of Nicaragua's 
northern neighbor. The advantage of the aging Honduran air 
force would quickly disappear if the Sandinistas acquired a few 
high performance aircraft. Although it is questionable whether 
Nicaragua as yet has the logistical and other capabilities 
needed to mount a conventional cross-border attack, the buildup 
points in the direction of their acquiring such capabilities. 
In the absence of a regional political settlement, Honduras 
will feel compelled to strengthen and modernize its armed 
forces. 
Although the government of Costa Rica has proclaimed a 
policy of strict mil·itary neutrality in the region's conflicts, 
we found in that country, too, a sense of foreboding over the 
Nicaraguan military buildup. Costa Rica has . no armed force, 
only a small civil guard and a rural constabulary. These 
police forces must patrol a dangerous border and guard a 
democracy threatened by Central America's turbulent political 
currents. The provisions of u.s. law under which no aid can be 
provided to police organizations create a particularly absurd 
situation for Costa Rica. Because of these provisions, we are 
unable to furnish badly needed assistance to forces dedicated 
to the safeguarding of democracy. 
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
While important u.s. interests are engaged in El Salvador, 
and while we pay a high political price at home and abroad for 
assisting the armed forces there, the United States has not 
provided enough military aid to support the methods of 
counter-insurgency we have urged. At the same time, the United 
States cannot countenance the brutal alternative methods of 
counter-insurgency which wreak intolerable violence upon the 
civilian population. In our judgment, the current levels of 
military ai-d are not sufficient to preserve even the existing 
military stalemate over a period of time. Given the increasing 
damage -- both physical and political -- being inflicted on the 
economy and government of El Salvador by the guerrillas, who 
are maintaining their strength, a collapse is not inconceivable. 
The Salvadoran Government's National Campaign Plan combines 
military operations with follow-up civic actions to restore 
agriculture and commerce. The plan is designed to provide 
secure areas within which the Salvadoran campesino can grow, 
harvest and market his crops, and where industry can again 
operate. The plan assumes that sufficient security can be 
established countrywide to reduce the insurgency at least to a 
low level within two years. But the government's forces must 
be significantly and quickly strengthened if the plan is to 
succeed. Their requirements include: 
* Increased air and ground mobility, to enable the 
government forces to reach and assist static positions 
under attack and, eventually, to seek out and engage the 
guerrillas. 
* Increased training to upgrade the forces tactically and 
to generalize further the use of modern, humane, counter-
insurgency methods, including civic action as such. This 
last includes not only road building and basic 
engineeering projects, but especially the provision of 
basic health care by paramedics. 
* Higher force levels, to enable the government forces both 
to protect important installations and to carry the war 
to the guerrillas; at present the choice is between 
allowing the destruction of vital infrastructures, or the 
indefinite prolongation of the war. 
* Greater stocks of equipment and supplies to support a 
consistent war effort. 
* Improved conditions for the troops in order to retain 
trained personnel, particularly by providing medical 
evacuation; at present, for the lack of evacuation 
helicopters, the fatality rate is very high. 
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There might be an argument for doing nothing to help the 
government of El Salvador. There might be an argument for 
doin'g a great deal more. There is, however, no logical 
argument for giving some aid but not enough. The worst 
possible policy for El Salv~dor is to provide just enough aid 
to keep the war going, but too little to wage it successfully. 
As we have already made clear in this report, the 
Commission has concluded that present levels of u.s. military 
assistance are inadequate. 
We are not in a position to judge the precise amounts and 
types of increased aid needed. We note that the u.s. 
Department of Defense estimates that it would take 
approximately $400 million in u.s. military assistance in 1984 
and l985 to break the military stalemate and allow the National 
Campaign Plan to be carried out. The Department believes that 
thereafter assi'stance levels· could be brought down to 
considerably more modest levels. 
The Commission recommends that the United States provide to 
El Salvador -- subject to the conditions we spe cify later i n 
this chapter -- significantly increased level s of military aid 
as quickly as possible, so that the Salvadoran auth orities can 
act on the assurance that needed aid will be forthcoming. 
The training and improvement of the Salvadoran forces to 
the point where they can effectively wage counter-insurgency 
will take time. Indeed, given the complexity of the internal 
as well as external problems confronting El Salvador, the 
situation there will remain precarious, even with increased 
military assistance. Such assistance alone cannot assure the 
elements of national unity and of will that are nece·ssary for 
success. But it is the Commission's judgment that without 
such aid the situation will surely deteriorate. 
The Commission has not undertaken an equally detailed study 
of the defense requirements of Honduras. Based on the 
testimony we have had, it is our judgment that increased u.s. 
military assistance to Honduras is needed for training and 
equipment in order to build a credible deterrent and to meet 
renewed efforts at insurgency. The Administration should 
submit to the Congress an appropriate program in that regard. 
Under suitable conditions, assistance to Guatemala to 
enable that country to pursue a more consistent and humane 
counter-insurgency strategy would be advisable. This question 
is treated below. 
Other Measures 
To be effective, u.s. military assistance programs require 
greater continuity and predictibility. As we have seen, local 
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commanders are now uncertain whether an adequate supply of such 
critical support items as ammunition will be on hand. The 
result in El Salvador has all too often been a less than 
vigorous prosecution of the war. The Commission believes the 
Administration and the Congress should work toge ther t o ach~ eve 
greater predictibility. That could be most e ff ectively 
achieved through mult i-year funding. 
Additional issues the Commission believes require attention 
but which we have not had the opportunity to examine in detail 
include: 
* The length of the service tours of our military people in 
El Salvador. 
* The development of greater area expertise by selected 
u.s. military personnel. 
* Organization and command structure in the Pentagon and 
the field. 
* Prospects for closer cooperation among the nations of 
Central America in defense matters. 
* The possibility of a strengthened role for the 
Inter-American Defense Board. 
We believe the National Security Council should conduct a 
deta iled rev i ew o f t hese i ssues. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The question of the relationship between military aid and 
human rights abuses is both extremely difficult and extremely 
important. It involves the potential clash of two basic u.s. 
objectives. On the one hand, we seek to promote justice and 
find it repugnant to support forces that violate -- or tolerate 
violation of -- fundamental u.s. values •. On the other hand, we 
are engaged in El Salvador and Central America because we are 
serving fundamental u.s. interests that transcend any 
particular government. 
Our approach must therefore embrace, and pursue, both 
objectives simultaneously. Clearly, sustained public and 
international support rests heavily on our success in 
harmonizing our dual goals. Against this background, we have 
stressed the need to make American development assistance 
strictly conditional on rapid progress towards democratic 
pluralism and respect for human rights, as well as economic 
performance. Respect for human rights is also of great 
importance to improved security in Central America, as well as 
to the self-respect of the United States. We recognize, 
however, that how the problem is addressed in this regard is 
vital because Central America is crucial to our natiorial 
security. 
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While the objectives of security and human rights are 
sometimes counterposed against each other, they are actually 
closely related. Without adequate military aid, Salvadoran 
forces would not be able to carry out the modern 
counter-insurgency tactics that would help keep civilian losses 
to a minimum. Were military aid to be cut off, it would open 
the way for the triumph of the guerrillas, an eventuality that 
no one concerned about the well-being of the Salvadoran people 
can accept with equanimity. Such a development would be 
unacceptable from the standpoint of both human rights and 
security. 
The Commission believes that vigorous, concurrent policies 
on both the military and human rights fronts are needed to 
break out of the demoralizing cycle of deterioration on the one 
hand and abuses on the other. We believe policies of increased 
aid and increased pressure to safeguard human rights would 
improve both security and justice. A slackening on one front 
would undermine our objective on the _other. El Salvador must 
succeed on both or ·it will not succeed on either. 
The United States Governmen.t has a right to demand certain 
minimum standards of respect for human rights as a condition 
for providing military aid to any country. 
With respect to El Salvador, military aid should , through 
leg i sla ti on r equ iring periodi c reports, b e made contingent upon 
demonstrated progress towar d f ree elect i ons ; f reedom of 
association; the establishment o f the rule o f l aw and an 
effect1ve judicial sys tem ; and the t erminat i on o f the 
activ i t ies of the so-called d eath squads , as well as vigorous 
action agains t t hose guilty o f cr i mes and t he prosecution to 
t he extent possible of pas t o ff e nders. These condi t i ons should 
be serious l y enf or ced. 
Implementation of this approach would be greatly 
facilitated through the device of an independent monitoring 
body, such as the Central American Development Organization 
spelled out in Chapter 4. 
As an additional measure , the United States should impos e 
sanct i ons , i n cludi ng t h e denial o f v i sas, deportation , and the 
i nvest iga t i on of fi nanc i a l deal i ngs, against for e ign national s 
i n the United States who are connected with d eath-squad 
activ i t ies i n El Sal vador or anywhere e l se. 
It is the Commission's judgment - that the same policy 
approach should be employed in the case of Guatemala. The 
existing human rights situation there is unacceptable and the 
security situation could become critical. Although the 
insurgency in Guatemala has been contained for the time being 
at a relatively low level, military assistance could become 
necessary. Military aid and military sales should be 
authorized if Guatemala meets the human rights conditions 
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described in this chapter. In terms of regional and u.s. 
security interests, Guatemala, with its strategic position on 
the Mexican border, the largest population in the Central 
American area and the most important economy, is obviously a 
pivotal country. 
Conclusion 
The Commission has concluded that the security interests of 
the United States are importantly engaged in Central America~ 
that these interests require a significantly larger program of 
military assistance, as well as greatly expanded support for 
economic growth and social reform~ that there must be an end to 
the massive violation of human rights if security is to be 
achieved in Central America~ and that external support for the 
insurgency must be neutralized for the same purpose -- a 
problem we treat in the next chapter. 
The deterioration in Central America has been such that we 
cannot afford paralysis in defending our national interests and 
in achieving our national purposes. The fact that such 
paralysis resulted from the lack of a national consensus on 
foreign policy in the United States would not mitigate the 
consequences of failure. We believe that a consensus is 
possible, and must be achieved, on an issue of such importance 
to the national security of the United States. 
We would hope, moreover, that a clear U.S. commitment to 
such a course would itself improve the prospects for successful 
negotiations -- so that arms would support diplomacy rather 
than supplant it. 
Chapter 7 
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 
Americans yearn for an end to the bloodshed in Central 
America. On no issue in the region is there a stronger 
consensus than on the hope for a diplomatic solution that will 
stop the killing and nourish freedom and progress. The 
Commission shares this deeply felt goal. 
Yet simply to endorse a wish for peace is futile. Our du~y 
is to try to define the means to achieve it. 
u.s. diplomacy toward Central America can be neither 
conducted nor considered in a vacuum. -It must reflect the 
larger realities of the hemisphere and of thi world. It must 
also clearly embody a sustainable strategy for promoting u.s. 
interests in the region for the long-term. That strategy will 
involve many factors. What precise measures should be adopted, 
what trade-offs made, what balances struck, what 
responsibilities assumed by us and by others are proper 
subjects for debate. But we must be clear on: 
* The context of our diplomacy. 
* The nature of our objectives. 
* The constancy of our policy. 
History and experience both teach that effective diplomacy 
requires the coordination of many elements. Incentives for 
progress are essential. So are penalties for failure. Often, 
friendly forces need to be bolstered by both economic and 
security assistance. Aggressors must be made aware that 
unacceptable behavior carries risks. They must also know that 
a different pattern of behavior can bring significant benefits. 
A successful political strategy in Central America must 
have certain basic underpinnings. It requires: 
* Significant resources to promote economic progress. 
* Vigorous efforts to advance democracy and social retorm. 
* Other inducements and penalties, short o~ force, to 
reinforce our diplomacy. 
At the same time, there is little doubt that the projection 
of U.S. power, in some form, will be required to preserve the 
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interests of the United States and of other nations in the 
region. A nation can project power without employing its 
forces in military encounter. However, a basic rule of 
statecraft is that assessment of risks is the solvent of 
diplomacy. In this case, we can expect negotiations to succeed 
only if those we seek to persuade have a clear understanding 
that there are circumstances in which the use of force, by the 
United States or by others, could become necessary as a last 
resort. 
Successful diplomacy must also look beyond tomorrow's 
headline, next month's military setback, or next season's array 
of political contests. It must be based on support that can be 
maintained politically in the United States, as well as in 
other countries whose aid might be essential. Designing a set 
of policies which can command bipartisan backing in the United 
States is thus an essential foundation for diplomatic 
strategy. Without such support, we risk being mired in 
uncertainty, and caught up constantly in emergency assessments 
of what is politically possible in the United States rather 
than what is diplomatically attainable in Central America. In 
addition, unless u.s. strategy takes full account of the views, 
interests, and capacities of other affected nations in the 
area, we will not be able to forge the cooperation based on 
mutual respect which is the essence of the new approach we will 
outline here. 
The general strategic objective that should animate u.s. 
diplomacy in dealing with the present threats in Central 
America can be simply stated: to reduce the civil wars, 
national conflicts and military preparations there at least to 
the dimensions of the Central American region. 
As a nation we are certainly not opposed to indigenous 
reform in Central America. In Chapter 4 the Commission has put 
forward a program to encourage such reforms. Nor are we 
threatened by indigenous revolutions that use local resources 
and appeal to local circumstances. 
What gives the current situation i~s special urgency is the 
external threat posed by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua 
which is supported by massive Cuban military strength, backed 
by Soviet and other East bloc w.eapons, guidance and diplomacy, 
and·.integrated into the Cuban network of intelligence and 
subversion. 
In considering the requirements for successful diplomacy in 
the region we should learn from our 'experience since 1962. The 
euphoria surrounding the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis 
in that year seemed to open the prospect that the Cuban 
revolution would at least be confined to its home territory. 
As President Kennedy put it in his news conference of November 
20, 1962, " ••• if all offensive weapons systems are removed 
from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, and if 
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Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist 
purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.• 
This was more than an expectation. It was a declared 
policy objective of the United States. Obviously, it has not 
been achieved. The problem has been that it was eroded 
incrementally. This ·often made it difficult to see the erosion 
clearly, and, as a practical matter, made it even more 
difficult to halt at any given point. The increases in the 
Cuban threat were always so gradual that to stop them would 
have required making a major issue of what was, at the time, 
only a small change. The total effect of such small changes, 
however, has been-- over five Administrations of both 
political parties -- an enormously increased military power and 
capacity for aggression concentrated on the island of Cuba, and 
the projection of that threat into Central America (as well as 
into Africa and the Middle East). 
This is not to assess blame. It is to sound a note of 
caution. Mutual restraint, settlement and peace are among the 
highest aspirations of mankind. But progress toward such goals 
can be difficult to measure. Words like • offensive weapons• 
and •aggression• are slippery. They can be made to mean 
different things in differing circumstances. And negotiators 
cannot anticipate the exact circumstances of the future. 
Any agreement in Central America must be verifiable. 
Equally important, it should also avoid any possible loophole 
that would permit the Soviet Union and Cuba to argue that 
whatever is not specifically prohibited is allowed. We should 
make sure that any agreement we reach is unambiguous. we 
should also remember that language and legalisms alone, however 
well crafted, will not provide airtight assurances in future 
cases not foreseen in the drafting. It will be important to 
give clear expression to the spirit of whatever obligations are 
undertaken, and to monitor continually how that spirit is 
respected. We must guard carefully against a gradual erosion 
of our position in any agreement worked out in Central America. 
Finally, we need constancy in the pursuit of our goals. If 
we keep altering course with every shift in the wind, our 
adversaries will have no incentive to negotiate seriously. 
Doing so invites them to procrastinate; it also invites 
continual pressure on us to improve our offers. If, however, 
they find themselves confronted by a steady, persistent United 
States, holding firmly to a position that is reasonable, 
coherent and consistent, they will be more likely to calculate 
that time is not on their side. They will therefore be more 
prepared to make concessions that produce a reasonable 
agreement. 
In sum, we believe that there is a chance for a political 
solution in Central America if the diplomacy of the United 
States is strategic in conception, purposeful in approach, and 
steadfast in execution. Our broad objectives should be: 
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* To stop the war and the killing in El Salvador. 
* To create conditions under which Nicaragua can take its 
place as a peaceful and democratic member of the Central 
American communit~. 
* To open the way to democratic development throughout the 
isthmus. 
El Salvador 
Obviously, the future of Central America will depend in 
large part on what happens in El Salvador. That nation most 
immediately faces critical choices about the course of its 
internal politics; it is wracked more severely by internal 
strife and conflict than any of its neighbors; it most requires 
intelligence and subtlety in the day-to-day conduct of u.s. 
diplomacy. 
The dilemma in El Salvador is clear. With all its 
shortcomings, the existing government has conducted free 
elections. But it is weak. The judiciary is ineffective. The 
military is divided in its concerns, and in the degree of its 
respect for human rights. Privileged Salvadorans want to 
preserve both their political and economic power. 
We have described in other chapters the economic, social 
and security measures we believe are necessary to make progress 
in economic development. 
In the political field two broad options have been 
presented: either elections, or what is commonly referred to as 
power-sharing. 
The government of El Salvador has consistently stated that 
a solution to the conflict •must be essentially political and 
democratic.• This means that a political solution must result 
from the free choice of the Salvadoran people expressed through 
elections. The political parties represented in the 
Constituent Assembly, from the center-left Christian Democrats 
to the right-wing ARENA party, have formally endorsed this 
view. The United States has supported thjs position. 
The Salvadoran Peace Commission was established last year 
-- again in consultation with the political parties -- for the 
•purpose of promoting the incorporation of all social and · 
political sectors in the democratic p~ocess.• The Commission 
has offered to discuss with the guerrilla fronts, the FMLN/FDR, 
the conditions under which the left could take part in the 
elections scheduled for March 25, 1984. The issues of security 
guarantees, . access · to the media and freedom to campaign would 
be included in such discussions. 
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The insurgents have .rejected this offer. They assert that 
their security could not be assured. In any event, they hope 
for a collapse of American support, and eventually for a 
military victory. They evidently want to maintain unity among 
the various guerrilla groups, which they perceive would be put 
at risk by rifts over tough political decisions. They may well 
judge that a contested election would reveal their low level of 
popular support. So they seem to have cast their lot with 
continued military struggle unless the government is prepared 
to abandon the scheduled elections and install a coalition 
government. 
The insurgents most recently set forth their formal 
position in September of last year, following contacts with 
Ambassador Richard Stone and the Salvadoran Peace Commission. 
In a document entitled "The Situation of Human Rights in El 
Salvador in Light of the Geneva Convention" and under the 
heading "Prospects for a Political Solution", the 
Political-Diplomatic Commission of the FMLN/FDR stated: "the 
Salvadoran people need a negotiated settlement between the 
government and the FMLN/FDR -- to bring about peace; they do 
not need elections." The document went on to detail the 
FMLN/FDR position calling for comprehensive negotiations on the 
following agenda: 
a) Composition of a provisional government. 
b) Restructuring the armed forces. 
c) Structural reforms. 
d) Salvadoran foreign po~icy. 
e) Mechanisms for future elections. 
f) The process to achieve a ceasefire. 
This is more than a refusal to campaign under the currently 
insecure conditions in El Salvador. Evidently the insurgents 
do not view power-sharing as merely an interim measure needed 
in order to hold elections in which the left could participate 
with security. Rather, it is a means of scrapping the existing 
elected governmental structure and armed forces and creating a 
provisional civil and military authority in their place in 
which the rebel leadership would have a major role -- and in 
which they would eventually gain a dominant position well 
before the electoral "mechanisms" were in place. 
Therefore, the Commission has concluded that power-sharing 
as proposed by the insurgents is not a sensible or fair 
political solution for El Salvador. There is no historical 
precedent suggesting that such a procedure would reconcile 
contending parties which entertain such deeply held beliefs and 
political goals, and which have been killing each other for 
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years. Indeed, precedent argues that it would be only a 
prelude to a take-over by the insurgent forces. 
To install a mixed provisional government by fiat would 
scarcely be consistent with the notion that the popular will is 
the foundation of true government. It would tend to inflate 
the true strength of insurgent factions that have gained 
attention thus far through violence and their ability to 
disrupt the functioning of government. It would provide 
openings for them and their foreign supporters to forestall 
democratic politics. The likely final outcome of power-sharing 
would be the imposition on the people of El Salvador of a 
government unwilling to base its authority on the consent of 
the governed. 
We believe that a true political solution in El Salvador 
can be reached only through free elections in which all 
significant groups have a right to participate. To be sure, 
elections do not solve a nation's problems. They can be the 
beginning, but cannot be the end, of political development. 
This is particularly true in El Salvador, which is threatened 
by a fragmentation of political life affecting most, if not 
all, of its institutions. 
How elections are conducted will be crucial. Given 
prevailing conditions in El Salvador, all factions have 
legitimate concerns about their security. Neither supporters 
nor opponents of the regime can be expected to participate in 
elections so long as terrorists of the right or the left run 
free. No political efforts at reconciliation can succeed if 
the Government of El Salvador itself aids and abets violence 
against its own people. Unless it effectively curbs the 
actions of the death squads -- unless it provides basic 
security for teachers, editors and writers, labor and religious 
leaders, and generally for the free and secure expression of 
opinion, the political process recommended here will break 
down. A secure environment must be established for all who 
wish to take part, whether leftists, centrists or rightists. 
The u.s. Government - to be credible - must insist that these 
conditions be met. 
Thus the El Salvador Government must take all appropriate 
measures to make the March 25 elections as safe and open as 
possible. This should include the introduction of outside 
observers to help insure the security and fairness of the 
process. 
The political process should not -- indeed cannot -- stop 
after the March elections. Following the elections, basic u.s. 
strategy for El Salvador should include firm support for the 
hewly elected legitimate government. Along with providing 
military assistance, we should encourage it to pursue 
negotiations and reconciliation with all elements of Salvadoran 
society that are prepared to take part in an open and 
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democratic political process, to promote rapid progress towards 
the protection of human rights, to strengthen civilian 
authority, and to undertake comprehensive reform of both 
political and military institutions. such reform is essential 
to the creation of a stable, democratic government and for the 
reconciliation of disparate elements within Salvadoran 
society. u.s. economic assistance should be a key instrument 
in helping to secure these ends. 
Even if the insurgents do not take part in the March 
elections, their participation in subsequent elections -- at 
least participation by those prepared to accept'the results of 
the balloting -- should be encouraged. The Commission believes 
that a proposal along the following lines -- which amplifies 
the government's approach -- would constitute a genuinely fair 
chance for all to compete peacefully for political power in El 
Salvador. The basic principle would remain that of consulting 
the popular will, not imposing a government on the people 
through power-sharing. It would test the intentions of the 
insurgents. 
We understand that El Salvador contemplates holding 
municipal and legislative assembly elections in 1985. The 
elements of the following approach could be applied to that 
process. 
1 . The Sal vadoran government would invi t e the FDR-FMLN to 
negotiate mutua lly acc eptable p rocedures to es tablis h a 
f ramewor k f or f ut ure e l ections. Al t houg h the de t a ils of the 
f ramewor k wou ld have to be worked out by the parties to the 
talks themselves, the United States would energetically support 
their efforts and encourage other appropriate arrangements for 
elections in which all parties could participate as a first 
step toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
2. As part of this framework a broadly r ep resentative 
Elections Comm i ssion wou ld be established, i nclud ing 
representatives of the FDR-FMLN. The Sa l vadoran Government 
would thus be i nv i t i ng part icipation by the political front of 
the guerrilla movement in the conduct of elections. The 
Commission would help ensure that all parties could compete 
openly and safely and that all citizens could receive political 
literature, attend meetings and rallies, discuss partisan 
issues freely, and cast their ballots without fear or 
intimidation. The insurgent opposition should have a 
significant voice and vote both · in the Elections Commission and 
in developing security arrangements for the campaign and. 
election. But this should not become a subterfuge for the 
sharing of power with regard to the responsibilities of 
government, which we have rejected in this report. 
3. Violence s hould be ended by all parties so that mutually 
satisfactory arrang ement s can be deve loped among the 
government, pro-government part ies, the different opposition 
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g ro ups and insurgent group s for the period of campaign ing and 
elections. To t ha t e nd , cer t a i n de ve l opment s are needed. The 
Salvadoran security forces and guerrillas should cease 
hostilities against one another. Guerrilla terror against 
military, government, and economic targets should end. 
Civilian and military violence of the right should also end. 
4. A s astem of international observation should be 
establi she to enhance the f a ith and confide nce of all parties 
i n the robit a nd e uit of arran ement s fo r e l ec tions. This 
mi ght 1nc l ude senior adv1sers t o th e Elect1 ons Comm1ss on drawn 
from the OAS, Contadora nations or third countries agreed upon 
by all parties to the conflict. 
In sum, the United States should make a maximum effort to 
help El Salvador to create a self-sustaining society dedicated 
to open participation in its political process, to social 
justice, and to economic freedom, growth and development. An 
El Salvador that works toward these goals deserves our 
continuing support. This should include adequate levels of 
economic and military aid, which in turn can produce pressure 
for a politically negotiated end to the fighting. 
What happens in El Salvador will have important 
consequences in the other nations of Central America. If the 
shaky center collapses and the country eventually is dominated 
by undemocratic extremes, this will lead to increased pressures 
on El Salvador's neighbors. For Guatemala and Nicaragua, the 
experience of El Salvador could carry a clear message: the best 
means of earning the support of the United States, and of 
promoting political, social, and economic development, lies in 
adopting both the form and the substance of democracy. 
In addition, events in El Salvador will have a major impact 
on developments in Nicaragua and on Nicaragua's relations with 
its neighbors. It is to these factors that we now turn. 
Nicaragua 
The basic threat posed by Nicaragua has been examined in 
previous chapters. The Sandinista military forces are 
potentially larger than those of all the rest of Central 
America combined. The government in Managua volunteered to 
this Commission an intelligence briefing which left no 
reasonable doubt that Nicaragua is tied into the Cuban, and 
thereby the Soviet, intelligence network. The Commission 
encountered no leader 'in Central America, including democratic 
and unarmed Costa Rica, who did not express deep foreboding 
about the impact of a militarized, totalitarian Nicaragua on 
the peace ~nd security of the region. several expressed. the 
view that should the Sandinista regime now be consolidated as a 
totalitarian state, their own freedom, and even their 
independ~nce, would be jeopardized. In several countries, 
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especially those with democratic traditions, we met leaders who 
expressed regret and outrage that the revolution against Somoza 
-- which their own government~ had supported -- had been 
betrayed by tqe Sandinistas. 
For all of these reasons, the consolidation of a 
Marxist-Leninist regime in Managua would be seen by its 
neighbors as constituting a permanent security threat. Because 
of its secretive nature, the existence of a political order on 
the Cuban model in Nicaragua would pose major difficulties in 
negotiating, implementing, and verifying any sandinista 
commitment to refrain from supporting insurgency and subversion 
in other countries. In this sense, the development of an open 
political system in Nicaragua, with a free press and an active 
opposition, would provide an important security guarantee for 
the other countries of the region and would be a key element in 
any negotiated settlement. 
Theoretically, the United States and its friends could 
abandon any hope of such a settlement and simply try to contain 
a Nicaragua which continued to receive military supplies on the 
present scale. In pratical terms, however, such a course would 
present major difficulties. In the absence of a political 
settlement, there would be little incentive for the Sandinistas 
to act responsibly, even over a period of time, and much 
inducement to escalate their efforts to subvert Nicaragua's 
neighbors. To contain the export of revolution would require a 
level of vigilance and sustained effort that would be difficult 
for Nicaragua's neighbors and even for the United states. A 
fully militarized and equipped Nicaragua, with excellent 
intelligence and command and control organizations, would weigh 
heavily on the neighboring countries of the region. This 
threat would be particularly acute for democratic, unarmed 
Costa Rica. It would have especially serious implications for 
vital u.s. interests in the Panama Canal. We would then face 
the prospect, over time, of the collapse of the other countries 
of Central America, bringing with it the spectre of Marxist 
domination of the entire region and thus the danger of a larger 
war. 
The notion that the United States should cope with a 
Marxist-Leninist Nicaragua, militarily allied to the Soviet 
Union and Cuba, through long-term containment assumes an 
analogy between conditions in post-war Europe and the present 
circumstances of Central America. The experience of the 
post-war period, however, shows that containment is effective 
as a long-term strategy only where u.s. military power serves 
to back up local forces of stable allies fully capable of 
coping with internal conflict and subversion from without. In 
such circumstances, the United States can help to assure the 
deterrence of overt military threats by contributing forces in 
place, or merely by strategic guarantees. 
-115-
On the other hand, where internal insecurity is a chronic 
danger and where local governments are unable to deal with 
externally supported subversion, a strategy of containment has 
major disadvantages. It would risk the involvement of u.s. 
forces as surrogate policemen. Any significant deployment of 
u.s. forces in Central America would be very costly not just in 
a domestic political sense but in geo-strategic terms as well. 
The diversion of funds from the economic, social, medical, and 
educational development of the region into military containment 
would exacerbate poverty and encourage internal instability in 
each of the countries that became heavily militarized. 
Furthermore, the dangers facing the other Central American 
countries might actually grow if each each side perceived that 
the other was tempted to use its increased military power. And 
the creation of garrison states would almost certainly 
perpetuate the armies of the region as permanent political 
elites. The hopes of true democracy would not be enhanced. 
Therefore, though the Commission believes that the 
Sandinista regime will pose a continuing threat to stability in 
the region, we do not advocate a policy of static containment. 
Instead, we recommend, first, an effort to arrange a 
comprehensive regional settlement. This would elaborate and 
build upon the 21 objectives of the Contadora Group. (For 
these, see the annex to this chapter.) Within the framework of 
basic principles, it would: 
* Recognize linkage between democratization and security in 
the region. 
* Relate the incentives of increased development aid and 
trade concessions to acceptance of mutual security 
guaranteees. 
* Engage the United States and other developed nations in 
the regional peace system. 
* Establish an institutional mechanism in the region to 
implement that system. 
The original peace initiatives of Nicaragua have given 
little cause for optimism that we could move toward these 
objectives. The latest of the Sandinistas' formal proposals 
were presented to the United States Government and to the 
United Nations in October, 1983, aa four draft treaties 
purportedly prepared •within the framework of the Contadora 
process.• The treaties would bind the parties to refrain from 
sending arms from one country to·another in the region, and 
otherwise to end intervention, • overt or covert, • in ihe 
internal affairs of other nations of the region. 
Significantly, these Sandinista proposals .would prohibit 
exercises and maneuvers of the type United States and Honduran 
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forces have carried out, while deferring the question of 
foreign advisers for later discussion. 
More recently, after the u.s. actions in Grenada, Managua 
has hinted at some accommodations in its external and internal 
policies. The Commission is not in a position to judge the 
sincerity and significance of these various signals. But 
clearly they would require extensive elaboration and more 
concrete expression before they could give solid grounds for 
hope. 
The Commission believes, however, that whatever the 
prospects seem to be for productive negotiations, the United 
States must sp~re no effort to pursue the diplomatic route. 
Nicaragua's willingness to enter int~ a general agreement 
should be thoroughly tested through negotiations and actions. 
We must establish whether there is a political alternative to 
continuing confrontation in the region. Every avenue should be 
explored to see if the vague signals emanating from Managua in 
recent weeks can be translated into concrete progress. our 
government must demonstrate to the people of the United States 
and the peoples of the region that the u.s. earnestly seeks a 
peaceful settlement. 
It is beyond the scope of this Commission's 
responsibilities to prescribe tactics for the conduct of these 
negotiations. As a broad generality, we do not believe that it 
would be wise to dismantle existing incentives and pressures on 
the Managua regime except in conjunction with demonstrable 
progress on the negotiating front. With specific reference to 
the highly controversial question of whether the United states 
should provide support for the Nicaraguan insurgent forces 
opposed to the Sandinistas now in authority in Managua, the 
Commission recognized that an adequate examination of this 
issue would require treatment of sensitive information not 
appropriate to a public report. However, the majority of the 
members of the Commission, in their respective individual 
judgments, believe that the efforts of the Nicaraguan 
insurgents represent one of the incentives working in favor of 
a negotiated settlement and that the future role of the United 
States in those efforts must therefore be considered in the 
context of the negotiating process. The Commission has not, 
however, attempted to come to a collective judgment on whether, 
and how, the United States should provide support for these 
insurgent forces. 
A Framework for Regional Security 
The Commission believes that a comprehensive regional 
settlement could be based on the principles enumerated below. 
Such a settlement would not imply the liquidation of the 
Sandinista Government or the formal abandonment of its 
revolutionary ideals, but only ~hat it submit itself to the 
I 
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legitimating test of free elections. It is therefore not 
beyond the realm of possibility that Nicaragua, and the other 
nations of the region, would in the end embrace it. The basic 
framework would be an agreement on Central American security 
negotiated among the Central American wfive• {Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), containing these 
key elements: 
* Respect for the sovereignty, independence, and integrity 
of all Central American countries. 
* A broad and concrete commitment to democracy and human 
rights. 
* A verifiable commitment by each nation not to attack its 
neighbors; nor to transfer arms overtly or covertly to 
any insurgents; nor to train the military personnel of a 
Central American country; nor to practice subversion, 
directly or indirectly, against its neighbors. 
* A verifiable commitment by each country not to possess 
arms that exceeded certain sizes, types, and 
capabilities. The total permissible scale of military 
forces in each nation could be stipulated as not to 
exceed an agreed level substantially lower than now. No 
military forces, bases, or advisers of non-Central 
American countries would be permitted. 
* United States respect for and cooperation with the 
agreement. This would include a readiness to support the 
Central American military and security arrangements, and 
a commitment to respect whatever domestic arrangements 
emerge from legitimating elections, as long as there is 
continuing adherence to the basic principles of pluralism 
at home and restraint abroad. 
* Commitments by all count·ries to pluralism, to peaceful 
political activity, and to free elections in which all 
political parties would have a right to participate free 
of threat or violence. Particularly, the pledges by 
Nicaragua of July 1979 to the OAS, and reaffirmed by the 
Contadora group, would be fulfilled. All insurgent 
groups would stop military activity. 
* Permanent verification. The United states would be 
prepared to offer technical assistance to ensure 
effective verification. The Contadora countries could 
play a major role. 
* The Central American nations that are parties to the 
agreement could invite other countries to be associated 
with it. They could also request that others in the 
hemisphere undertake mutual pledges of non-interference. 
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* Adherence to the agreement would be a condition for 
participating in the development program outlined in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The Central American Development 
Organization would, as suggested there, maintain a 
continuing audit and review of .compliance with the 
commitments ' to nonintervention abroad and democratization 
at home. 
* Foreign and other ministers of the Central American 
members, together with the United states, Mexico, Panama, 
Colombia, and Venezuela as observers, would meet 
regularly to review the arrangement pnd compliance with 
it. The council would develop procedures for 
conflict-resolution among member states. 
A program along these lines would end any reason for 
Nicaragua to continue to depend on Cuba for its security. It 
would open the way for Nicaragua to participate in a vastly 
expanded, integrated development program. It would also bar an 
American military base in Honduras. The Nicaraguan insurgents 
would be able to participate in Nicaraguan elections. The 
insurgents in El Salvador would continue to be free to 
participate in elections there. 
A settlement of this nature would bring peace and stability 
to Central America. It would insulate the region from great 
power rivalry. Dilution of its terms would carry risks. A 
failure of negotiations because not every term was fulfilled 
would carry other risks. These considerations will have to be 
weighed in the negotiating process itself, which is properly 
the responsibility of the u.s. Government, not of this 
Commission. 
In any event, we recognize that to negotiate such an 
ambitious arrangement will take imagination, patience, and 
perseverance. We cannot expect a sudden solution to the 
security problems of Central America, just as we .cannot expect 
democracy and pluralism to bloom overnight. But we can measure 
progress. We can expect long and arduous negotiations. But 
the stakes are too high, and the alternatives too bleak, to shy 
away from the most determined efforts to succeed. 
These efforts will be critically dependent on inducements 
for agreement and compliance. It is partly for this reason 
that the Commission has proposed the major financial and 
commercial incentives set forth in Chapter 4. We conceive of 
these new programs in trade, aid, investment, employment, 
health and education as an integral element in the search for 
peace in the region. Such incentives have the added value of 
demonstrating to the peoples in the region the benefits of 
productive relations with the United States and the West in 
general. 
At the same time, this diplomacy must carry with it 
penalties for failure to comply with any agreement reached. 
I 
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These would include at least the loss of shared economic 
benefits -- such as a major drop in external aid flows and 
denial of access to special trade advantages. 
Finally, as part of the backdrop to diplomacy, Nicaragua 
must be aware that force remains an ultimate reco4rse. The 
United states and the countries of the region retain this 
option. There are, of course, non-military measures available 
that we have not yet used -- for example, economic restrictions 
and reduction of diplomatic contact. As for the military 
option, the precise circumstances in which it might be 
considered essential to u.s. security are beyond the 
Commission's mandate. But we do urge that direct u.s. military 
action -- which would have major human and political costs --
should be regarded only as ·a course of last resort and only 
where there are clear dangers to u.s. security. 
If Managua proves responsive to serious negotiations, 
hopeful vistas open up for the beleaguered peoples of Central 
America, including those of Nicaragua. This is the course that 
we would strongly prefer. We do not seek confrontation. We 
prefer to resolve the conflicts in the region peacefully. We 
would like to get on with the formidable challenge of improving 
the lives of everyone in the region, including Nicaraguans. 
The Contadora Group 
The United States has a strong interest in encouraging the 
nations of Central America to assume greater responsibility for 
regional arrangements. Our involvement will be more acceptable 
if it reflects a regional consensus. When countries of the 
region take the lead, when we are not perceived as imposing 
regional goals, the prospects of a constructive evolution based 
on shared purposes will increase. Thus, a key objective for 
the United States should be to promote the development of an 
independent system of regional relations, backed up by 
commitments of u.s. economic resources, diplomatic support, and 
military assistance. In the final analysis, for any regional 
arrangement to be lasting it must be able to count on u.s. 
support. But for it to be supported it must elicit the 
cooperation and good will of our sister republics to the south. 
Successful regional diplomacy within Central America must 
be based upon the interests of the Central American countries 
themselves. These interests will have to be reflected in 
broader regional arrangements that impose mutual obligations, 
create shared incentives to respect national rights, and 
provide both for verification of compliance and penalties for 
violation. 
The four neighboring Contadora countries -- Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama and Venezuela -- have been active and creative 
in trying to develop a regional diplomacy that can meet the 
432-785 0 - 84 - 9 
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needs of Ce~tral America. Their role has been constructive in 
helping to define issues and to demonstrate the commitment of 
ke~ Latin American nations to pursue stability and peaceful 
evolution within the region. 
To be sure, the interests and attitudes of these four 
countries are not identical, nor do they always comport with 
our own. The Contadora nations do not have extensive 
experience in working together, and the Contadora process has 
not yet been tested in terms of crafting specific policies to 
provide for regional security. Thus the United States cannot 
use the Contadora process as a substitute for its own 
policies. Experience has shown that the process works most 
effectively when the United states acts purposefully. When 
our policy stagnates, the Contadora process languishes. When 
we are deci~ive, the Contadora process gathers momentum. 
Within this framework, the United States should actively 
encourage the Contadora process. We should continue to consult 
genuinely and regularly with its members. We should continue 
to support its 21-point program while urging a more specific 
settlement. Given the size and complexity of the task, it is 
not surprising that progress is often gradual and on a general 
level. As already noted, the principles of the regional 
framework set forth in the previous section are fully 
consistent with the Contadora program. Indeed these principles 
seek to give greater concreteness to that program. And 
whatever ~he role of the Contadora group in the actual 
fashioning of settlements, it will certainly be central in 
their implementation and supervision. 
The Contadora countries are engaged in . a bold new 
experiment. They deserve the gratitude and encouragement of 
all the nations in the hemisphere. 
Cuba and the soviet Union 
Both the role played by the Sandinista regime in Central 
America and the threats in neighboring countries gain added 
importance for the region and for the .united states because of 
Cuba's active engagement. As we have seen, Cuba has long been 
committed to revolutionary violence as an essential part of its 
ideology; indeed, that commitment is reflected in its national 
constitution. In turn, Cuba is closely allied with the Soviet 
Union and other communist bloc states, gaining support from 
them and promoting their interests in the Caribbean Basin 
region. 
Over the years, Cuban conduct in the region has taken on 
forms never foreseen at the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 
1962. In his proclamation of October 23, 1962, President 
Kennedy declared that: 
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•the United States is determined to prevent by 
whatever means may be necessary, including the 
use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba 
from extending, by force or the threat of force, 
its aggressive or subversive activities to any 
part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba 
the creation or use of an externally supported 
military capability endangering the security of 
the United States.• 
In this section of the proclamation, President Kennedy was 
in fact quoting a Joint Resolution of the Congress which had 
been passed only a few weeks before. 
Clearly, these goals have not been achieved. Since then, 
Cuba -- supplied, trained, ~nd supported by its Soviet mentors 
-- has grown into a power with major offensive capability, as 
outlined in the previous chapter. Propped up economically and 
militarily by the USSR, Cuba has been able to bankroll, train, 
advise, and participate in insurgent movements in Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and 
elsewhere in the hemisphere. 
Thus President Kennedy's vision of 1962 has given way to a 
vastly different reality in 1984. In 1962 the United States 
hoped that, by the exercise of American will and the projection 
of American strength, Cuba would be neutralized as a threat to 
Central and South America. More than twenty years later the 
threat is still there -- and in guises that are arguably more 
dangerous to the stability of the region than the IRBMs of the 
1960's. 
The United States has a clear interest in reducing Cuba's 
role as a surrogate for the soviet Union in the hemisphere. 
Yet because of their mutual dependence -- Cuba in gaining arms, 
economic aid, and diplomatic support: the soviet Union in 
gaining greater access to the region -- it is not likely that 
the United States will be able to separate Moscow from Havana 
under present circumstances. As in the past, Moscow may at 
times seek to limit particular acts of Cuban adventurism within 
the region when such acts impose excessive risks, conflict with 
other Soviet objectives, or offer little opportunity. But 
Moscow is unlikely to be either able or willing to require Cuba 
to abandon its revolutionary principles and activity. 
Should Havana, for whatever reason, change its basic 
attitude ~nd be prepared for genuine coexistence with the 
United States, we, in turn, should be prepared to negotiate 
seriously. Such coexistence would have to involve an end to 
Cuban support for insurgency in Central America and promotion 
of revolutions elsewhere in the world. We, in turn, should 
then be prepared to live with Cuba and lift existing 
restrictions. 
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In the meantime, the United States has a dual task: to 
create those economic conditions in Central America that thwart 
the export of revolutions and to make clear the risks of 
expanded violence. Social reform, economic advance and 
political stability in Central America will discourage Cuban 
adventurism in the region. But we must also bring home to 
Havana a due appreciation of the consequences of its actions. 
As for the Soviet Union, it has been pursuing a strategy of 
progressively greater involvement in the Western Hemisphere, 
particularly in reaching beyond Cuba to Central America and the 
Caribbean. It has employed gradualism, ambiguity, and 
proxies. For Moscow, this strategy has entailed few risks, 
either military or political; except in the case of Cuba, it 
has been inexpensive; and it has held the potential for 
significant gains. soviet objectives, beginning with Cuba in 
the early 1960's, have been to end unchallenged u.s. 
pre-eminence within the hemisphere and possibly to see other 
•cubas• established, to divert u.s. attention and resources 
from other parts of the world that are of greater importance to 
Moscow, to complicate our relations with our West European 
allies, and to burnish the Sovi~t Union's image as a 
revolutionary state. 
Preserving u.s. interests in Central America and the 
Caribbean against the Soviet challenge will be a significant 
concern for years to come. We reject the proposition that the 
establishment of a Soviet military base in Central America is 
the sole, or even the major, threat to u.s. interests. Unless. 
current Cuban-Nicaraguan designs are checked, long before 
Moscow feels ready for such a move the turmoil in Central 
America will have reached a point of crisis that could not be 
contained in Central American dimensions. In designing a basic 
policy toward the region, we must make the Soviet Union 
understand the limits of its activity, especially before its 
practice hardens into precedent. Moscow must be forestalled 
from making gains that would give it major advantages either 
within the region or in wider aspects of East-West relations. 
Excluding soviet involvement in Central America altogether 
-- extending to trade, diplomatic relations, and the gaining of 
some influence in individual countries -- is no doubt 
impossible. At the other extreme, clearly any Soviet 
involvement in the region that poses a strategic threat to the 
United States is unacceptable. The policy questions are, 
first, to decide at what point between these two extremes of 
Soviet involvement the balance point of u.s. interests lies; 
and second, to take those actions necessary to preserve those 
interests. 
The United States cannot accept soviet military engagement 
in Central America and the Caribbean beyond what we reluctantly 
tolerate in Cuba. 
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We will also need to define specific situations as 
precisely as possible and to make those definitions clear to 
Moscow. At the same time we must avoid the inference that 
Soviet actions we have not proscribed are thus acceptable to 
us. If we do challenge directly any particular Soviet military 
activity in the region, we must be prepared to prevail. 
On the other hand, some soviet involvement in Central 
America and the Caribbean is likely to fall into grey areas. 
Except where a Soviet position of dom~nance is either imposed 
or preserved through force of arms, Moscow depends for its 
opportunities on conditions both within the region and within 
individual countries. Where political, social and economic 
programs forestall violent revolution, Soviet ability to fish 
in troubled waters is severely limited. Where we can agree 
with countries in Latin America that soviet actions pose a 
threat to hemispheric interests, we can share leadership in 
opposing those actions. Where countries of the region can 
agree on mutual security and the pooling of benefits, 
collective actions can reduce Soviet opportunities. 
Against this backdrop, the Commission see~ little promise 
in negotiating with the Soviet Union over Central America. The 
Soviets would almost certainly use negotiations to legitimize 
their presence in the region. They would welcome discussion 
about superpower spheres of influence, which would prompt 
Soviet assertions of primacy and the need for u.s. abstention 
on the Soviet periphery, in such places as Eastern Europe and 
Afghanistan. For the United States, however, such a concept of 
spheres of influence is unacceptable. Should the United States 
now accept. that concept, the soviet Union would reap 
substantial gains. 
In sum, the United States cannot eliminate all soviet 
political involvement and influence within Central America and 
the Caribbean. But we must curb soviet military activity in 
the hemisphere. And we can reduce Soviet opportunities and 
increase the incentives for others to abstain from forging ties 
with Moscow that damage u.s. and regional interests. 
Western Europe 
In developing a basic strategy toward Central America, we 
also need to take into account the policies and interests of 
our West European allies. Spain has important historical, 
cultural and economic ties to the region. Other European 
countries have modest economic concerns in the region and only 
occasional residual involvements, such as the British military 
presence in Belize. But none of them has vital stakes in the 
Western Hemisphere. 
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Their fundamental interest derives from our own, and it is 
not inconsiderable. As was seen in the previous chapter, the 
ability of the United States to fulfill its commitments to the 
Western Alliance would be adversely affected by developments in 
Central America that threatened the security of the Caribbean 
sea lanes (through which Europe would be resupplied in the 
event of a crisis) or that required a redeployment of u.s. 
forces to protect interests in this hemisphere. The European 
security interest in Central America is thus significant, even 
if it is indirect. 
Unfortunately, this interest is not always well-appreciated 
in Europe. some European governments and political 
organizations have taken actions inimical to u.s. -- and 
indeed, to European -- security, such as supporting the 
Sandinista government or the Salvadoran insurgents. At the 
same time, some European governments have shown understanding 
of the difficult problems facing the United States in Central 
America. 
The differences between the United states and Europe over 
Central America have diverse causes. In part they derive from 
differing views concerning the management of East-West and 
North-South relations. In addition, some Europeans see 
domestic political advantage in distancing themselves from us 
on issues in this hemisphere. In some instances, there is also 
political solidarity with revolutionary forces in the region. 
Recently, allied expressions concerning Central America 
have been muted. This is partly due to a growing, though still 
inadequate, awareness by our allies that this region is of 
great political and security concern to the United States and 
therefore to themselves as well. They also are beginning to 
see that while there are some advantages in disassociation from 
u.s. policy in Central America, there are also costs in public 
disagreement with us. Not least, their recent restraint is 
also due to the increasingly widespread awareness in Europe 
that the Sandinistas have betrayed their revolution and 
threaten their neighbors. 
The United States obviously cannot grant our European 
allies a veto over our policy decisions on Central America. At 
the same time, it is important that we regularly discuss our 
policies with them, and also discuss with them the rationale 
and factual basis for such policies. We should seek their 
political and diplomatic support where this is possible, and 
their restraint where it is not. We should strongly discourage 
their aiding the Sandinista regime, until it fundamentally 
changes course. And we should encourage their economic 
involvement in the region to help promote politirial, economic 
and social reform, both bilaterally and through multilateral 
institutions. 
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The Broader Efforts 
The prospects for security and progress in Central America 
will turn on the efforts both of the nations of the region and 
of the United States. For the longer term, the primary 
emphasis must be upon the progressive reform of societies, the 
strengthening of political processes, and the improvement of 
economic conditions. To embrace these goals and provide the 
needed resources will not by itself assure security and 
progress. But without these broader efforts, no diplomatic 
strategy can be successful or endure. 
There are no easy answers for the United States in Central 
America. There will be no early end to our domestic debate 
about the best course to follow. We must, nevertheless, 
vigorously pursue diplomatic and political approaches --
together with the other strands of our policy -- to foster a 
regional framework for security, peace, development and 
democracy. 
/ 
Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
We have concluded this exercise persuaded that Central 
America is both vital and vulnerable, and that whatever other 
crises may arise to claim the nation's attention the United 
States cannot afford to turn away from that threatened region. 
Central America's crisis is our crisis. 
All too frequently, wars and threats of wars are what draw 
attention to one part of the world or another. So it has been 
in Central America. The military crisis there captured our 
attention, but in doing so it has also-wakened us to many other 
needs of the region. However belatedly, it did •concentrate 
the mind.• 
In the case of this Commission, one effect of concentrating 
the mind has been to clarify the picture we had of the nations 
of Central America. It is a common failing to see other 
nations as caricatures rather than as portraits, exaggerating 
one or two characteristics and losing sight of the subtler 
nuances on which so much of human experience centers. As we 
have studied these nations, we have become sharply aware of how 
great a mistake it would be to view them in one-dimensional 
terms. An exceptionally complex interplay of forces has shaped 
their history and continues to define their identities and to 
affect their destinies. 
we have developed a great sympathy for those in Central 
America who are struggling to control those forces, and to 
bring their countries successfully through this period of 
political and social transformation. As a region, Central 
America is in mid-passage from the predominantly authoritarian 
patterns of the past to what can, with determination, with 
help, with luck, and with peace, become the predominantly 
democratic pluralism of the future. That transformation has 
been troubled, seldom smooth, and sometimes violent. In 
Nicaragua, we have seen the tragedy of a revolution betrayed; 
the same forces that stamped out the beginnings of democracy in 
Nicaragua now threaten El Salvador. In El Salvador itself, 
those seeking to establish democratic institutions are beset by 
violence from the extremists on both sides. But the spirit of 
freedom is strong throughout the region, and the determination 
persists to strengthen it where it exists and to achieve it 
where it does not. 
The use of Nicaragua as a base for Soviet and Cuban efforts 
to penetrate the rest of the Central American isthmus, with El 
Salvador the target of first opportunity, gives the conflict 
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there a major strategic dimension. The direct involvement of 
aggressive external forces makes it a challenge to the system 
of hemispheric security, and, quite specifically, to the 
security interests of the United States. This is a challenge 
to which the United States must respond. 
But beyond this, we are chal lenged to respond to the urgent 
human needs of the people of Central America. Central America 
is a region in crisis economical ly, socially and politically. 
Its nations are our neighbors, a nd they need our help. This is 
one of those instances in which the requirements of national 
interest and the commands of conscience coincide. 
Through the years, there has been a sort of natural 
progression in this nation's ties with other parts of the 
world. At first they were almos t exclusively with Europe. 
Then, without diminishing those ties with Europe, we expanded 
our trans-Pacific bonds. Now the crisis in Central America has 
served as a vivid reminder that we need to strengthen our ties 
to the south, as well as east and west. 
Our response to the present cris is in Centr al America must 
not be a passing phenomenon. The Un ited States was born of a 
vision, which has inspired the world for two c e nturies. Tha t 
vision shines most brightly when it is shared. Just as we want 
freedom for ourselves, we want freedom for othe rs. Just as we 
cherish our vision, we should e ncourage o thers to pursue the ir 
own. But in fact, what we want for ourselves i s very largely 
what the people of Central America want for themselves. They · 
do share the vision of the future that our ideals represent, 
and the time has come for us to help them not just to aspire to 
that vision, but to participate in it. 
Our task now, as a nation, is to transform the crisis in 
Central America into an opport~nity: to seize the impetus it 
provides, and to use this to h elp our neighbors not only to 
secure their freedom from aggression and violence, but also to 
set in place the policies, processes arid institutions that will 
make them both prosperous and free. If, together, we succeed 
in this, then the sponsors of violence will have done the 
opposite of what they intended: they will have roused us not 
only to turn back the tide of totalitarianism but to bring a 
new birth of hope and of opportunity to the people of Central 
America. 
Because this is our opportunity, in conscience it is also 
our responsibility. 
NOTES BY INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS 
(Where these notes are addressed to specific issues in the 
Commission report, brackets indicate the pages of the report on 
which that issue is discussed.) 
Henry G. Cisneros 
The Commission report is a major contribution to u.s. 
thinki ng about its relations with the nations and peoples of 
Central America. I am in support of the vast majority of 
recommendat ions in the Commission report. There are however 
several fundamental issues which in my opinion require the 
statement of an alternate view. The following notes are my 
views on the issues discussed in Chapter 7, The Search for 
Peace. 
[pp. 111-112] Strong steps must be taken to convince 
FDR/FMLN moderates with backgrounds of peaceful political 
struggle to take part in discussions concerning participation 
in a security task force to arrange security provisions for all 
participants on election processes. Many elements of the FDR, 
especially Social and Christian Democrats, actively contended 
for political power in elections as legal parties during the 
1970's and their UNO coalition (which included both parties) 
ran Jose Napoleon Duarte and Guillermo Ungo as the 
presidential-vice presidential ticket in 1972 and won. It is 
important to note that a military coup prevented Duarte from 
taking office, that electorul fr aud denied another UNO 
coalition ticket its rightful presidential victory in 1977, and 
that representatives of major FDR components, including Mr. 
Ungo, took part in the October 1979 reform junta strongly 
supported by the United States. Violence should be ended by 
all parties so that mutually satisfactory arrangements can be 
developed among the government, progovernment parties, and 
opposition groups for periods of campaigning and elections. As 
part of such security arrangements the Salvadoran security 
forces and the guerrillas should agree to a complete cease fire 
and cessation of hostilities. Such discussions on the details 
of security a~rangements and election matters are intended to 
determine the exten~ to which meaningful dialogue on coalition 
approaches and structural reforms can proceed. 
[pp. 115-116] Nicaragua in October .announced initatives 
that suggest some possibilities for movement on negotiations 
concerning key aspects of relations among the countries in the 
region. More recently, Managua has taken other actions which 
should. be encouraged to further internal conciliation. The 
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Sandinista regime should be encouraged to intensify dialogue 
with the hierarchy of the Nicaraguan Catholic Church, the 
private sector, and the opposition parties~ expand its offer of 
amnesty for anti-Sandinista rebels; introduce details of 
legislation to permit the free functioning of political parties 
and the promise of elections in 1985; eliminate censorship of 
the press; fulfill its recent promises to the opposition 
newspaper La Prensa to acquire n ewsprint; and reduce the 
numbers ofiCuban advisers and Sa lvadoran rebel elements from 
Nicaragua. I believe further accommodation by the Nicaraguan 
regime to its internal opposition and to its neighbors can be 
encouraged through vigorous diplomacy by the United States. 
The United States should raise the standing of efforts to 
engage in diplomacy with Nicaragua as the most immediately 
hopeful means toward peaceful resolution of differences. 
The United States should suspend "covert" aid to the 
anti-Sandinista rebels. The period for aid suspension should 
be through the year 1985 so that the Sandinista government can 
demonstrate its capacity to move toward p luralism a nd t o 
fulfill its promise to hold free and fair elections in 1985. 
Such a step is intended to be matched by significant movement 
on the part of the Nicaraguan government to change policies 
which have aroused apprehension among its regional neighbors 
and is intended to reduce the r isk of war between Nicaragua and 
Honduras. Success in changing Ni caraguan policies on external 
advisers, aid to Salvadoran insurgents, and the level of their 
military build-up should diminish the need for large increases 
in U.S. military aid to Honduras and El Salvador. 
William P. Clements, Jr. 
[pp. 107-108] I became convinced from the Commission's 
examination of the 1962 Kennedy-Khruschev exchanges that those 
exchanges did not produce a meeting of the minds. I also 
believe that our policies since then have too often placed 
undue reliance on those exchanges as though they were a 
comprehensive agreement governing all aspects of u.s.-Cuban 
relations. I am convinced that there was no understanding or 
agreement. 
Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro 
As the introduction to this report wisely indicates, no 
document crafted by twelve persons will be completely 
satisfactory to each of them. While proud to associate myself 
with our report, I must go beyond that introductory caveat and 
register two points of fundamental disagreement. 
[pp. 115-116] I believe that the type of covert support 
given by the United States government to Nicaraguan insurgents 
on balance hurts the chances of reaching the goal of a truly 
democratic Nicaragua. The net effect of such support is more 
-130-
likely to strengthen the most extremist sectors of the 
Sandinista leadership, and to allow them to claim patriotric 
motivation for bringing Nicaragua into closer military alliance 
with Cuba and the USSR. u.s. support to some insurgents is 
used by Managua to brand all di ssidents as pawns of a foreign 
power, eroding the legitimacy o f dissidence within Nicaragua, 
especially among the nationalis tic youth, while giving Managua 
a handy excuse for economic fai lures and further political 
repression. The possibility of accidental war along the 
Nicaraguan northern border is a lso increased by these covert 
operations. Thus, rather than creating pressures for 
negotiations, U.S. support to Nicaraguan insurgents has made 
successful negotiations less likely. Under present 
circumstances, u.s. support to Nicaraguan democrats, if 
requested, should be overt and channelled primarily via the 
newly created Democracy Endowment and similar mechanisms. 
[p. 55] In another crucial area, the timidity of the 
report in recommending a further opening of the u.s. market to 
Central American exports sharply contrasts with statements 
about the strategic importance of that region to the u.s. I 
believe that, under foreseeable circumstances, the most 
effective single policy for advancing long-term u.s. strategic 
interests in Central America would be to offer complete and 
unimpeded access to the United States market to exports from 
Central American countries joining the Development 
Organizations proposed in the report. Even with generous 
adjustment assistance to displaced u.s. workers and 
entrepreneurs, which I would favor, this policy would remain 
more cost-effective, over the long run, than direct economic 
and military aid. 
Henry A. Kissinger 
Nicholas F. Brady 
John Silber 
[p. 102] We strongly endorse the objectives of the 
conditionality clause. We are also convinced that the United 
States extends military assistance to El Salvador above all to 
serve vital American political and security interests. We hope 
that both goals can be served simultaneously. We wish to 
record our strong view that neither the Congress nor the 
Executive Branch interpret conditionality in a manner that 
leads to a Marxist-Leninist victory in El Salvador, thereby 
damaging vital American interests and risking a larger war. 
Robert s. Strauss 
This report of the National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America reflects valuable work done over the past 
months. The report provides the basis for continuing national 
debate about the best course for u.s. policy towards Central 
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America in the years ahead. Its basic thrust is sound: that 
fundamental u.s. interests are a t stake in Central America; 
that we must continue to be deeply engaged; that we need to 
develop a basic strategy that includes diplomatic, economic, 
and military elements; and that, to be sustainable, any u.s. 
approach must first earn and then command broad bipartisan 
support. 
I file this note not in dissent to the report but because 
in my view in many Central American countries the creation 
and/or preservation of pluralistic government depends as much 
or more on a basic restructuring of internal political and 
social institutions as on military assistance. My concern is 
that this report, while not saying otherwise, might incorrectly 
be interpreted to the contrary. 
[p. 102] 
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conclusions 
background, 
the Central 
William B. Walsh 
I am proud to have been a member of this 
The report represents the objective and serious 
of twelve members of diverse social and political 
whose prime concern was to suggest solutions for 
American problem in an atmosphere of peace. 
It is my feeling that conditionality must apply equally to 
all nations in the region. The proper revulsion with the 
activities of the "death squads" in El Salvador may give the 
reader the impression in this document that more severe 
restrictions have been placed upon that nation in qualifying 
for increased assistance than upon any other. 
It is appropriate to recall that El Salvador has had a 
democratic election participated in by 80 percent of its 
population. More significantly, a second election is scheduled 
to be held on March 25, which will doubtless have the same 
media attention and international supervision as did the last 
election. Trade unions are functioning and poli tical parties 
are permitted freedom of association and ass embly with highly 
diverse views and actually participating in the electoral 
process. Concrete steps in response to demands by the Reagan 
Administration have been taken to reduce the activity of the 
death squads and to discipline those responsible for this 
activity. Participation of the extreme left has been invited 
in both the activities of the electoral commission and the 
political process. The left has rejected this opportunity in 
part because of fear, but primarily becaus e of their belief 
they cannot win and because 6f their dedi cation to a military 
victory. No group dedicated to a Leninis t philosophy can 
realistically be expected to participate in an electoral 
process which they cannot control. History is replete with the 
evidence for such a conclusion. 
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The government of El Salvador has a way to go -- but the 
process has begun. Such progress should be acknowledged and 
encouraged, and must be taken i nto account in applying 
conditions for the provision of military aid. Pluralism in the 
electoral process, personal freedom, and individual dignity are 
equally important in all nations in the region. Progress 
towards these objectives applies to all equally as a precedent 
for assistance. 
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